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Abstract 
This thesis considers the effects the private exercise of coercive violence on the modern 
nation-state through an examination of the increasing prevalence of Private Military and Security 
Contractors. It studies the practical implications of the privatisation of violence for Domestic and 
International Law and seeks to propose an original typological framework for the classification and 
regulation of PMSCs. 
 
This thesis begins by examining the historical relationship between coercive violence and 
maintenance of power/authority from the perspective of the Westphalian Sovereignty and the 
resulting state-centric international legal regime. It considers how the ‘violence-power’ relationship 
has historically been conceptualised through social contract and ‘force of law’ theories and the 
limitations these suffer in relation to PMSCs. Specific focus is given to the manner in which existing 
theories have tended towards viewing violence either as an instrument of power or, as a public good 
and the corresponding implications of the commodification and globalisation of violence. The 
study, therefore, seeks to develop an original conceptual framework on the nature of coercive 
violence. This conceptual framework draws upon a body of work built around the theoretical 
critiques of violence undertaken by Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, allowing the study a 
unique perspective to analyse the relationship between private violence and governmental 
power/authority 
 
Utilising this conceptual underpinning, this thesis investigates the political and economic 
factors instrumental in the growth of PMSC activity, considering the expansion of globalisation and 
neo-liberalism and the corresponding weakening of the nation-state. To highlight the increasing 
diversity of private actors, the research presents three case studies into the globalisation of coercive 
violence within national security assemblages namely; Peru, Nigeria and Afghanistan. These case 
studies first examine the social and political climate in which the growth of private coercive 
x 
 
violence developed and identify key security concerns which have affected these areas. Each case 
studies identifies the legal regulation of PMSCs in the State to understand both how States have 
sought to limit the proliferation of private violence and understand the difficulties these States have 
encountered in applying or enforcing these regulations. 
 
Drawing upon these case studies, the thesis critically analyses the current attempts to 
regulate and establish accountability for PMSCs through either domestic or state-centric 
international Law noting the inherent difficulties within these. It considers how effectively the 
Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Contractors are 
able to regulate the activities of PMSCs before analysing the effectiveness of the international legal 
regime in regulating PMSCs with a focus on the doctrine of State Responsibility. This notes the 
inherent difficulties in establishing effective regulatory frameworks and particularly the arbitrary 
distinctions drawn within these regulations 
 
Finally, considering both the practical and theoretical issues identified throughout the 
research the thesis looks to create an original typological approach to identifying and classifying 
PMSCs. This approach examines stakeholder relationships and power structures to produce a 
framework for the classification of PMSC activity and extrapolates trends and features with 
emphasis on democratic accountability and human rights. The thesis proposes the suitability of this 
system as a framework for legal regulation in a manner capable of addressing the intricacies and 
difficulties posed by PMSCs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
General Theme of Enquiry 
This thesis seeks to examine the position and role of coercive violence and fully consider 
the implications of the increasing prevalence of private coercive violence within the international 
legal regime. It seeks to provide a conceptual framework for the growth and proliferation of Private 
Military and Security Contractors as a foundation for a greater understanding of their implications 
for the modern nation-state and propose a unique solution to some of the difficulties posed by the 
changes within state structures and legal systems. Specifically, this thesis considers the need to re-
examine the relationship between the nation-state, the exercise of coercive violence and conceptions 
of sovereign power. In this way, the thesis provides a conceptual and practical foundation through 
which the increasing prevalence of private violence can be critiqued in a practical and effective 
manner.  
 
Understanding the Importance of the Investigation 
A full examination of the importance of private coercive violence within the modern state 
is desirable for a number of reasons as Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) become 
an increasingly central and legitimate figure within the modern global security landscape. While 
estimates of the value of the industry vary widely they are generally considered to exceed the £500 
billion,1 with an annual growth rate of over 5%. Included within this is almost half of the entire US 
Intelligence Agency budget2 as well as a large proportion of both the American and UK’s Defence 
                                                     
1  Arjun Sethi, ‘Military Contracting: Our New Corporate Warriors’ The Guardian (London, 23 January 2013) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/23/military-contracting-corporate-mercenaries> accessed 13 
December 2014. 
2  L Elaine Halchin, ‘The Intelligence Community and Its Use of Contractors: Congressional Oversight Issues’ 
(Congressional Research Office, 18 August 2015) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R44157.pdf> accessed 17 May 2016. 
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Department budgets.3 More recently, however, an increasing proportion of this business is coming 
from the private sector. It is estimated that Shell spends over $120 million on security for its 
Nigerian operations each year4 while the PMSC G4S is currently the world’s second largest private 
employer with over 600,000 employees working in 125 nations.5  Furthermore, much as their 
original growth coincided with the end of the Cold War and the corresponding downsizing of 
standing armies, it is suggested that evolving security threats and reductions in large-scale military 
activities may lead to a similar surge in the private security market6. The growth in non-traditional, 
asymmetric conflict has led to an increasing reliance upon non-traditional security with private 
actors playing a central role in fulfilling the security needs of both public and private organisations. 
The ability and need for companies to quickly transfer operations, equipment and personnel across 
the globe has created a situation in which actors increasingly require uniform security services, a 
situation the States involved are incapable of providing. A 2011 study found PMSCs operative in 
28 of the 32 states that have “collapsed”.7 Finally, PMSCs are increasingly blurring the line between 
security and military operations and in two of the most notable examples of this, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, PMSCs have at times represented the largest foreign contingents.8 Overall, private 
security is believed to outnumber public security in at least 40 nations around the world. 9 
                                                     
3 Simon Chesterman, ‘We Can't Spy … If We Can't Buy!’: The Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing 
‘Inherently Governmental Functions’ (2008) 19(5) European Journal of International Law 1055; Casper Alexander 
Daugaard, ‘Blackwater And Private Military Contractors’ (2012) The Yale Review of International Studies 
<http://yris.yira.org/essays/707> accessed 13 December 2014. 
4 Afua Hirsch & John Vidal, ‘Shell Spending Millions Of Dollars On Security In Nigeria, Leaked Data Shows’ The 
Guardian (London, 19 August 2012) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/19/shell-spending-security-
nigeria-leak> accessed 13 December 2014. 
5 ‘Who We Are’ (G4S)  <http://www.g4s.com/en/Who%20we%20are/> accessed 16 December 2014. 
6  Eberhard Kienle, ‘The Security Implications of the Arab Spring’ (Geneva Papers, 2013_ < 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/160196/GCSP_RS_10.pdf> accessed 14 May 2017; David Isenberg, ‘The Ferengi Rules of 
Acquisition: PMSC and the Arab Spring’ Huffington Post, (New York, 2012) < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-
isenberg/ferengi-rules-of-acquisition_b_1830366.html> accessed 14 May 2017. 
7 Željko Branović, ‘The Privatisation of Security in Failing States: A Quantitative Assessment’ (Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces Occasional Paper - No 24) 26 
<http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/think_tanks/dcaf_branovic_the_privatisation_of_security_in_fa
iling_states.pdf.> accessed 16 May 2016 (Collapsed states were defined by having suffered one of the four major events 
identified by the Political Instability Task Force namely; revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime change and 
genocides and politicides). 
8 Moshe Schwartz & Jennifer Church, ‘Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: 
Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress’ (Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2013) Table A-1, Table A-2 
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43074.pdf> accessed 16 May 2016. 
9 Claire Provost, ‘The Industry of Inequality: Why the World is Obsessed with Private Security’ The Guardian (London, 
12 May 2017) < https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/may/12/industry-of-inequality-why-world-is-obsessed-
with-private-security> accessed 14 May 2017. 
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Considering this, there is a growing consensus that the private actors are not only now legitimate, 
but increasingly necessary within the global security sector. 
 
In light of the increasing range and variation within modern security providers, this thesis 
proposes that an examination of the role of coercive violence within societies is necessary to fully 
understand the implications of the increasingly diverse provision of security. This requires an 
understanding of their function in both privatising and externalising violence from communities, 
with reference to the historical relationship between violence, power and governance. In particular, 
this must recognise that the ability to exercise coercive violence has historically been viewed as the 
basis of the sovereign power of states.10 Max Weber’s proposition that the state is he who “lays 
claim to the monopoly on legitimate physical violence”11 has persisted as the basis of the majority 
of academic discussion regarding the foundation of the nation-state, and the relationship between 
violence and power. PMSCs however, have the ability to fundamentally alter this relationship. The 
exercise of coercive violence for financial reward alone represents a divergence from the 
assumption that it constitutes an integral aspect of the internal power structures within a political 
community. From this point of view, the use of force by PMSCs should not be viewed through the 
prism of the exercise of legitimate power. This thesis, therefore, proposes that a new form of 
dialogue must be devised to consider the issues that arise with their proliferation.  
 
Furthermore, these changes pose significant challenges to established forms of 
accountability and justice with PMSCs increasingly undertaking roles that place them in a position 
to exercise coercive violence in a manner historically occupied by state entities. Consequently, they 
are also increasingly in positions to directly impact individuals and groups, in a manner 
                                                     
10 For more in depth examinations of this see Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall (eds.)Power in Global Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008); Anna Leader, ‘Globalisation and the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of 
Force’ (2004) Political Science Publications 1, 4.; Rodney Hall & Thomas Biersteker (eds.,) The Emergence of Private 
Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
11 ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills trs. and eds., Oxford 
University Press, 1946). 
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unforeseeable during the establishment of modern international law and specifically international 
human rights regime. This is particularly troubling when they do so acting on behalf of parties 
directly responsible for the implementation and safeguarding of these rights, and the sole bearers 
of legal responsibilities under these international regimes.12 For this reason, this thesis considers it 
necessary to re-evaluate these mechanisms in the context in which PMSCs now operate. This 
requires considering the effectiveness of these approaches to the divergent factual circumstances in 
which they are applicable and thereafter considering alternative approaches better able to serve this 
purpose. Central to this is an appreciation that modern PMSCs operate in such disparate conditions 
and activities that attempts to examine or discuss them as a homogenous group are not capable of 
dealing with these complexities. While individual incidences have attracted academic attention, 
attempts to extrapolate trends from these suffer from over-generalisation.13 Therefore, this thesis 
considers that accurately and effectively examining the proliferation of PMSCs encompasses a 
foundational need for classification, capable of accurately and concisely categorising PMSCs with 
reference to the specific circumstances involved. 
 
Gaps in the Current Research 
Considering the significant presence of PMSCs throughout global security assemblages, it 
is unsurprising that they have attracted significant academic and journalistic attention. Despite this, 
however, there exists a significant lacuna within the current legal analysis and published work that 
this study seeks to fill. Specifically, despite the exponential growth of PMSCs in both size and 
activities, much of the academic and political dialogue relating to them has focussed on a limited 
set of circumstances in which they operate. As a result, the current body of work on PMSCs 
overwhelmingly falls into a number of categories with regards to their approach to studying PMSCs.  
                                                     
12 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) (noting “the state parties to the present Covenant” and the “obligation of States under the 
Charter of the United Nations”); Alan Bryden & Marina Caparini, Private Actors and Security Governance (Springer, 
2007) 288-9 (For a consideration of the difficulties posed by “mercenarism and private security and military services in 
the framework of security governance”). 
13 The events of Nissour Square in Iraq have been repeatedly examined, however, they are largely unrepresentative of the 
many DOD contractors who worked in Iraq.  
5 
 
Illicit Actors 
The first approach, that many examinations of PMSCs have adopted, is to begin from the 
premise that their mere existence represents the exercise of violence and power that more properly 
belongs to the state and is thus illegitimate, and illicit. Thus, for example, Hall and Biersteker’s 
examination of PMSCs in The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance, is limited to 
concluding that the authority of PMSCs should be classed alongside that of mafias and 
mercenaries.14 Similarly, the recent report by the NGO War On Want, Return the Dogs of War 
approaches the use of PMSCs via the language of mercenaries, presenting them as illicit actors.15  
This approach has been particularly prevalent in relation to the use of PMSCs in developing nations, 
with the actions of Executive Outcomes and Sandline International continuing to influence modern 
views.16  
 
Military Contractors 
Second among these approaches, in particular since the emergence of Blackwater in Iraq, 
there remains an overarching tendency to discuss PMSCs and the privatisation of security, within 
the context of warfare.17 P.W. Singer’s Corporate Warriors18 and Robert Mandel’s Armies Without 
States19  stand out within this field and have undertaken extensive quantitative and qualitative 
investigations into both the actions of, and potential issues with, PMSCs. In comparison, works 
from Jeremy Scahill and Robert Pelton represent studies more limited in scope, though more 
                                                     
14 Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker (n 10).   
15 ‘Mercenaries Unleashed: The Brave New World of Private Military and Security Contractors’ (War on Want, 2016) < 
http://www.waronwant.org/sites/default/files/Mercenaries%20Unleashed%2C%202016.pdf> accessed 20 May 2017. 
16 See e.g. Fabien Mathieu and Nick Dearden, ‘Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of Private Military & Security 
Companies’ (2007) 34(114) Review of African Political Economy 744; MH Foaleng, ‘Private Military and Security 
Companies and the Nexus Between Natural Resources and Civil Wars in Africa’ (2007) 139 Institute of Security Studies 
Monographs 176.  
17 Among the many excellent works on PMSCs within warzones see generally Sean McFate, The Modern Mercenary: 
Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order (Oxford University Press, 2015); Bruce E Stanley, Outsourcing 
Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy (Potomac Books, 2015); P.W. Singer, Corporate 
Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell Press, 2007); James Jay Carafano, Private Sector, Public 
Wars: Contractors in Combat - Afghanistan, Iraq, and Future Conflicts (Praeger Publishing, 2008) 
18 P.W Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Private Military Industry (Cornell Press, 2007). 
19 Robert Mandel, Armies Without States: The Privatisation of Security (Reinner Press, 2002). 
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detailed, relating to specific examples of PMSCs and their use during the War on Terror. Scahill’s 
Blackwater,20 provides not only a detailed account of the actions of Blackwater during the Iraq war 
but more importantly, the political negotiations and financial motivations behind the employment 
of contractors.21 Similarly, Pelton’s Licensed to Kill,22 notes many of the financial motivations 
behind the rise of PMSCs.  
 
Works within this approach overwhelmingly examine the increasing use of PMSCs by 
western governments, primarily the US and UK, in order to undertake politically inexpedient 
actions or undertake foreign interventions in the face of “continued reluctance by the international 
community to intervene”23 and potentially circumvent governmental checks and balances within 
democratic governance.24  Both Singer and Mandel specifically cite the lack of Congressional 
oversight in the deployment of PMSCs by the US during the war on drugs, suggesting that despite 
the importance of their role their use has been hidden from public scrutiny.25 American PMSCs 
working with governments, who would normally be ineligible for US military aid due to “extensive 
allegations of human rights abuses”,26 have attracted attention from the perspective of undermining 
American democratic processes and foreign policy.27 Crucially, however, these fail to examine the 
effects on the host nation populations with no consideration given to how external actors may affect 
the democratic processes within host countries. The potential effects of PMSCs in these 
circumstances can be seen in the differing outcomes of the Arab Spring. In Egypt the citizen army 
ultimately refused to comply with orders to open fire on protestors turning the tide in the 
revolution,28 whereas in comparison, the UAE finance and employ a notable subsidiary of the firm 
                                                     
20 Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (Serpents Tail, 2008). 
21 Ibid.  
22 Robert Young Pelton, Licensed To Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (Penguin, 2006). 
23 Mandel (n 19) at 16; Singer (n 18) at 129 (both authors cite the actions of MPRI in Bosnia and the role of DynCorp in 
Colombia.) 
24 Singer (n  18) at 215.  
25 Singer (n 18) at 220; Mandel (n 19) at 83. 
26 Singer (n 18) at 131, (discussing MPRI’s assistance to the Sri Lankan army) 
27 Ibid. 
28  Chris McGreal, ‘How Hosni Mubarak Misread his Military Men’ The Guardian (London, 12 February 2011) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/12/hosni-mubarak-misread-military-men>  accessed 23 December 2014. 
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previously known as Blackwater, which is responsible for a state security force, to quell the internal 
revolt.29 According to one source, this is made up solely of foreign non-Muslims to ensure there is 
no religious opposition to use of lethal force.30 As such, it is clear that there remains considerable 
scope for further discussion of PMSCs from a less US-centric approach.   
 
Doctrinal Legal Analysis  
 More recently, a range of exemplary legal analysis has sought to clarify the legal position 
of PMSCs under international law. Francesco Francioni’s edited collection31 addresses much of the 
previously existing gaps in legal analysis with a broad-ranging qualitative examination of PMSCs. 
Within this work, various authors propose a variety of regulatory possibilities, including both host 
states human rights regime and international business regulations based upon John Ruggie’s UN 
report.32 In the period since its publication a body of legal analysis has sought to further examine 
the applicability of existing legal regimes in establishing accountability for both contractors and 
their employers.33 These works have significantly reduced the opaqueness that has plagued the legal 
accountability of PMSCs since their emergence. As a result of this discourse there now exists a 
largely established understanding of the legal responsibilities of PMSCs and their employers under 
a range of legal regimes. Despite this, however, this thesis proposes that there remains scope for 
examination within this field. In particular, much of this work remains focussed on large-scale 
overtly military operations, with the use of PMSCs in Iraq continuing to dominate the discourse. 
Less attention has been paid to the effect that privatising even seemingly “civilian” tasks, may have 
                                                     
29 Mark Mazetti, ‘Blackwater Founder Force Set Up By Former Blackwater Founder’ New York Times (New York, 14 
May 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0> accessed 1 
January 2015. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Francesco Francioni & Natalino Ronzitti, (Eds.,) War by Contract; Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private 
Contractors (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
32 Ibid at 476.  
33 See e.g Nigel D. White, ‘Due Diligence Obligations of Conduct: Developing a Responsibility Regime for PMSCs 
(2012( 31(3) Criminal Justice Ethics 233; Jackson Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, ‘Private Military Companies & 
International Law: Building New Ladders of Legal Accountability & Responsibility’ (2009) 11 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 
99, 101; Antenor H. de Wolf, ‘Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War From the Perspective of International and 
Human Rights Law’, (2006)13 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 315; Chia Lehnardt, ‘Individual Liability of Private Military 
Personnel Under International Criminal Law’  (2008) 19 Eur. J. Of Int’l Law 1025. 
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in light of the increasing diversity of PMSC activities. Considering this, it is clear, despite the 
significant academic attention that PMSCs and the legal regimes have attracted, there remains both 
the scope and the necessity to consider the more nuanced and foundational effect that PMSCs have. 
Specifically, this requires examining not just the effects of privatising war, but how privatising 
violence in general can impact the structures that international law and politics often assume 
underpin discussions of power and sovereignty.  
 
Research Approach 
Research Question 
This thesis asks how the proliferation of PMSCs affects the relationship between the exercise of 
coercive violence and sovereign power and the practical implications of this for International Law 
and Human Rights. 
Research Aims 
• Examine the relationship between violence and power through an original theoretical lens 
in order to conceptualise the effects of the increasingly private provision of coercive 
violence. 
• Consider the extent to which the globalisation of coercive violence affects the legal position 
of both PMSCs and their employers.  
• Identify major variations in the manner in which PMSCs operate. 
Research Objectives 
• Critically analyse the ability of existing avenues to establish accountability and regulation 
within the PMSCs market. 
• Establish an effective classification system for the study of private security activities with 
reference to the theoretical approach adopted within this study.  
 
  
 
9 
 
Research Methods 
The thesis draws upon a combination of research methods in order to effectively examine 
PMSCs within the research framework established. Much of the research will be undertaken 
through an interpretivist approach, aiming to utilise pre-existing data and literature, re-examining 
and interpreting this within the theoretical framework outlined above. The thesis will specifically 
review data relating to the increasing use of PMSCs by MNCs for roles that State police or militaries 
would traditionally have undertaken. Through this interpretivist approach, it will seek to identify 
the contextual and time relative relationship between power and violence through focusing on the 
variables responsible for these changes. Furthermore, it will seek to utilise the knowledge of these 
variables in order to identify potential future trends and seek to examine the actors able to influence 
and manipulate these variables. The research will seek to understand the changing nature of power 
through the ability to exercise legitimate violence, not only by sovereign states but by a global 
hegemony of MNCs and transnational actors. Utilising this knowledge, the work will seek to 
understand the potential effects the changing nature of power. This will be combined with 
quantitative research to establish the prevalence of PMSCs internationally, and the proportion of 
those engaged in military, quasi-military or general security services. Due to transparency issues, 
various research avenues are combined to provide an overview including budgetary/shareholder 
documents of both PMSCs and MNCs and secondary sources.  
 
Alongside this, the thesis utilises doctrinal research34  to critically analyse the liability of 
PMSCs under international law. This will examine the content of PMSCs regulations, including 
both legal and voluntary agreements, and consider the basis and background for the implementation 
                                                     
34 Enrico Patarro, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer, 2005) 3 (Patarro describes 
doctrinal research as the foundation of legal research “There is one kind of legal research prominent in professional legal 
writings… that implements a specific legal method consisting in the systematic, analytically evaluative exposition of the 
substance of… law, etc… One may call this kind of exposition of the law “legal doctrine.”) 
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of these regulations. Furthermore, doctrinal analysis will be used to establish the legal approaches 
to PMSCs operate in a range of countries.  
 
Original Approach Adopted Within this Study 
 In order to complete these research aims; this thesis will undertake an original analysis of 
PMSCs combining two specific research approaches. The first of these is that the research will look 
to examine the historical relationship between coercive violence and maintenance of 
power/authority within the formation of the nation-state. This will provide the context needed to 
consider how the increased privatisation of coercive violence may affect the ability of states to 
operate in the manner necessary to fulfil their national and international obligations. This will 
require combining and synthesising a unique conceptual framework with a historiographical 
account of the relationship between violence and power drawing upon the theories of Walter 
Benjamin and Hannah Arendt in order to present a synthesised theory of violence. This study will 
look to utilise this theory in order to critically analyse the monopolisation of violence by the 
(European) state through the founding of Westphalian Sovereignty and the resulting state-centric 
international legal regime. This will seek to critically analyse the historical relationship between 
the capacity to monopolise legitimate violence, and the ability to exercise a form of power, or 
authority over a population or geographical area. Through combining these historical precedents 
and the conceptual framework the work will seek to extrapolate a unified and evidentiary theory as 
to the relationship between coercive violence and the governmental power. 
 
Parallel to this theoretical investigation, this thesis will seek to examine the application of 
potential avenues of accountability to PMSCs as an increasingly diverse range of actors. Using case 
studies to identify specific examples of the use of PMSCs the thesis will critically analyse the 
effectiveness of existing legal instruments for regulating and establishing accountability for 
PMSCs. Finally, building upon this foundation of knowledge and theory this study seeks to provide 
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a mechanism through which PMSCs can be accurately studied. Specifically, considering the range 
of variation within the actors exercising coercive violence, this thesis considers that in order to 
accurately and effectively examine the increased prevalence of PMSCs there is a more foundational 
need; namely that of classification. Therefore, this study seeks to present a classification criteria 
capable of identifying and grouping PMSC activity in a manner that addresses their role within 
local power structures and provides a grounding for future regulation, within the international legal 
system. Specifically, it aims to identify the criteria necessary for an accurate and comprehensive 
examination of PMSC activities, in a manner capable of identifying how the structural relationships 
that underpin their appropriation and exercise of violence interact with established concepts of 
power and effect mechanisms of accountability and governance. The assumption is that a 
classification that is nuanced towards the specificity of the circumstances, that permit PMSCs to 
operate and flourish, is a pre-requisite if focused and effective mechanisms of scrutiny and 
regulation are to exist. 
 
 
Thesis Structure 
In order to achieve these research outcomes, the study is split into six chapters. The first of 
these chapters looks to consider traditional understandings of violence within power structures. The 
study, therefore, begins by critiquing Hannah Arendt’s On Violence, discussing her interpretation 
of violence within the modern society. Specifically, it will draw upon her interpretations of the 
relationship between violence and power. The work will move on to consider Walter Benjamin’s 
Critique of Violence which takes a more philosophical approach to understanding the role of 
coercive violence within society. It will examine how Benjamin’s work has since been understood 
and interpreted by subsequent theorists most notably Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. These 
examinations will be formulated into a synthesised conceptual framework that will form the basis 
of this examination of the role of coercive violence within power structures and authority.  
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Having established this conceptual framework, Chapter Two will move on to scrutinise the 
historical position of violence within society, with a particular focus on understanding the 
development of the European nation-state. As such, it will briefly consider the early civilisations 
that played a central role in establishing European society namely, Egyptian, Greek and Roman 
considering how these societies organised coercive violence both internally and externally with 
particular reference to how this was related to the maintenance of their power structures. Beyond 
this, the study will focus more substantially on the role of violence during the enlightenment. This 
will first consider the competing political formations of city-states and empires in order to examine 
the reasons for the variation in the forms of societal violence. Beyond this, the study will examine 
both how and why the nation-state emerged as the preeminent entity within modern international 
law. It will consider how societal changes were central to the emergence of the national state, most 
notably the increasing importance of the Social Contract. It will examine how Social Contract 
theories fundamentally changed the relationship between the state and their citizens, regulating the 
role of coercive violence in controlling and exercising authority over the citizens. This examination 
will provide the foundation for an understanding of the role of the coercive violence as a central 
aspect of the relationship between a state and the citizens, and particularly of how the ability to both 
exercise, but also withhold, coercive violence is the foundation of legitimate power in comparison 
to pure forceful authority.  
 
Having identified the role of the nation-state in developing the perceived monopoly over 
violence Chapter Three will examine the conditions against which the growth of PMSCs has 
occurred. It will consider how changes within the structures and capabilities of states have 
established the environment in which private security has flourished. This includes identifying these 
factors both in terms of providing the supply of resources necessary and also the increasing demand 
for private security as a basis for an examination of the current security market. 
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Chapter Four of this study will be split into two separate sections. The first section will 
seek to examine the growth of modern private security and consider the role of the changing nature 
of statehood in this growth. This section will begin by examining the security landscape following 
the end of World War Two. From this point, it will examine the growth of private actors, 
considering the changing nature of statehood as a foundation for understanding the role of private 
actors in the traditional state preserve of coercive violence. This will include an examination of how 
traditional security industries have interacted with globalisation to form organisations capable of 
exercising coercive violence in increasingly widespread and influential manners. Thereafter, the 
study seeks to provide an in-depth examination of the causes behind the growth of PMSCs. This 
will include examining the growth of asymmetrical warfare and terrorism, the growth of 
supranational organisations and the prevalence of MNCs requiring security across the globe. The 
second section of Chapter Three will consist of three case studies which identify the difficulties 
posed by the broad variety of actors exercising coercive violence in a state. The section will begin 
by establishing the methodological approach utilised in the study. Having established this, the 
section will move on to discuss the three chosen case studies namely; Peru, Nigeria and 
Afghanistan. These case studies will proceed by first examining the social and political climate in 
which the growth of private coercive violence is being considered. Thereafter each case study will 
the identify specific security concerns which have affected these areas in order to provide a factual 
background for the security markets. Each of the case studies identifies the legal regulation of 
PMSCs in the State in order to understand both how States have sought to limit the proliferation of 
private violence and the difficulties they have encountered in applying or enforcing these 
regulations. The study identifies the types of actors present in each of these regions concentrating 
on identifying the key characteristics of the actors including the make-up of both the leaders/owners 
and employees and the type of employer likely to engage these actors. Finally, the study identifies 
notable examples of how these actors have affected the region they are employed in, particularly 
noting any credible allegations of human rights abuses, criminal activity or use of excessive 
violence.  
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Chapter Five of this thesis will examine the legal and regulatory framework in which 
PMSCs currently operate. It will examine the extent to which PMSCs and their employers can be 
held legally accountable under international law. It will examine the extent to which states retain 
legal obligations for PMSCs operating on their behalf, or in their territorial jurisdiction through the 
doctrine of state responsibility. Thereafter, it will consider the extent to which international criminal 
law is capable of holding those most responsible accountable in circumstances in which PMSCs are 
found to have committed serious breaches of international law. Finally, this section will identify 
the manner in which the international community has sought to address the growth of PMSCs 
through regulatory approaches. It will identify and examine the strengths and weaknesses of the 
various approaches including the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct of 
Private Security Providers.  
 
The final chapter of this thesis will present an original typology with the aim of providing 
an effective mechanism that can both facilitate further study and ground a regulatory framework. 
The study proceeds from an assumption that a degree of specificity in relation to the circumstances 
that permit PMSCs to operate and flourish is a pre-requisite if focused and effective mechanisms 
of scrutiny and regulation are to exist. On this basis, the classification seeks to identify the operative 
distinctions within PMSCs at a foundational level, in order to identify their ability to both directly 
affect human rights, and also the secondary impact their use may have for accountability and 
governance. This section, therefore, begins by identifying the variations within the form of coercive 
violence undertaken by the PMSC. Thereafter, the study considers the distinctions first within the 
identity of the group or individual employing the PMSC and thereafter the identity of those 
individuals employed by or acting on behalf of the PMSCs. Having established the framework for 
the typology, this study will seek to combine this framework with both the case studies and the 
conceptual framework in order to establish a series of classes of PMSCs. This section will aim to 
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provide both a specific but workable classification system capable of accurately capturing the 
operative distinctions and thereafter classifying PMSCs into similar types.  
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The Definition of Coercive Violence 
Before undertaking this study it is essential that work establishes a consistent definition of 
violence within which this study is situated. Specifically, within much of the existing literature, the 
term violence is simultaneously overused and under analysed, with the scope of potential activities 
covered by the term violence vast. The English term violence is particularly difficult within this 
framework of this study as it fails to consider the corresponding intent that motivated the violence. 
Examining Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Violence,35 it appears the German term Gewalt referring, 
instead to the use of force or violence in the pursuit of authority or power is much more instructive. 
It is this form of violence that this thesis seeks to consider, specifically the use, or even threat, of 
violence in a manner designed to coerce another’s actions. For the purpose of this thesis, the term 
“coercive violence” will be used to represent this form of violence. Whilst it is impossible to fully 
consider every form of coercive violence within a state, for the purpose of this research two specific 
forms are instructive. The first of these is that of internal coercive violence, utilised to compel the 
citizens of a state to act in accordance with the will of the sovereign. Alongside this, is external 
coercive violence, the provision of force necessary to protect the sovereign’s interests from external 
threats. In the modern state these two forms of coercive power are associated with the police and 
the military respectively, and it is the privatisation of the functions of these institutions that this 
work will consider.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
35 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’ in Reflections (Random House, 1995). 
17 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  
 
COERCIVE VIOLENCE AND SOVEREIGN 
POWER 
1 Introduction 
To fully understand the implications of the privatisation of violence through the use of 
PMSCs, it is necessary to understand the role of violence in the creation and maintenance of 
sovereign power and authority. The ability of sovereigns to exercise authority within their specific 
territory, both over the citizens of that state and against external threats, is an essential component 
of the Westphalian sovereignty that international law is based upon. As such, this research suggests 
that in order to understand the effect of PMSCs within international law, it is necessary to fully 
consider the foundational relationship between the provision of coercive violence and the exercise 
of sovereign power. 
 
This question has been considered and examined since the beginning of political theory and 
goes to the very foundation of law. This theory has been examined extensively within fields 
including social contract theory and more recently force of law theory and the sociology of law. 
Even before social contract theories were explicitly espoused and popularised in the sixteenth 
century the question as to the legitimate control, and use of, violence over the population remained 
a key political concern, both philosophically and practically. For millennia, the ability of sovereigns 
to raise armies or command an internal security force had provided a political tightrope, and on 
many occasions, failing at this balancing act was the impetus for revolutions.   
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1.1 Evidence from the Etymology 
 
Before even considering the historical and theoretical foundation of the relationship 
between coercive violence and power, simply considering the etymology of many of the words we 
commonly associate with the state security apparatus indicates a complex context. The term Police, 
used in modern states to describe a body impose the law and maintaining order, instead has a much 
more consensual foundation. Taken directly from a Middle French translation of the 
Latin politia, which is in turn the Latinisation of the Greek politeia the term originally denoted a 
combination of “citizenship, administration, civil polity.” 36  It is ostensibly derived from the 
word polis which describes nothing else but the city or more accurately the city-state. In ancient 
Greece, therefore, the word politeia represented the force of power mastered by the head of the state 
to ensure compliance with what had been voted into force.37 In comparison, the modern term soldier 
has an entirely apolitical heritage, with its military meaning being adopted relatively recently in the 
17th Century. Instead, soldier derives through the Middle English or Anglo-French word soudoer, 
from a combination of the words Sou, a term for the currency of the time and soldarius, which 
translates almost directly to ‘being in the pay of.’38 Meanwhile, the modern move away from the 
term Mercenary to Private Contractors, bears a striking resemblance to term Latin term Condottiero, 
the name of the military companies hired out by the Roman City States to conduct their wars, which 
traces its roots to the Latin term condotta for contract,39 and in Renaissance Italian came to mean 
literally contractor.  
 
                                                     
36 ‘Police’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017) < https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/police> accessed 4 July 
2015. 
37  ‘The Police in Ancient Greece’ (The Greek Reporter) <http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/05/30/the-police-in-
ancient-greece/> accessed 23 September 2016. 
38 ‘Soldier’ (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017) < https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/soldier> accessed 4 July 
2015. 
39 Singer (n 18) at 22. 
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Considering this, it is clear that this historical relationship between power and the exercise of 
violence goes to the very foundation of society, and it is as a result of the foundational importance 
of the control over violence that Weber formed the conclusion that the sovereign is he with the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. In order to fully understand the implications of the 
privatisation of violence, it is necessary to consider the foundational relationship of violence and 
power and acknowledge that the modern phenomenon of PMSCs represents a unique form of the 
exercise of coercive violence within the modern state. Whilst some literature has suggested that 
modern PMSCs are modern incarnations of powerful medieval mercenary armies or colonial 
trading companies, no similar entity has co-existed with either the concepts of self-determination 
or within the era of human rights. In examining the privatisation of coercive violence through the 
use of PMSCs therefore, it is important to note the unique context within which they operate. 
Considering this, it is important for this research to establish the conceptual framework through 
which study will examine and interpret the development and current use of PMSCs. 
 
1.2 Analysing the Role of Coercive Violence 
The starting point for this work is an analysis of the role and function of coercive violence 
as an independent concept. In doing so this section seeks to counteract the overarching narrative 
adopted within legal and political studies that consign coercive violence to a mere function of 
sovereign power. However, considering the unique nature of PMSCs, this research finds it 
necessary to establish and examine the position of coercive violence as a “phenomenon in its own 
right.” Only through this approach can the research accurately examine the role and position of 
PMSCs within modern legal regimes and governance structures. Examining coercive violence as a 
unique phenomenon will allow the thesis to more accurately analyse how private coercive violence 
interacts with traditional theoretical concepts of sovereign power and authority. Specifically, this 
understanding of the relationship between the exercise of coercive violence and power is important 
on two distinct levels.  
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The first of these is that the study utilises this conceptual framework of coercive violence 
as the basis for the interpretivist research undertaken throughout this work. Through developing a 
conceptual framework which identifies the specific role of coercive violence within sovereignty, 
the study will seek to re-interpret and understand historical changes and movements in a manner 
that provides a perspective through which to examine and critique PMSCs. Numerous studies have 
examined the historical position of mercenaries and similar organisations and sought to draw 
parallels to the modern position of PMSCs. However, this research proposes that through utilising 
a firm conceptual framework this historical data can be interpreted in a manner that allows 
conclusions to be extrapolated in order to reconceptualise the purpose and effects of PMSCs. 
Beyond simply drawing parallels based upon historical similarities, this approach allows the 
research to provide a detailed analysis of the role of coercive violence within power and governance 
in order to accurately study the implications of the increasing globalisation of violence. 
 
Secondly, at a more foundational level, this research argues that a comprehensive 
understanding of this concept is a fundamental requirement for any examination of law that 
questions the grounding of domestic and international legal regimes. Identifying the relationship 
between the capacity to exercise coercive violence, and the ability to exercise authority or govern 
are intrinsically linked. It has even been suggested that a questioning of the social role of coercive 
violence is a “questioning of the foundations of law, morality and politics”40 and therefore provides 
an essential insight into foundations of both the national and international legal regimes this work 
relies on for discussing PMSCs.  
 
In order to establish this theoretical framework, this section will first consider conventional 
theories of the foundations of law and sovereignty, proceeding from Max Weber’s ubiquitous 
definition of the nation-state. This will consider the position of coercive violence within these 
                                                     
40  Jacques Derrida, ‘The Force of Law’ in Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson (eds.) 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge, 1992) 234. 
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theories and particularly note the failure of these to distinguish coercive violence as a unique 
phenomenon, the result of which is that they fail adequately to explain many of the factual 
circumstances which arise. This research will particularly consider the extent to which PMSCs as 
purely “violent” actors, are able to fit within these theories and the difficulties they pose in 
undermining traditional conceptions. The section will thereafter look to consider theories that have 
sought to reimagine the position of coercive violence within political and legal structures in a 
manner that would provide a framework for interpreting the phenomena of PMSCs and provide the 
capabilities to analyse and critique the rise of private coercive violence. This section, therefore, 
proceeds from an examination of the works of Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt, drawing upon 
interpretations of their work in order to present a theoretical framework that serves as the basis for 
this study. 
 
1.2(1) Power, Violence and the Law 
As he concluded his remarks to the lecture theatre, Max Weber commented: “let's revisit 
this topic again in ten years.”41 It is unfortunate therefore that Weber’s definition of the state has 
formed the basis of almost all questions of the changing nature of statehood and sovereignty. 
Nowhere has this been more ubiquitous than in the study of PMSCs; almost all examinations of 
PMSCs proceed from a starting point of Max Weber’s definition of the state,42 as a “community 
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”43 Weber’s conception of the state, as he himself makes clear only applies to the modern 
formulation of the state; which this work refers to as the nation-state. According to John Ruggie, 
the defining characteristic of nation-state its position within the unique, modern “global organising 
principle of global politics – sovereignty.” As a result, the common understanding is that a nation-
state must possess the monopoly over legitimate coercive violence in order to be considered 
                                                     
41 ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills trs. and eds., Oxford 
University Press, 1946). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid at 1. 
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sovereign, with the proliferation of PMSCs often considered to bring into question the sovereignty 
of the state and its ability to exercise power within its geographical borders. This work, however, 
seeks to consider this proposition more forcefully, in order to fully consider the impact of the 
erosion of the state monopoly over coercive violence. Specifically, if sovereignty is the ability to 
monopolise coercive violence, sovereign power must be intimately connected to coercive violence. 
However, what is necessary to establish is the function of coercive violence and the justification of 
the state in monopolising it.  
In the following section, this work will consider the theoretical foundation of Weber’s 
“monopoly on violence”, tracing its routes from Hobbes Leviathan to the foundation of the modern 
state and considering how the justification and necessity of this monopoly has been interpreted. 
Specifically, it will conclude that the monopoly over coercive violence is based on an assumption 
that coercive violence is an instrument of power. Identifying the limits of these approaches, 
particularly in relation to the globalised world and the increasingly contested nature of power, this 
section will seek to identify a new theory for understanding the true nature of the function of 
coercive violence. This will examine two critiques of the state monopoly over coercive violence 
that have sought to establish the function of violence, specifically Walter Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence and Hannah Arendt’s On Violence. It will examine how these theories seek to ground 
legitimacy of power and examine their perceived illegitimacy of violence. Using this as a 
foundation, this section will argue that the issue posed by the increasing use of PMSCs is not one 
of the state monopolies over violence, but instead one of the instrumentalities of violence, and the 
legitimacy of the power created. 
 
1.2(2) The Theoretical Precedents of the State Monopoly over Coercive 
Violence 
While the monopoly over coercive violence as a prerequisite of the state is frequently 
discussed within “Weberian Sovereignty”, the theoretical foundation for the sovereign monopoly 
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over coercive violence traces its routes from the theories of Hobbes and Locke. Much as Weber 
conceived his theory of the state with thought to the horrors of World War I, early legal theorists 
were first drawn to consider the question of political legitimacy in direct relation to the control of 
coercive violence, and the ability to control the excesses of violence across the European continent. 
Ostensibly, the social contract sought to discover the foundation of the relationship between the 
sovereign and citizens, and in particular the grounding of the legitimacy of the sovereign power.  
 
For Hobbes this was built upon a common consent of the people to lift themselves out of a 
“state of nature”, characterised by self-preservation through the perpetual use of personal violence 
leading to “continuall feare, and danger of violent death.”44 In order to do this, Hobbes proposed 
empowering an absolute authority to regulate the interaction of each individual and vesting in them 
“all of their power and strength… [to] act, or cause to be acted, those things which concern the 
Common Peace and Safetie.” 45  In The Leviathan, therefore, Hobbes first proposed the state 
monopoly on legitimate violence, with the implication that coercive violence is synonymous with, 
and an essential constituent of sovereign power. Interpreting Hobbes in this manner leads to the 
conclusion that “[t]he central issue of [the] authority of the sovereign is… whether the sovereign 
can effectively discharge the obligation to protect those who have consented to obedience.”46 Both 
Weber and Hobbes clearly “think of the state in terms of violence and physical force.”47 Even as 
the Enlightenment increasingly placed the conception of the supreme sovereign under scrutiny, the 
central role of coercive violence within power structures remained unquestioned. Locke’s Two 
Treatises of Government establishes that for the sovereign to be capable of executing these rules 
they must exercise sole authority over the use of coercive violence for the effective functioning of 
                                                     
44 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Tom Griffiths ed., Wordsworth Editions, 2014)  (see Chapters 10-14 for a discussion of 
the State of Nature) 
45 Ibid at 120. 
46 Winston P. Nagan and Aitza M. Haddad, ‘Sovereignty in Theory and Practice’ (2012) 13 San Diego International Law 
Journal 429, 442. 
47 A. Anter, Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State; Origins, Structure and Significance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
29. 
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the state.48 If this is not the case, society reverts to a position of insecurity and uncertainty and it is 
only “where there is an Authority… from which relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance 
of the State of War [Nature] is excluded.”49 Similarly, it has been argued that Weber’s conception 
of the state draws upon a monopoly over violence because without the “monopoly… the law is no 
longer binding.”50 It is clear that Weber’s formulation drew upon theoretical concepts that have 
deep roots. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the specific definition of the state monopoly 
over violence was conceived by Rudolph von Iherin, “who defined “coercive force” as within the 
“absolute monopoly” of the state.”51 Clearly, therefore, Weber’s analysis of the state monopoly 
over violence follows a long tradition of seeking to monopolise violence for the purpose of 
sovereign power. However, it has been suggested that like the absolute sovereigns of Hobbes and 
Locke the purpose of violence within this formulation is reliant upon the ability to establish 
obedience, and that only through a monopoly on legitimate violence can we “establish enduring 
subordination [as] the authority to enforce rules by force needs credible “inner justification”52 As a 
result of these foundations, Weber’s concept of the state has been criticised as an “authoritarian 
fantasy.” 53  Despite these criticisms, however, there has been little discussion of alternative 
approaches to conceptualising the function of violence within the state. Instead, overwhelmingly, 
the function of violence has been premised upon the ability to enforce acquiescence. Even where 
theorists have sought to posit a variety of other factors within this relationship,54 almost universally 
they have concluded that its foundation is built upon an exercise of domination. In this tradition, 
Derrida in seeking the Mystical Foundation of Authority55 first discusses Blaise Pascal’s assertion 
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that “it is right that what is just should be followed; it is necessary that what is strongest should be 
followed.”56  Throughout much of political and legal theory therefore, the distinction between 
power and violence has been largely under-examined if acknowledged at all,  with “theorists from 
the left to right think[ing] that “violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of 
power”57  It is unsurprising therefore that Bertrand Russell, a self-described socialist, conceived in 
Naked Power58 a view of violence as an extreme power that largely mirrors Carl Schmitt’s concept 
of the sovereign decision in the state of exception.59 While neither considers coercive violence to 
be the sole basis of power, they both consider the ability to exercise a monopoly over coercive 
violence as a pre-requisite foundation upon which other forms of legitimate power may thereafter 
build. As a result, while people’s acquiescence may occur for various reasons, the fundamental 
quality of sovereign power lay in being able to violently control the population when all other forms 
of power failed.  
 
1.1(1) The Contested Nature of Power 
 While these may provide an account of the effect of coercive violence, they provide little 
illumination as to the function of violence and instead pose significant questions concerning the 
legitimacy of the regime they support. Specifically, these classical formulations of the violence - 
power relationship are all theorised against a formulation of power in which the state controls an 
absolute and indivisible power over the population. According to this approach, power exists only 
as legitimate state power, which is exercised in a top-down fashion where individuals agree to 
submit to a sovereign who, in return for the guarantee of security, establishes and enforces the 
distinction between permitted behaviour and prohibited. From Hobbes’ statement that “[P]ower… 
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is his present means to obtain some future apparent Good”60 to Weber’s formulation that power is 
“the probability that one actor… will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance.”61 
This view has come under increasing scrutiny as the nature of power has been theoretically 
reformulated to explain and understand the practical transformation of the modern states. While 
this research does not intend to fully investigate and study the nature of power in general, there are 
several salient points that provide assistance in understanding the effect that this change has had on 
the relationship between violence and power and supports the decision within the research to focus 
on alternative approaches to examining coercive violence.  
 
 While the exact nature of power remains elusive, recent theoretical developments have to 
a large extent agreed that the classical formulation fails to conceptualise the more complex power 
structures that are contained within the modern state. The theoretical discussion surrounding the 
contested nature of power has sought to identify the more opaque manner in which power actually 
functions in society. Among the most prominent of these approaches is the that of governmentality 
proposed by Michael Foucault in Discipline and Punish62and later refined in Security, Territory, 
Population. 63  According to this approach, the state exists superstructurally through local and 
personal power relations, including among many others those of doctor-patient and teacher-student, 
whose relationship has been brought under the control of the state placing the physical life as an 
increasingly central role in political power. This role, coined bio-politics by Foucault proposes that 
since the fall of the ancient regime, man has changed from “a living animal with the additional 
capacity for political existence” to an “animal whose politics places his existence as a living being 
in question.”64 For Foucault, this change represented the threshold of political modernity; from the 
historical position of sovereignty, based upon the sovereign taking life or allowing to live; to the 
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modern bio-politics in which the primary duty is to “foster life or disallow it, to the point of death.”65 
It is arguable that this approach to the horizontal dispersion of power is in effect mirrored by PMSCs 
who provide a correlating, horizontal dispersion of coercion, capable of simultaneously extending 
and isolating the states coercive capacity particularly from the population. 
 
More recently the importance of the bio-power has been reviewed in Giorgio Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer trilogy66 Noting that the era of bio-politics has been accompanied by an ease with 
which great totalitarian states transform into liberal democracies and vice-versa, 67  Agamben 
hypothesises that there exists a hidden foundation, represented by a point in which taking life and 
keeping alive become indistinguishable, with this point of indistinction representing precisely the 
borderline that sovereignty has historically been built around68 identifiable through an examination 
of an “obscure figure of archaic roman law” 69  who could be killed by anyone without the 
commission of homicide, but who could not be sacrificed; the homo-sacer. Central to perceiving 
this figure is an understanding of sovereign power which Agamben derives from the work of Carl 
Schmitt assertion that “the sovereign is he who decides upon the exception.”70 As general laws can 
apply only within a normal situation, for Schmitt this decision amounts to a declaration that due to 
a specific situation, the law no longer applies. 71  Furthermore, as the “precise details of an 
emergency”72  nor “how it is to be eliminated”73 can be planned or legislated for, this moment 
contains a “specifically juristic element – the decision in absolute purity.” 74  Fundamentally, 
therefore according to Schmitt, power is the monopoly over the last decision, with the essence of 
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sovereignty contained not within its ability to coerce or rule but in the monopoly to decide over 
what he termed the “borderline concept.”75 
 
For Agamben however, this presents a much more complex relationship, in which this 
“borderline concept” creates a boundary of law to identify the internal and external. Within this 
framework, therefore, the essence of sovereignty originates as an exclusion from the law. However, 
as the exclusion occurs through the law itself; rather than simply excluding the situation; it includes 
it through its exclusion.76 The fundamental sovereign claim, therefore, is characterised “by applying 
in no longer applying; including that which is outside of itself”;77 an inclusive exclusion. Within 
the paradox of this ‘inclusive exclusion,’ Agamben believes there exists a “limit figure” in which 
exists every possibility; “membership and inclusion… outside and… inside,… exception and 
rule.”78 At its foundation, therefore, Agamben believes the inclusive exclusion is a relationship of 
banishment, with the ban” therefore representing the original power of sovereignty. However, 
within this structure “he who has been banned is not… simply set outside of the law… but rather 
abandoned by it…. Exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law… become 
indistinguishable.”79 It is arguable that while Agamben proposed this theory with reference to the 
U.S. torture program and Guantanamo Bay, the conceptual framework is able to equally identify 
the key issues with the growth of PMSCs, as law and power are externalised. What is left is not a 
population explicitly set outside of the law but rather simply exposed and removed from the 
protection afforded by the state. 
 
Finally, while not an explicit theory of power per se, it is also enlightening to consider the 
neo-Gramscian perspective of international relation, evolved largely from Robert Cox’s, Social 
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Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.80  Adapting Antoni 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, this approach perceives power relationships through a hegemonic 
structure comprised not only of states but of multi-national companies and transnational 
organisations. Within this structure, power is derived not through unilateral dominance or economic 
leverage but initially by developing a perception of legitimacy within a hegemonic block through 
the establishment of a dominant ideology81 and the control over the social forces required to support 
this. As a result, contrary to classic sovereign power theories, neo-Gramscianism argues that rather 
than power existing solely as a top-down domination it instead relies upon harnessing existing 
social and cultural structures in order to engage the tacit consent of those being ruled with coercion 
the final resort in the face of a new hegemonic block.  
 
 Though this section has not sought to reconsider the nature of power, it has sought to 
demonstrate that existing theories of the violence-power relationship predicated upon traditional 
notions of power as domination will necessarily be limited by the increasingly contested nature of 
power. The following section will therefore seek to more directly examine the problems implicit 
within the theory of a state monopoly over violence and seek to outline an alternative that can 
answer some of these problems. This research particularly identifies two strains of political thought 
which over the past two decades have gained increasing attention within the academic world; the 
works of Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin. These two approaches have particular relevance 
due to their focus on the role of violence outside traditional theories of power which provides a 
particularly appropriate perspective for the examination of PMSCS. Walter Benjamin conceived 
his Critique of Violence against the backdrop of a collapse within the Weimar Republic and a 
growing disenchantment with the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Arendt placed her examination of 
violence against growing dissatisfaction with the US war in Vietnam and increasing violence on 
both sides of the civil rights movement.   
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1.2(3) An Alternative Theory 
In considering a conceptual framework for this study, this section first requires a theoretical 
examination of coercive violence. In grounding his research, Benjamin approaches Critique of 
Violence by identifying an appropriate existing theory and deconstructing this before rebuilding it, 
as a critique of violence as a stand-alone phenomenon. Benjamin adopts a traditional Kantian 
methodological approach of selecting two opposing, seemingly axiomatic ideas, examining the 
problems with each and how these correspond to the other and synthesising these to create a 
“perfect, paradoxical symmetry.” 82  Benjamin identifies the nature of the relationship between 
violence and justice as the true question of his critique, and so starts from the opposing positions of 
natural and positive law. Natural law, he claims, predicated upon the basis that there exists a true 
“good” within which violence exists only as a means; a “raw material, the use of which is in no way 
problematical unless force is misused for unjust ends.”83 In contrast to this, Benjamin examines 
how violence exists within a theory of positive law, which without a call to an inherent good, relies 
instead upon a consideration of the act itself, in order to decide whether an act is just or not. Both 
natural law, and positive law are therefore equally reliant upon a circular paradox; justice can only 
be established through an alignment of means and ends but “positive law is blind to the absoluteness 
of ends, natural law… to the contingency of means.”84 In order for violence to be just, Benjamin 
seeks to break this circular argument in order to examine the legitimisation of coercive violence 
“independent… of just ends and justified means.”85 
 
Benjamin adopts positive law as a “hypothetical basis,”86 as types of violence can be 
independently distinguished, in contrast to a reliance upon their eventual application, as either 
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sanctioned or unsanctioned violence. It is this distinction that Benjamin utilises to illuminate the 
rest of his study. Benjamin’s study therefore considers how legitimate and illegitimate violence 
exist. He suggests that for a subject acting within a legal system,87 the exercise of violence for an 
individual’s own ends “must collide with legal ends.” Instead, the legal system will “erect in all 
areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can only be 
realized by legal power,”88 with Benjamin concluding that “law sees violence in the hands of 
individuals as a danger undermining the legal system.” However, it is not that the use of violence 
by individuals in private matters may undermine the legal ends that Benjamin sees as problematic 
for the executive, “or if this were the case violence as such would not be condemned, but only that 
directed to illegal ends.”89 Rather, Benjamin suggests that the potential for violence to pursue ends 
outside of the law is not the issue; the problem for the system is the mere existence of violence 
outside of the law. Instead, it is presupposed that the price of moving from a Hobbesian State of 
Nature into a modern state is the abdication of the personal use of violence.  
 
Benjamin however, identifies a case in which the state monopoly on violence is called into 
question, that being the general strike. This represents for Benjamin a paradox; an “objective 
contradiction in the legal situation, but not a logical contradiction in the law.”90 Specifically, this 
refers to the fact that through sanctioned means, the general strike, the proletariat are able to work 
towards an unsanctioned end, revolution, and that within these circumstances the laws only recourse 
is to meet violence with violence.91 Through this example, Benjamin sets the foundation for the 
central narrative of his thesis, “[f]or in a strike the state fears above all else that function of violence 
which it is the object of this study to identify as the only secure foundation of its critique.”92 
Specifically, the example of the general strike illuminates the ability of violence to not only meet 
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immediate ends but “found and modify legal conditions.” Comparing the violence of the general 
strike with the “peace ceremony” that follows military violence, Benjamin concludes that all 
violence, used for natural ends; that is unsanctioned ends, inherently contains “a law making 
character.”93 This then, “explains the… tendency of modern law to divest the individual… as a legal 
subject, of all violence” for an individual using violence for their own natural ends, which Benjamin 
illustrates through the character of “the great criminal”94, would threaten to declare a new law.95 
Benjamin’s central narrative, therefore, arrives in the form of an opposition between two types of 
violence. The first of these is the law-making violence epitomised by the “peace ceremony” or the 
“general strike.”  Parallel to this however, exists violence utilised for sanctioned, or legal, ends. 
Benjamin cites the example of conscription as the most extreme illustration of this, in which the 
State forces individuals to risk their lives for the protection of the state, a legal end. In these cases, 
law-preserving violence, from the extreme case of conscription but down to each arrest or 
imprisonment, seeks not to create law but instead fortify the pre-existing legal order. All violence, 
therefore “is either law-making, or law-preserving.”96  
  
However, Benjamin does not believe that the relationship between these is one of strict 
limitations and that the two are unconnected. In particular, focusing on the police, Benjamin sought 
to examine and deconstruct the relationship between the two, in order to illuminate its true 
symbiotic nature. Although the police always exercise violence within the arc of law-preserving, 
they do so with the authority to decide “within wide limits.” Though Benjamin cited the right of 
decree as evidence of this, such acts are in fact daily occurrences having to decide whether 
infractions are worthy of intervention, or certain laws are enforceable, with policing, therefore, an 
exercise of law-preserving violence on a situational basis.97 Furthermore, Benjamin cites police 
                                                     
93 Ibid. 283. 
94 Ibid. at 281. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid at 287. 
97 Abbot (n 82) at 84. (“The refrain that “it depends on the cop”…. There are countless legal situations in which police 
must exercise a discretionary power”) 
 
33 
 
interventions prior to unlawful acts or at large gatherings for “security reasons” as further evidence 
of the decision-making aspect of this. Within each of these decisions therefore there exists an 
element of law-making, in which the violence exercised is in excess of “strict legality, but that will 
have been legitimate.”98 Furthermore, Benjamin considers this amplified by modern society in 
which the foundation of this decision-making capacity is “formless, like its nowhere tangible, all-
pervasive, ghostly presence in the life of civilized states”99 giving it a particularly devastating spirit: 
“And though the police may, in particulars, everywhere appear the same, it cannot finally 
be denied that their spirit is less devastating where they represent, in absolute monarchy, 
the power of a ruler in which the legislative and executive supremacy are united, than in 
democracies where their existence, elevated by no such relation, bears witness to the 
greatest conceivable degeneration of violence.”100 
It is clear that for Benjamin, the modern police force, through their law-preserving violence 
simultaneously exercises perpetual law-making violence. However, as a result of their (the police) 
ubiquity, their law-making violence can manifest at any time or place. Hence, establishing the 
central founding point of this violence becomes impossible; instead becoming an almost 
omnipresent underlying foundation of the society. There are two key points at work here that 
converge to materialise in Benjamin’s final conclusion. 
 
The first of these points is that rather than law-preserving and law-creating violence being 
two separate entities they are instead rigorously inseparable. For law-creating violence to remain 
powerful and capable of fulfilling its role it must evidently become law-preserving; the process of 
legitimising the law can never reach its end. Instead, with each act, the legitimacy upon which the 
violence was based is lost and we are instead left with the cyclical acts of law-making or preserving 
violence building off each another. This “oscillation” continues increasingly moving away from its 
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foundation101 It has been noted that for Benjamin what “manifests itself as laws inner decay is the 
fact that the rule of law is… established and sustained by a dimension of… violence that, as it were, 
holds the place of those missing foundations.”102 For Benjamin the effect of law-making violence 
is that;  
“with violence as its means, what is... established is law, but at the moment of instatement 
does not dismiss violence… it specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by 
violence, but one necessarily and intimately bound to it”103 
This is the rotten core of law that Benjamin saw exposed through the police and capital punishment; 
the law represents not justice but instead a form of rule based upon “an immediate manifestation of 
violence.”104 However, as the legitimisation is lost instead of losing power it will demand an 
increasingly violent defence of the law.105 The “something rotten” that Benjamin identified within 
the law was a “continual reinforcement of the means/end relationship in which laws preservation, 
as an end, will legitimise any means in order that law be in fact preserved.”106 It was this that 
Benjamin criticised in the French Revolution as the vacuum left by the ancien regime was replaced 
by a reign of terror, in which violence became a mere instrument in preserving their rule.  
 
Arendt’s Theory of Violence 
While not explicit, it is likely that Arendt took up Benjamin’s critique in On Violence107 
having witnessed the ultimate manifestation of the reign of terror under the Nazi and Stalinist 
regimes. Seeking an answer to the instrumental nature of violence that Benjamin identified, Arendt 
sought to re-examine the relationship between power and coercive violence in order to prevent the 
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re-emergence of this kind of totalitarian regime. Arendt particularly sought to redefine power which 
had, largely as a result of Weber’s Politics as a Vocation, been reduced to the power of men over 
men through domination.108 For Arendt, to view the state as a mere manifestation of violence is to 
view the state as nothing more than a superstructure physically imposing down upon the 
populace.109 Instead, she sought to redefine the terms of this debate by returning to the foundation 
of power in order to understand how it interacts with violence. She argued that if “the essence of 
power is the effectiveness of command”110 then power is exemplified by “the barrel of a gun.”111 
To believe this, however, would be to accept that the orders given by a policeman have equal 
legitimacy to those of a hostage taker,112 and as this is not the case we must reconsider the nature 
of power. Tracing the route of the term “power” to Athens, where it was conceived as “the power 
of the people” she concluded that “in this perspective, power is dissociated with the command-
obedience relationship… instead power is consensual.”113 For Arendt therefore, when the term 
power is used correctly, it represents not an act undertaken by a person or group but instead the act 
of being empowered, by the majority.  
 
As such, one of the most obvious distinctions between power and coercive violence is that 
power is always formed through the basis of consensual support; even when seemingly small 
numbers of individuals institute non-violent change, it is through the tacit support of the majority. 
In the moment of revolution, what is revealed in the moment of “sudden dramatic breakdown” is 
how “civil obedience – to laws, to rulers, to institutions- is but the outward manifestation of 
obedience.” For Arendt, even the “most despotic domination” known to man, the institution of 
slavery, was possible not because of the brutally violent coercion but instead rested upon the 
“organisation of power”114 behind it, the solidarity of support for the institution. In the United 
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States, once this fell in the ‘free’ states, the institution of slavery could not, even with brutal 
coercion, survive on violence alone. Similarly, within actual warfare, Arendt draws upon the 
increasing effectiveness of ‘guerrilla warfare’ in particular noting the American experience in 
Vietnam, to illustrate that even overwhelmingly superior armies are ineffective against a well-
supported and therefore, more powerful opponent.115 
 
  Despite this Arendt recognises the frequent interaction between the two concepts as power 
frequently utilises violence. However, while states often do occupy a seeming monopoly on 
violence, this is not a constitutive aspect of the state. Instead, this monopoly lasts only so long as 
the power structures necessary to implement this violence exist; once these power structures fail, if 
police refuse to enforce the law or army refuse to use their weapons, this monopoly is 
instantaneously lost. This does not mean that violence is incapable of appearing as if it “were the 
prerequisite of power.” With the right instruments, the exercise of this violence may create the 
effect of power for “out of the barrel of a gun grows, the most instant and perfect obedience.”116 
Furthermore, in “head on clashes” between pure violence and power, violence “can destroy 
power.”117 Attempted popular uprisings, resting purely on power such as Gandhi's efforts against 
Britain, would have been entirely futile if instead faced with “Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany 
even pre-war Japan.” Instead, Arendt views the difference between violence and power as one of 
legitimacy. Power derives its legitimacy from the initial, act of empowering an individual or group 
to act on behalf of the political community, and all future claims derive from this past act. Any 
claims of legitimacy within violence are according to Arendt, instead misleadingly based upon a 
claim of justification. Violence can in certain extreme cases, self-defence and necessity, be justified 
but this can never equate to legitimacy and as a result, while violence may be capable of destroying 
power, it is “utterly incapable of creating it.”118 
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Furthermore, it is not simply that violence is unrelated to power; instead, she suggests that 
they have an axiomatic relationship. To illustrate this, Arendt examines how the concepts of 
violence and power are manifested at their most extreme ends. For power, this is represented by a 
scenario in which “all are against one” whereas the most extreme form of violence is represented 
by “one against all.”119 Arendt suggests that if a rule of power is founded by the majority, then “rule 
by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost.”120 Furthermore, considering that 
violence is incapable of creating power, the use of violence is “self-defeating,”121 destroying the 
basis of the power. Furthermore, for Arendt once a government has destroyed its legitimacy through 
the uninhibited use of violence, a new form of government replaces that lost through power: 
“terror is not the same as violence, it is, rather, the form of government that comes into 
being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, 
remains in full control.”122 
For Arendt however, this terror in the form of a totalitarian government123 supported by violence is 
inherently limited. It relies upon the ability of the state to prevent any potential for power to be 
founded, “every kind of organised opposition must disappear.”124 At its most extreme, this appears 
as “social atomisation,”125 a state in which every person one comes into contact with has the 
potential to be an informant. 126 Within this society, power has no foothold and as such violence 
remains the sole form of coercion. Instead, so long as violence cannot create power, it remains 
instead a destructive force, the ubiquity of the informer in the modern police state marks the point 
when the “state begins to devour its own children.” Arendt suggests that at this moment, when 
yesterday’s executioner, becomes today’s victim, that violence loses its coercion, and the 
instruments of violence themselves begin to turn against the state. In explaining the de-Stalinisation 
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of Russia, Arendt cites the belief of Stalinist functionaries that they would be the next victims as a 
central reason for the fall of the regime,127 with their belief that the regime’s continuation within 
such a cannibalistic manner would lead to a paralysis of the whole country. In the end, therefore, 
“Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s 
disappearance.”128 
 
1.3 Re-Positioning the Debate on the Monopoly  
It is clear through this examination that there are significant problems attempting to 
establish legitimacy for coercive violence. Traditional approaches that perceive it as an instrument 
of power remain prevalent. From this position, the ability to coerce a population through violence 
is primarily viewed as synonymous with power, with the sovereign therefore recognised as the 
entity or person that can enforce their rule over the population through physical coercion. However, 
these theories fail to establish a lasting basis for legitimacy. Instead, as Benjamin identified, each 
act of violence moves the power away from its original foundation, as the legitimacy is gradually 
destroyed to be replaced by pure violence. Therefore, when considering the role of coercive 
violence in the power structures, this work proceeds by adopting the positions of Benjamin and 
more explicitly Arendt that the use of coercive violence should be considered axiomatic to the 
establishment of legitimate power. The reliance upon physical coercion, should instead of being 
considered the basis of legitimate government, be seen as its “rotten core.” The reliance on violence 
for the basis of authority establishes a “bloody power over mere life for its own sake,”129 the effect 
of which is that which Arendt terms a regime of terror; “the form of government that comes into 
being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains 
in full control.” 130  While the ability to monopolise coercive violence need not inherently be 
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dangerous, the ability to exercise it against legitimate power, in the form of the will of the citizens, 
is the basis of an authoritarian state. 
 
Although representing varying political spectrums, the two theorists clearly converge and 
in effect, at the foundation of both of these lines of thought is a fundamental belief that coercive 
violence represents a unique phenomenon unrelated in practice to legitimate power. While violence 
is capable through coercion of maintaining the obedience of the population, it is impossible for 
coercive violence to gain legitimacy as power. Furthermore, so long as this rule through violence 
cannot gain legitimacy, it is an inherently weak system and is constantly threatened by a more 
legitimate and powerful form of authority based upon the collective action of the population.  
 
An analysis of both author’s views of the role of police further illustrates their views on the 
true nature of the exercise of coercive violence, and provides a clue as to how PMSCs may fit into 
this conceptual framework. Both suggesting the violent function of the police goes beyond that of 
simply upholding the law.  For Benjamin, the role is instead to reinforce the law, with each police 
decision, supported by the threat of coercive violence, creating a new law for that situation. Much 
like Benjamin, Arendt’s analysis also sees the role of the police as an explicit manifestation of the 
relationship between violence and power. She considers this manifestation can appear on varying 
levels, the central role that the police hold in supporting violent institutions places them at the heart 
of this relationship. In particular, in a society run through violence, it is the police that acts as the 
instrument of violence by means of which governments are able to suppress legitimate expressions 
of contradictory power.  In situations in which the power has become “impotent,”131 the police offer 
a “temptation to substitute violence” where there exists a potential for loss of power.132  
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132 Ibid at 54. 
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Ultimately, however, both Arendt and Benjamin discussed the role of violence with a 
nation-state and could not have envisaged the effects of globalisation and decreasing sphere of state 
influence. As a result, their work fails to explicitly consider the dissipation of coercive violence 
through a web of transnational corporations, private military contractors and non-state actors. 
Specifically, both theories were premised upon a state monopoly of coercive violence within a 
defined geographical territory. The globalisation of coercive violence, however, has transformed 
this relationship, with fundamental consequences for the relationship between coercive violence 
and power. Through globalisation and the development of PMSCs, coercive violence has essentially 
been commodified. In the phenomenon of PMSCs, we see coercive violence as a transactional 
commodity whose function is predicated solely upon an economic benefit. This, therefore, has the 
potential to remove the political function from the exercise of coercive violence and through 
removing this link between coercive violence and power. While both Arendt and Benjamin saw 
rule through violence as weak, this was due to the 
 
The use of PMSCs clearly has the potential to undermine a central element that many of 
these traditional theories were predicated upon. The second transformative effect of the 
globalisation of coercive violence through PMSCs is the externalisation of violence through the use 
of contractors who are external to the polity. Specifically, traditional theories on the nature of the 
relationship between coercive violence and authority have been premised upon citizen armies and 
public policing. The externalisation of coercive violence by PMSCs fundamentally undermines this 
assumption. It instead provides the opportunity to import into a polity a form of coercive violence 
which can act with relative impunity, as it is essentially removed from the consequences that 
traditionally would otherwise follow.  
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While Arendt, partially envisaged this when predicting that “biological weapons… would 
enable “small groups of individuals to upset the strategic balance”133 and “the amount of violence 
at the disposal of any given country may soon not be a reliable indication of the country’s strength… 
or guarantee against [its] destruction,”134 she was unable to foresee the role of private, profit-driven 
actors within this future. When considering Marx’s view of violence, she concluded that while it 
was an instrument of the ruling class, it could not be the source of its power,135 however, it is 
possible to hypothesise that PMSCs represent a vehicle capable of de facto blurring these lines. 
Returning to Benjamin’s view of the police, which he believed when controlled by a bureaucratic 
institution give violence an ethereal presence against which the citizens have no recourse, this effect 
is exacerbated by the use of PMSCs. The use of non-local contractors, not representative of or 
accountable to the population, can be combined with a decision-making body beyond even minimal 
democratic control. The effect is to prevent any recourse against pure violence, subverting 
legitimate power and removing any mechanisms of accountability. In these circumstances, the 
inherent weaknesses of a rule through violence can in effect be circumvented, and the internal 
strength of legitimate power negated.  
 
Considering this, this research proceeds from the basis that PMSCs rather than just diluting 
the state monopoly over violence, fundamentally undermine the foundation of representative 
sovereignty. The ability to exercise coercive violence on a large scale without the support of a 
population fundamentally undermines the factors that are considered to make violence deficient in 
relation to power. PMSCs therefore, if not adequately controlled, can represent the vehicle through 
which violence and power can be blurred, undermining accountable governance and potentially 
establishing a foundation for effective authoritarianism.  
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135 Ibid at 11. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
MAINTAINING SOVEREIGN POWER: 
LEGITIMACY THROUGH COERCIVE 
VIOLENCE? 
2 Introduction 
The theoretical framework, identified within Chapter One of this study sought to identify 
the relationship between the ability to exercise coercive violence, and the position of sovereigns in 
maintaining both legitimate and tyrannical power.  For this study, it is important that this framework 
is supported by the practical application of this theoretical understanding to factual circumstances. 
This section, therefore, seeks to undertake a historical examination of the position and role of 
coercive violence in societies and consider how this has interacted with contemporaneous political 
structures. The research will use this overview to trace the historical relationship between the 
control of coercive violence and power and analyse this through the research’s conceptual 
framework.  
 
Through a chronological overview of the evolution of coercive violence, and the role of 
private actors within this, the aim is to demonstrate that a state monopoly over coercive violence 
has historically been the exception rather than the rule. It will demonstrate that instead, the use of 
private coercive violence has historically been a prominent feature of unaccountable rulers in 
preserving power. The chapter will examine how the desire to monopolise coercive violence was 
central to the underpinning of sovereign states, signifying that the monopoly over coercive violence 
is a central component in the establishment of the nation-state. Finally, it considers how evolving 
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conceptions of statehood and society relied upon a developing democratic control over coercive 
violence, in transitioning away from autocratic or tyrannical rule. It identifies how the move away 
from autocracy, and the corresponding development of reciprocal rights and duties between states 
and their citizens, required an ever-increasing monopolisation of coercive violence, culminating in 
the development of citizen armies and national police. Through the combination of these themes, 
this chapter will seek to demonstrate how the ability to control coercive violence was essential for 
maintaining power in historical societies, while conversely uncontrolled private actors had the 
ability to destabilise and undermine power. Through identifying historical parallels, this chapter 
will provide the study with a foundation from which to examine the growth of modern PMSCs and 
the issues related to them. 
 
This chapter begins by examining the organisation of coercive violence in three ancient 
civilizations; specifically, Pharaonic Egypt, the Greek city-states and finally the Roman Empire. 
These civilizations represent three of the most influential Ancient States in the historical 
development of Europe, with their power structures replicated throughout European society in the 
proceeding centuries. These civilizations represent three of the most common recurring societal 
structures replicated throughout history, specifically hierarchical or feudal systems, commercial 
city-states, and the empire. Thereafter, the section will consider the competing sovereign models of 
the European middle ages, in particular, the feudal approach of northern Europe and the Italian city-
state models, examining how this led to the increase in private violence that prevailed in the period 
leading up to the Hundred Years War. Finally, it discusses both the practical and theoretical changes 
that occurred following this, leading to the establishment of Westphalian sovereignty, and the 
corresponding state monopoly on coercive violence, as the preeminent form of statehood within 
International Law.  
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2.1 From Ancient Societies to the Middle Ages 
When considering the provision of coercive violence through a historiographical lens, it is 
notable that private soldiers have formed a part of society for as long as written history has existed, 
becoming so widespread as to appear repeatedly for example throughout Old Testament accounts. 
David, prior to defeating Goliath, commanded a roving group of mercenaries who had previously 
fought for the Philistines while on the run from Saul. 136  Similarly, when Pharaoh chased the 
Israelites out of Egypt, he did so with a force of hired foreign soldiers.137  
 
2.1(1) Ancient Egypt 
Ancient Egyptian society, based upon a form of divinely appointed dynasty, relied heavily 
upon military power and coercive violence, to maintain and thereafter expand its control with the 
army consequently requiring large numbers of troops.138 This was achieved primarily through local 
“nomarchs” being required to make levies of men available to the Pharaoh.139 In times of emergency 
a form of national conscription was implemented, with the soldiers of this responsible directly to 
the Pharaoh, often causing power struggles between the Pharaoh and nomarch.140 The Ancient 
Egyptian army eventually supplemented this heavily with the employment of mercenaries from at 
least 2400 B.C.E., drawing particularly heavily upon the skills of the Nubian archers,141 who were 
revered for their excellence with the bow.142 While the use of hired soldiers in conducting warfare 
was common throughout the period, mercenaries also played an important role in the internal 
politics of the society, with personal authority so dominant, many early rulers found it prudent to 
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rely upon hired foreign forces for personal protection. Following difficulties maintaining authority 
within the civil society, Amenhotep IV employed a force of personal bodyguards, recruited 
exclusively from outside of Egypt, using their threat of violence to “break the power of the 
priesthood and the bureaucrats.”143 Beyond this, internal security was largely directed to two forms 
of activity; 144  protecting borders and sights of civic importance including palaces and royal 
tombs,145 and maintaining civil obedience in public and ensuring payment of correct taxation.146 
The former of these tasks was undertaken by a paramilitary force known as the Medjay147 drawn 
from Nubian soldiers. The latter role was undertaken by a force whose leadership were drawn 
exclusively from within the ruling classes, who were known primarily for their wanton brutality 
and corruption.148  
 
2.1(2) Ancient Greece 
The deployment of coercive violence in ancient Greece shared many similarities with that 
of ancient Egypt, although the form of society necessitated differences. The first notable difference 
was that as Ancient Greece consisted of City States there was no one overall sovereign. Instead, 
geographically smaller and isolated trading states were governed with an element of democracy. 
Relations between the States resulted in regular inter-state clashes as cities fought for hegemony 
through controlling trade routes. The security requirements of these City States were therefore 
unique, with the protection of trade being of primary importance. Mercenarism became a lucrative 
business, in particular following 30 years of the Peloponnesian war, when many of the city-states 
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47 
 
were left financially ruined and had a generation of men who had no experience beyond war. 149 As 
technological advances made the waging of war more difficult and expensive, many city-states 
established themselves as specialists within a particular field, with the most in-demand specialisms 
proving financially highly lucrative. The most successful of these built reputations that lasted for 
centuries, among these were Cretan slingers, known for their highly-specialised ability with the 
bow,150  and the Greek hoplites, highly organised spearmen.151  At times, the mercenary forces 
themselves became so powerful that during the Punic Wars, upon learning that they would not be 
paid correctly, Carthage’s mercenaries revolted temporarily taking control of the city of Tunis.152 
Within these Greek city-states, the internal provision of security was representative of the 
democratic form of governance 153  with individual dispute-settlement, arbitrated by elders the 
primary form of legal order.154  Where this failed and “crimes” did occur it was the personal 
responsibility of the individual, often assisted by other citizens, to arrest and punish the offender.155 
As such, the maintenance of social order was heavily dependent upon on tribal kinship and 
affiliations.”156 Moreover, a belief that divine collective punishment was essential to ensuring 
communities policed themselves.157 When the first laws were written, society was so concerned 
with the vesting of coercive violence in one person or group directly that they used foreign slaves 
to undertake “police work”158 with the belief that having citizens undertake the exercise of coercive 
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violence over their fellow citizens was potentially dangerous, because it vested them with the power 
of the state.159  
 
2.1(3) The Roman Empire 
The use of coercive force within ancient Rome was considerably more developed, 
centralised and authoritative that in either Egypt or Greece providing one of the earliest true 
examples of a state security apparatus. There was a high degree of centralisation of power within 
the Roman Empire, supported largely by an authoritarian structure in place to prevent unrest 
throughout the Empire. The use of highly regimented citizen armies and security throughout the 
Empire is often considered indicative of this authoritative system. 
 
Despite the reputation for central power, and the popular belief that Rome existed solely 
upon a citizen army, in reality the Roman Empire relied heavily upon mercenaries throughout much 
of its 1000-year history. In particular, the lack of a trained cavalry meant that the early Roman 
Empire, after suffering a devastating loss at the Battle of Adrianople against Gothic cavalry, began 
to rely heavily upon Germanic mercenaries,160 with these eventually outnumbering even Roman 
soldiers.161 The reliance upon Germanic mercenaries, funded by victory loot, meant that once the 
Empire stopped expanding, unrest crept into their ranks eventually playing a central role in the fall 
of the Roman bureaucracy as the Gothic cavalry, who had for a long time been employed the 
Romans, instead invaded Rome.162  
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Beyond simply employing mercenaries for the external expansion of the Empire, the early 
Roman Emperors also relied upon foreign mercenaries for personal protection.163 Having seen the 
growth in influence of the Praetorian guards, to the point that they were regularly responsible for 
deposing and choosing replacement Emperors, several Emperors supplemented these with the 
Imperial German Bodyguards164 who were chosen primarily for the fact that they bore no political 
allegiance to any particular province of the Roman Empire. They continued in the form of the 
Varangian Guard in the Byzantine Empire until the late 14th century. 
 
For the average Roman citizen, security was a largely personal affair with wealthy 
individuals relying heavily upon private bodyguards, often gladiators or even slaves, to protect 
themselves and their property.165 However, as the authoritarian nature of the Emperors increased 
Rome was considered to have employed one of the first public security forces attributed to the 
Roman Emperor Augustus, through the introduction of Roman vigils.166 Established following the 
assassination of Julius Caesar, around 27 B.C., these were an effort to bring Rome under a 
centralised control. Included within this were an elite unit, called the Praetorian Guard, whose sole 
role was to protect the Emperor from assassination. 167  Studies suggest up to 9000 men were 
employed at each time, with around 1/3 of these operating undercover, being housed among the 
civilian residents to report upon them. Urban Cohorts, consisting of men not good enough to get 
into the Praetorian Guard, acted as local police, arresting lawbreakers, and eventually gaining the 
name of the vigiles (watchmen) of Rome.168 Outside of Rome, the rule of law was enforced on a 
more stringent basis through military rule using Roman Guards. Legions were employed to 
maintain law and order, while auxilia (non-roman citizens) were allowed to undertake similar roles 
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only outside of their home regions.169 In Alexandria, 18,000 heavy infantry were available to the 
Roman Governor to enforce the governor's rules.170 In effect, outside of Rome, citizens of the 
Roman Empire lived under a constant state of martial law, with the military responsible for 
preventing crime and punishing criminals.171  
 
2.1(4) Lessons of Ancient Society 
Early societies, therefore, present a series of notable trends in discovering the relationship 
between coercive violence and power. The authoritarian nature of both the Egyptian and late Roman 
societies coincided with the use of a private external force in order to maintain control. In both of 
these societies, these external actors were relied upon as the local population were considered 
dangerous to the sovereign’s power. Ancient Rome is particularly instructive, within Rome German 
guards were employed to protect the Emperor, while in the Empire Roman citizens were considered 
suitable to compel the local population's obedience. The reliance upon external actors to violently 
enforce the submission of their population indicates that within this societies power was applied 
with force from the top down. In effect, both Egypt and the Roman Empire were controlled through 
tyranny. In comparison, Greece, which retained an early form of democratic and accountable 
leadership, sought to limit the influence of coercive violence within the state, with popular will 
taking precedence over coercion. Externally, there appears to be similarities between all three 
societies including a heavy reliance on mercenaries in both defence against external enemies and 
in geographical expansion . However, there remains a slight difference between Greece and 
Roma/Egypt. Both Rome and Egypt attempted to maintain a citizen army. For the Egyptians, this 
was based upon a hierarchical duty, though ultimately this proved insufficient as personal loyalty 
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was insufficient to maintain allegiance.  In Rome, an early form of citizenship was used to justify 
the need to serve one’s country. Whilst this proved highly successful with citizens from within 
Rome, the citizens of the Empire felt no such civic duty, and at this point the military was 
supplemented by individuals serving for financial gain. In comparison, Ancient Greece saw warfare 
largely as a commercial undertaking and as a result of the use of mercenaries, who were better 
equipped to win battles, was the norm.  
 
2.2 The Middle Ages 
Following the fall of the Roman Empire, European States moved to one of two social 
structures. The coastal and trading regions of Italy moved towards a city-state system, with City 
Councils of the wealthiest businessmen de facto controlling the city. In comparison, the largely 
agricultural based regions of France and England moved towards a feudal system with monarchs, 
under papal authority,  representing the head of the realm, supported by Lords and below them 
Knights. 
 
2.2(1) The Feudal System 
The provision of coercive violence within the Feudal system largely drew upon the 
experiences of the Roman Empire, with particular regard to the difficulty establishing authority 
over large geographical areas. Partly due to the experience of the late years of the Roman Empire, 
the Feudal system was originally based around the concept that citizens would give a certain amount 
of time to the military operations of their Lords in exchange for personal protection and the holding 
of land, which would then be subdivided again between their subjects. The hierarchical pyramid 
system was considered effective because each level was expected to ensure the loyalty of those 
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below them. Ultimately, however, the system proved to be ineffective,172 and feudal lords began to 
rely heavily once again upon mercenaries to fill the specialist roles within their military.173  In 
particular, the ruler could rely upon their military only for certain periods and, due to these limited 
periods of military service, the soldiers would usually be of an inferior quality to professional 
soldiers.174 Furthermore, during the Hundred Year War (1337-1453), European rulers frequently 
dropped into and back out of war and were unable to maintain the standing forces required to 
conduct warfare on the scale expected.175 Simultaneously, frequent warfare left the land and the 
ruling class economically ruined while during times of peace rulers found the maintenance of order 
challenged by large numbers of men returning home to difficult economic situations.176 With no 
home or job to go home to, the soldiers banded together in order to sell their military services for 
the highest price, and when not in service provide each other with communal protection.  These 
groups of soldiers became known as Companies, or specifically Free Companies, in response to 
their opposition to the feudal society.177 The feudal system expected all people to be tied to a 
hierarchical order; the Free Companies sought to establish themselves outside of this system, 
eventually playing a central role in undermining the whole system. In particular, these Free 
Companies saw no reason to respect the position of nobility and even questioned the position of the 
church.178 These Free Companies, posed a direct threat to the authority of feudal rulers, as when 
they were employed to wage war they maintained a livelihood by pillaging local communities who 
refused to pay for their protection. 
 
Alongside this threat to the established political order, the Free Companies were directly 
responsible for ensuring Europe remained in a perpetual state of war for centuries. The level of 
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destruction they left ensured it was more expedient for rulers to maintain their employment as a 
permanence presence than risk the Companies destroying their populace.179 As further protection, 
it was considered prudent to ensure that the Free Companies employed by a ruler were given 
missions as far from that ruler’s homeland as possible.180 France, in particular, was ravaged, as 
noblemen sent these mercenaries to attack far away rivals for the simple reason of ensuring they 
were not around to cause destruction on their soil. This destruction was compounded by the manner 
in which most of these battles were fought. Due to the purely economic nature of the Free 
Companies, they tended to see all out battles as a waste and unnecessary risk. The leaders had 
invested personally in training and arming their groups and were averse to risking the potential loss 
of life. Furthermore, the Companies’ reputation was built upon their successes, and a major loss in 
battle could undermine the fear they used to drum up business and extort the local population. 
Instead, therefore, these battles concentrated on small and tactical counterattacks, often focusing 
primarily on taking prisoners to be ransomed back for further economic profit. It was this method 
of warfare that led Machiavelli, when the Free Companies crossed the Alps into Renaissance Italy, 
to describe mercenary fighting as “bloodless battles”. 181  Despite this, when required the Free 
Companies were able to call upon huge quantities of resources. When the King of France, unable 
to cope with the near constant destruction these Free Companies caused, raised the entire French 
feudal army, the Free Companies formed a temporary alliance routing the French army at the Battle 
of Brignais in 1362.182 The French king eventually decided the only way to prevent the Free 
Companies entirely destroying the nation was to employ them, waging campaigns in Spain and 
Hungary “just to find their private units some employment and get them out of the country”183 
Eventually, France found relative peace only when the Free Companies discovered that the City 
States of Renaissance Italy offered a better business environment.  Once these Companies had left, 
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King Charles VII imposed a standing tax on all merchants, using the proceeds to keep rehire several 
of the larger Companies permanently.184 With this, the King Charles VII of France created the first 
professional, standing army of the modern era, made almost entirely of Scots and Germans.185 
 
While mercenaries played a central role in the external security of the feudal state, internal 
security was more community-based. Attempts at policing sought to replicate the hierarchical 
feudal approach to military service, being based on community pledges of individuals, with each 
feudal community expected to aid neighbours and protect their villages from crime.186  In the 
thirteenth century, a watch system was developed to protect property in larger towns and cities. 
Watchmen patrolled at night and helped protect against robberies, disturbances and fire reporting 
to the area constable. In England this was formalised in 1326, when justices of the peace were first 
appointed to assist the sheriff in controlling the county and maintain peace.187 In France, a similar 
system was supplemented by a military police, whose role it was to ensure that the rural areas 
remained peaceful and were safe from foreign attack. This force, the Maréchaussée, was formally 
a branch of the French national army, but operated outside of the Feudal hierarchy and were 
employed directly by the King of France to enforce order and ensure the safety of the highways.188  
 
In Britain, the importance of the Monarch in the rationale for the establishment and 
implementation of laws eventually came to be signified by the establishment of the “kings peace,” 
which each member of the community was considered responsible for keeping.189 Disobedience 
and criminality were, therefore, seen as a direct affront to the King, whose position had been 
anointed by God. Thus, the punishment was seen not only within the specific circumstances it 
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occurred, but also with the potential to undermine the civic and religious system more generally. 
These punishments, which were exceptionally harsh and intended primarily to warn the population, 
were considered to have gained their legitimacy through the Church.  
 
2.2(2) The City States  
Unlike the Feudalist systems of the North, the City States in Italy did not view the control 
over coercive violence as an essential aspect of their State function. Instead, with the increasing 
economic prosperity of many of these States, it became unpopular to expect merchants and bankers 
to give their own time to military endeavours. It was this growing economic independence that led 
the Italian City States to move away from citizen armies to Condotta or contract armies.190 In this 
system, business guilds represented states and their clients would contract out the defence to private 
units, leaving the merchants and bankers free to continue their trade. While geographically small, 
their role as merchants rather than agrarian also meant that the City States were considerably more 
wealthy, and with capital not tied to lands, than the feudal lords or France. As a result, while they 
had first formed in rural France, Italy’s City States provided the perfect ground for the Free 
Companies to expand.  
 
However, while they often provided a desired service to the City States, when they could 
not find employment by the States, the City States limited geographic size meant they could call 
upon only small citizen defence forces and the Free Companies took advantage by extracting 
premium “insurance” money.191 Over three days in 1375 alone, one Free Company was able to 
extract 35,500 Florins (more than the operating capital of Francisco Dantini, a famous merchant of 
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the time.192) On one occasion, a city was extorted for so much they could not afford to pay in one 
lump sum and instead gave over hostages as a form of collateral.193   
 
With time, the Free Companies came to represent an integral part of Italian culture, moving 
away from the roving hoardes into legitimate legal entities. The agreements between the companies 
and their employers became increasingly complex documents, with one contract between a 
Company and the City of Florence having more than 230 individual signatories. These contracts, 
or Condotta, eventually gave rise to the new term for these organised and legal mercenaries, the 
Condotierri (literally the Contractors.)194 Among these contractors were groups whose success 
made them equivalent to some of the largest armies of the day, and with it their captains held a 
privileged position within society. The White  Company, immortalised by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 
was presided over by Sir John Hawkwood and could call upon over 8,000 men, including 3,500 
cavalry.195  
 
This approach to the private provision of coercive violence was similarly utilised for the 
internal security of the City States, with the richest of the trading city-states particularly keen to 
establish more effective forms of policing and enforcing local laws. As such, many Italian City 
States operated a form of security called the Podesta which, when communities were suffering 
either political or criminal difficulties, an external judicial organisation, complete with police, 
would be hired to temporarily quell the difficulties. Romagna, a town of only a few thousand 
inhabitants, hired such a Podesta around 1300 AD. The lease included the services of one Podesta, 
one knight, three trained judges, and ten policemen whose “principal objectives were urban peace 
and justice for all. Although his policemen were ordinary soldiers, his judges theoretically had five 
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consecutive years of legal training at Bologna or at some other renowned university.”196 In bigger 
Cities the Podesta could call upon significantly bigger police forces, with Florence maintaining a 
force of 300 for its Podesta. A key feature of the Podesta’s justice during the period was the harsh 
and disproportionate sentences the individuals judged guilty of committing criminal acts were 
expected to receive, most commonly implemented in public.197  
 
Ultimately, while these policing cooperatives were able to deal with low-level local 
criminals they were largely powerless against the more serious threats, and incapable of 
implementing law and order in the manner expected by the wealthy traders. These businessmen, 
though neither nobility nor elected, maintained de facto control over their communities, with many 
of the great City States making “the protection of their merchants a matter of policy.”198 As such, 
“[L]ocal government, always limited in its resources, could never fully replace private justice.”199 
It was the security and protection of these merchants and traders that first created the demand for 
private security that the Free Companies, and later the Condottieri, would be more than happy to 
fill. As discussed, however, the import of this form of private security was to turn the City States 
into a primary target for extortion, or even rival attacks. With time, “[S]uppression of private 
warfare constituted the greatest single problem faced by the community in its effort to attain a new, 
more ordered and more stable form of political life."200  
 
2.1(3) Private Violence Takes Control Across Europe 
Regardless of the competing forms of state system, however the majority of the medieval 
period was characterised by widespread private violence and organised criminal gangs, in the shape 
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of the Free Companies and Condottieri. Local communities were often forced to pay sums of 
protection money to unemployed mercenary groups to prevent them from looting and pillaging. 
Even with this, however, roaming groups of Free Companies plagued the security of the medieval 
state at both a local and state level, interrupting trade routes and swapping allegiances to rival 
Nobles or City States. The growth of private violence eventually reached the point of entirely 
surpassing State violence, with mercenaries not only supplementing but entirely replacing state 
armies and creating a Golden Age of Mercenaries. Two innovations within the market for violence 
were largely responsible for this. 
 
The first of these was a shift in tactics that placed two competing forms of infantrymen at 
the pinnacle of warfare. This began with the burgeoning reputation of the Swiss army following 
their surprising victory over the Austrian Habsburgs, at Sempach (1368) and Nafels (1388), with 
just 1,600 Swiss defeating over 6,000 Austrian. 201  Their revolutionary use of close square 
formations and pikemen was able to repeatedly defeat heavily armed cavalry formations that had 
previously been considered the strongest battlefield units.202 With this reputation, the Swiss were 
able to command the highest fees in Europe and as such, were employed extensively throughout 
Italy, France and Germany, with contracts drawn directly with the leader of the Canton from which 
the group originated. Amongst the biggest of these contracts was a continuing relationship with the 
House of Valois, protecting the French crown. A similar relationship existed between the Swiss 
Guards and the Vatican City, a role they continue symbolically to date.203  
 
Eventually, the Swiss lost their monopoly over the pike formation, as Austrian and German 
soldiers from similar mountainous regions as the Swiss, believed they could cash in on the success 
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of the Swiss.204 The Landsknecht, as they became known, copied the tactics and style of the Swiss 
but were not bound by the same loyalty and geographical rigidness. The Landsknecht quickly grew 
in popularity across Europe as a mercenary force and, due to their flexibility, with the invention of 
firearms, the Landsknecht soon became the most powerful mercenary force, cementing this status 
at the battle of Bicocca.205 
  
The turn of the Sixteenth Century saw the final innovation in the “golden era of 
mercenaries” with the final move from military business to the business of military. According to 
the historian Michael Howard, “war became the biggest industry in Europe.”206 In particular, having 
seen the success of the Swiss Cantons and Landsknechts, many wealthy businessmen saw an 
opportunity to invest their wealth, and establish their own Free Companies to lease out themselves; 
coining the term entrepreneurs.207 One of the first of these entrepreneurs was Wallenstein, then one 
of the richest men in the Habsburg empire, which following the reformation and protestant revolt 
was teetering on the brink of collapse. As such Wallenstein proposed that he would field a force of 
fifty thousand men at his own personal cost, who rather than fighting as part of the Habsburg army 
would be lead separately by Wallenstein himself, with final say over all internal matters.208 In return 
for targeting enemies of the Habsburgs, Wallenstein would be able to keep the entirety of any war 
bounty made, paying the soldiers, and keeping whatever else as profit.209 Wallenstein thereafter 
used his experience as a businessman to revolutionise the manner in which armies were constructed, 
setting up armament factories to control the supply of weapons, and introducing rigid training. 
When Ferdinand announced the Edict of Restitution in 1629, Wallenstein was able to call upon 
over 130,000 soldiers to enforce the decision on Ferdinand’s behalf.210  Wallenstein’s approach to 
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financing armies, with the money coming out of the spoils of war, soon caught on amongst many 
other wealthy and entrepreneurial individuals of the time.211 It has been suggested that the military 
entrepreneur offered a middle ground for rulers combining aspects of the condotierri style 
contractor, and a civilian standing army; to represent a “hybrid of both”212 . Specifically, the 
entrepreneurs tended to be more loyal to the parties they represented, with their interests often being 
closely interlinked with those of their employer. As such, they tended to work closely with one 
group for extended periods, rarely switching sides when the money was better as the condottieri 
had often been accused of. As a result, however, they relied heavily upon their individual employer, 
continually undertaking military campaigns with the constant requirement of war spoils, ensuring 
that there was an almost endless supply of increasingly violent conflict.  
  
Although ostensibly a war between Catholic and Protestants, it was the finance and 
motivation of these military entrepreneurs that led the Thirty Years War to become one of the most 
deadly and destructive wars in European history. As more nations and rulers joined the war, almost 
every side was made up of a majority of mercenaries. Among the most remarkable feats of military 
entrepreneurs of the day was Lous de Geer, who sourced and funded a complete navy for the 
Swedish when they sought to enter the fray, whilst even the revolutionary army of Gustavus 
Adolphus of Sweden consisted of over 90% hired soldiers.213 In total, the soldiers of the Thirty 
Years War represented almost every corner of Europe; Scotland alone contributed 50,000 troops, 
while the Ottomans leased 60,000 cavalry in exchange for a tribute to the Sultan.214 Eventually, 
however, the toll of such large numbers of troops became too much. If there was no fighting 
available, the local populations found themselves being destroyed by the forces intended to protect 
them. The Elector of Brandenburg at the time went so far as to write, “our military forces have cost 
us a great deal and done much wanton damage. The enemy could not have done worse.”215 It was 
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this general demoralisation that gave the eventual peace treaty the designation The Peace of 
Exhaustion although as far as its relation to private contractors is concerned, it its official title as 
The Treat of Westphalia, and specifically its namesake theory of sovereignty that provides the basis 
for the modern conception of the state monopoly on violence.  
 
As the chapter above makes clear, for the greater part of European history the concept of 
private violence has been the rule, rather than the exception. Within the vast majority of forms of 
states and sovereigns, the ability to call upon private violence was not only a positive but more 
fundamentally a necessity for maintaining order. The reasons for this would often vary from state 
to state. Within types of personal rule, including monarchies and divine dynasties, this 
fundamentally came down to the fact that the use of force was primarily seen as the private preserve 
of individual rulers to maintain or expand their power. While the use of local forces was common, 
relying upon them was both very expensive and a significant risk. In particular, the devolution of 
local power to lords, or their regional equivalents, meant that the local power structures did little to 
encourage or foster loyalty, with relationships primarily operating at a local, rather than a larger 
state, level. In comparison, many states based primarily on trading including city-states considered 
it more practical and efficient to contract out the exercise of violence within a state. Despite this, 
over the hundred years between the mid 17th and mid 18th century, there was a foundational shift 
towards a belief that the state alone should hold control over the monopoly on coercive violence.  
 
2.3 The Growth of the State Monopoly over Coercive Violence 
For much of human history, coercive violence has been a tool wielded by rulers to maintain 
authority and ensure obedience by their citizens. Even a brief examination of European history 
comprehensively demonstrates that for millennia, societies were overwhelmingly formed and 
maintained through the tyrannical control of coercive violence. Sovereigns, regardless of their form, 
relied upon and exploited coercive violence in order to sustain their power at the expense of their 
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subjects. More significantly, to do so, these sovereigns came to rely upon private, and often external, 
actors to exercise coercive violence on their behalf. The use of mercenaries was pervasive, both for 
protecting their territory from external threats, but more notably for enforcing order among their 
own subjects. It is remarkable therefore that within 200 years the two most powerful European 
Nations would voluntarily enact laws prohibiting the use of mercenaries216 and just a century later 
the democratic control over coercive violence would become accepted as a necessity within 
international law.217 Without this transformation, this study would be redundant. It is imperative, 
therefore, that if this study is to understand the implications of the increasing prevalence of private 
violence, it must understand this transformation. Therefore, this section will attempt to trace the 
growth of the state monopoly over coercive violence and the corresponding decline of private 
violence that places PMSCs in the lacuna they currently occupy. Three factors within this 
transformation are particularly notable in reference to the study of PMSCs: the move towards citizen 
armies, the democratic control over coercive violence and the move towards a state responsibility 
for their citizen’s safety. While this section will seek to consider these factors separately, in practice 
many of the influences behind these changes are common to more than one and tracing this 
evolution will unfortunately therefore not be a linear or chronologically simple task. 
 
Crucial to positioning the transformation within coercive violence was the emergence of 
the sovereign state as the pre-eminent form of institution within the political establishment. The 
starting point for this examination, therefore, must be the Peace of Westphalia, which when signed 
to end the Thirty Years War gave rise to the conception of the Westphalian state with the 
sovereignty of each nation paramount. These series of treaties, forming the Peace of Westphalia, 
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were essentially an attempt at “seeking a response to the religious conflict of Europe”218 through 
recognising a “European body politic” consisting of “decentralised sovereignty dominated 
bod[ies].”219 This approach, influenced heavily by the theories espoused by Grotius regarding the 
self-determination and independence of states, established the framework for modern international 
law based upon the equal sovereignty of nations.220 The effect of this approach was to establish a 
system of sovereign states with the right of each nation to control its own internal affairs, without 
external interference or intervention a central prerequisite to the state monopolizing force. It was 
immediately following the Peace of Westphalia that a European state first established a standing 
national army with the issuing of a decree to retain fifty-two regiments of the Habsburg Empire’s 
military221 for the Holy Roman Empire. This army, funded by a direct taxation upon the Estates and 
commanded personally by the Habsburg monarchy through a Council hand-picked by the sitting 
Monarch,222 became the model of a national army. Similarly, the Prussian Army retained over 4,000 
permanent professional soldiers following the Peace of Westphalia, 223  while the first French 
national military was formed in 1659 with the incorporation of permanent infantry units alongside 
the rapid expansion of the national Gendarmerie from 1667 onwards.224 England, which had not 
been a party to much of the Thirty Years War due to its own Civil War, for the first time in its 
history saw the establishment of the New Model Army under Oliver Cromwell in 1645, as a fully 
professional and permanent army, not tied to Feudal lands and obligations.225  
 
Despite the rapid incorporation of these state armies however, the effect of Westphalia is 
regularly overstated. The suggestion that the conclusion of the Treaty meant “sovereignty won out 
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against the empire”226 or the “Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 officially sanctioned [the] state’s 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force”227 exaggerate the impact of the Treaty significantly. 
Instead, the monopolisation of coercive violence within states was slow and gradual, with the 
effects being seen in a varying degrees depending upon the unique characteristics of each state. 
Furthermore, regardless of the rationale for the use of private force preceding the Thirty Years War, 
it remained at the time of the Treaty one of the most lucrative businesses in Europe.  
 
Military entrepreneurs, who stood to lose heavily from the downsizing of mercenary 
warfare exercised strong political influence and often a financial interdependence with many rulers. 
Rather than directly establishing citizen armies, or even prohibiting the employment of mercenaries, 
following the Treaty states increasingly regulated mercenary activity by incorporating them into 
their standing armies. Mercenaries remained a principal component of the armies of most European 
states with hired foreign forces forming up to 60 percent of all infantry and cavalry.”228  The 
principal change, therefore, was not a move away from mercenaries per se, but instead the removal 
of their purely financial motives as “[t]he mercenaries remaining were no longer independent and 
were generally hired out from one state to another in situations of tight control.”229 It is clear 
therefore that while the Peace of Westphalia was influential in establishing the foundation of the 
state monopoly over coercive violence, while sovereign’s remained absolute the use of private 
violence continued to be a norm. The provision of private coercive violence remained an important 
and lucrative industry.230 Tracing the origins of the state monopoly over coercive violence therefore 
requires a comprehensive examination of the changes concerning the ideas of sovereignty and the 
provision of coercive violence.  
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In order to do this, this section will examine the most significant factors in the 
transformation of coercive violence and consider how each relates to the move towards citizen 
armies, the democratic control over coercive violence and the move towards a general acceptance 
of the idea of a state responsibility for their citizen’s safety. In her examination Mercenaries: The 
History of a Norm in International Relations231 Sarah Percy identifies three prevalent arguments 
within existing literature for the shift towards a citizen army. Percy argues that traditional 
approaches within literature adopt either systemic arguments, i.e. that population growth and 
changing demographics caused citizen armies to be seen as beneficial, political changes, in 
particular, the development of enlightenment ideals and finally international changes, specifically 
the development of the doctrine of neutrality before advancing her own argument premised upon 
changes in morality. This section adopts a similar approach but argues that this complex transition 
cannot be attributed to any one individual cause but requires a holistic approach to establishing the 
cause of what was in effect a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between a sovereign and 
citizens.  
 
2.3(1) Attitude to War 
A central component of these social changes was a shift in opinion towards the role of 
coercive violence. Influenced heavily by military progress that affected both the practical approach 
and public view of warfare, societal opinion shifted against the perpetual state of war that private 
coercive violence relied upon financially. As the previous section shows, for much of European 
history war had been a regular and lucrative business. Entire regions relied heavily upon the income 
provided by mercenaries, with little other work for the male population and the prospect of 
significant war booty from successful trips.232 While European rulers, seeing mercenaries as a threat 
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to their power, had long sought to bring this industry under their control,233 practicalities had 
ensured that mercenaries and military entrepreneurs continued to play an important role. The 
eventual impetus for change came as a result of technological advances in warfare.  As the 
mechanisation of war introduced the use of both heavy and light artillery, and an increasing 
prevalence of firearms, the entire nature of warfare suddenly changed. The effect was to make war 
an increasingly cheap and deadly vocation. Prior to these innovations, a ruler’s primary difficulty 
in maintaining a standing army lay in the economic requirements of funding for training and 
maintaining soldiers and equipment. Highly skilled soldiers in the cavalry, archery or certain 
infantry divisions, Swiss Pikemen or Landsknechts for example, required several years of expensive 
training to reach the standard expected and with this came an understanding of the value of their 
skills and an expectation of appropriate remuneration. These soldiers expected continuous 
employment at high wages and could not simply be mobilised quickly when necessary. This 
changed with the advent of the musket which, turned common infantrymen, with relatively little 
training,  into the most sophisticated and deadly soldiers on the battlefield. As a result, rulers were 
able to maintain small or medium garrisons or soldiers at low wages, and when necessary quickly 
expand this force without great expenditure or training, and with this the standing army became 
both an economic and practical reality. Moreover, prior to the expansion of firearms warfare had 
been surprisingly non-lethal. Training troops was a significant investment and tactics were designed 
to ensure minimum casualties, casualties were primarily non-fatal and the injured soldiers would 
often return to a later battle. This had even developed into the establishment campaigning season, 
accompanied by a corresponding break during which soldiers would go home to recover over winter 
before taking up arms again in the spring. Firearms and artillery changed this indefinitely with the 
level of fatalities and serious injuries growing exponentially.234 Soldiers who could be replaced 
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cheaply became expendable, with the result that military tactics becoming riskier, while the 
decreasing effectiveness of formations against artillery left individual effectiveness as the decisive 
factor.235 The ability to quickly recruit soldiers took precedence over the ability to train soldiers and 
as a result, the nation-state, with the ability to conscript, for the first time emerged as the most adept 
organisation for waging war. While the process was by no means immediate236 these technological 
advances played a crucial role in establishing the state monopoly over coercive violence and in 
particular the transition towards citizen armies.   
 
2.3(2) Development of the Nation State  
While changes within the nature of warfare made the state monopolisation of coercive 
violence a practical goal, they also played a second arguably more crucial role in this transition, 
establishing the political framework for the development of the nation-state and the corresponding 
emergence of public international law (PIL). As the changing nature of warfare made it easier and 
cheaper for rulers to conduct war, the increasing levels of violence led to the growth of a widespread 
European antipathy towards war on a level previously unseen. Even before the Thirty Years War, 
Europe had witnessed an unprecedented level of violence both between rulers and increasingly by 
rulers against their citizens.237 While firearms had already made war an increasingly deadly activity, 
the religious upheavals that accompanied the Protestant Reformation gave added significance to the 
perceived importance of victory and pushed the boundaries of warfare. The German Peasant Revolt 
of 1524-1525 and the Wars of Religion in France from 1562 to 1598 devastated their countries 
causing over 300,000 and 2,000,000 deaths respectively.238 Modern technology made Total War239 
increasingly conceivable, culminating in the Thirty Years War, where an increasing number of 
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belligerents expanded the conflict throughout Europe. As these interventions increased so did the 
ruthlessness of the armies, with widespread devastation on a level unseen before.  
 
Furthermore, previous military tactics had largely limited the impact of warfare on civilian 
populations; large open spaces were required for cavalry and pike formations, leaving urban centres 
largely unaffected directly by conflict. 240  The evolution of military technology and tactics 
increasingly blurred this line; warfare became progressively less restricted with actors seeking not 
only victory but total annihilation of the opposition, military and civilian alike.241 By the end of the 
war between a quarter and third of all people living within the fragmented stated of the Former 
Holy Roman Empire had been killed, and a third of all towns raised to the ground.242 Entire regions 
were decimated, with previously prosperous towns left without a trace that have not recovered to 
this day. This widespread devastation was previously unknown with Grotius stating that 
“Throughout the Christian world I observed a lack of restraint in relation to war, such as even 
barbarous races should be ashamed of… there is no longer any respect for law, divine or human; it 
is as in accordance with a general decree, frenzy had been let loose for committing of all crimes.”243  
 
As the effects of war began to be felt more significantly by civilians, citizens increasingly 
began to question the incontestable rights of their rulers to exercise coercive violence. This gradual 
movement gained significant momentum from the middle of the 16th Century as the Reformation 
split Europe and increasingly undermined the foundation of monarchies across the continent. Legal 
theorists, including Bodin244 and Grotius,245 emerged seeking to establish alternative theories both 
for the justification of the authority of sovereigns to complement, or eventually replace, divine 
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choice and for the identification of limits upon the role of a sovereign which could prevent some of 
the most exceptional atrocities carried out in the name of religion.. Bodin’s Six Books of the 
Commonwealth246 was conceived in reflection on the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre, arguing 
that only through a strong unitary sovereign could such events be prevented in future. Similarly, 
Grotius wrote De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (Of the Law of War and Peace)247 in the middle of the 
devastation, and genocidal tactics, of the Thirty Years War. Finally, Thomas Hobbes’ espousal of 
the first complete explanation of a social contract, did so with direct reference to the English Civil 
War and the tyrannical rule that Oliver Cromwell had relied upon, to conclude that a contractual 
transfer of sovereign power from a people to their ruler was essential to “defend them [citizens] 
from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another.”248  
  
While these theorists ultimately came to competing conceptions of sovereignty, their 
explanations ultimately rested upon the pre-eminence of Sovereign States within the international 
community.  The starting point was Jean Bodin, who although did not invent it, most consider the 
“‘father’ of ‘sovereignty’”249 For Bodin, establishing an absolute sovereign with a corresponding 
absolute control over coercive violence was essential to maintaining peace with this, while not 
explicitly, laying the foundation for the pre-eminence of the sovereign state, in particular against 
the claim of papal superiority.250 Bodin’s theory of sovereignty was re-examined by Grotius who 
while he questioned the need for a ruler to have absolute sovereignty over their citizens, maintained 
that at the international level sovereign states remained the only legitimate actors and maintained 
the absolute control over the decision to utilise a state’s coercive violence, within the constraints of 
Natural Law.251 The effect of this philosophical development was to establish the sovereign state as 
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the pre-eminent actor within international law, establishing the foundation of what we now term 
Westphalian sovereignty, and placing state sovereignty at the centre of public international law. 
 
Overall, therefore. this development of what we now term Westphalian sovereignty is 
particularly relevant in the study of private coercive violence. It was largely due to the increasing 
supremacy of the sovereign state, at the expense of both extra-territorial authority in the case of the 
Church and localised authority in the case of Feudal Lords, that national armies became a prevailing 
standard. And while not exclusively the case, it was the view that states exercised sole authority 
over their citizens which also led to a gradual increase in the number of these armies consisting 
only of citizens. Parallel to this, while the theory of internal sovereignty played a role in developing 
citizen armies, the external theory of the sovereign state, led towards the principle of non-
intervention. This view that states should not interfere with the actions of other states was an 
essential component of Westphalian Sovereignty and intimately linked to the Peace’s attempt to 
prevent further religious wars. A key component of this non-intervention was a duty on states to 
prevent the recruitment and organisation of mercenaries within their territory for the purpose of 
intervening in another state. Private mercenaries therefore became increasingly proscribed within 
international law. Ultimately, however, it is important to note that while the doctrine of state 
supremacy reduced the influence of private mercenaries, the use of foreign armies remained 
relatively widespread.252  
 
2.3(3) The Social Contract and the Sovereign State 
The final and most significant factor it is necessary to examine in relation to the state 
monopoly over violence is the development of the social contract. At the heart of the question that 
these theorists sought to answer was discovering the relationship between the sovereign and their 
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citizens. As a result, this era became associated with the first modern conceptions of nationality and 
the reciprocal relationship of rights and duties between a state and its citizens. While it is beyond 
the scope of this study to fully consider the development of social contract theory, an examination 
of the three most prominent proponents can give us an insight into how this philosophical revolution 
transformed the nature of the sovereign power and consequently coercive violence within societies. 
This section will therefore examine the theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and finally Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. It will examine how their attempts to identify the relationship between 
sovereign, state and citizen laid the foundation for the modern conception for not only the state 
monopoly over violence but also the corresponding democratic control over this coercive violence.  
 
The starting point for this examination, therefore, must be Thomas Hobbes’ whose 
Leviathan is widely considered to have established Social Contract theory. Hobbes’ central thesis 
claims that all political society is premised upon a common consent of the people to lift themselves 
out of the anarchical “state of nature” which was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”253 In 
order to do this, Hobbes reasoned that the citizens must come together and “erect such a Common 
Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and injuries of one 
another”.254 In effect, Hobbes social contract was founded upon the basis of a sovereign monopoly 
over legitimate violence. Hobbes reasoned that only through giving up their “natural right to the 
use of armed force for their protection and transfer[ing] it to a collective authority”255 can a society 
ensure that cooperation, rather than violence prevailed as the form of societal authority. The central 
component of this theory, however, lay not simply in combining the means of violence within a 
society, but instead in “prohibiting the private use of armed force and invest[ing] it in a 
sovereign” 256  Specifically, Hobbes argued that “[t]he nature of War, consisteth not in actual 
fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all times there is no assurance to the 
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contrary”257 The key aspect to maintaining this assurance of peaceful interaction in the social 
contract therefore, is the sovereign monopolisation of coercive violence. This sovereign monopoly 
has two effects on the relationship between sovereign power and citizens. Within a state, this 
monopoly over violence required the sovereign to exercise a form of coercive authority, supported 
by the threat of violence, to secure the enforcement of the Social Contract. As the sole bearer of 
coercive capacity, the sovereign owed a responsibility to citizens to maintain peace and order over 
society. Internally, therefore, the sovereign owed a duty to citizens to ensure their physical safety 
and protect their rights from interference; in effect establishing the state responsibility for enforcing 
laws.  
 
Beyond the national borders however, the sovereign’s absolute right manifests in an ability 
to utilise the collective violence of the society in “procuring the safety of his People” through 
“making Warre and Peace with other nations… that is to say of judging when it is for the publique 
good; and how great forces are to be assembled, armed and pay’d for that end.”258 In relation to 
private violence, it is notable that Hobbes did not specifically mention mercenaries. This is possibly 
due to the fact that while mercenaries were used in the English Civil War, their prevalence was 
relatively minor and limited to individual mercenary groups, unlike the military entrepreneurs who 
devastated much of Central Europe. Instead, it must be inferred that if all citizens vest their capacity 
for violence in an absolute sovereign the Social Contract would not allow an individual to offer 
their personal violence in a private market. Hobbes further alludes to this when stating that a man 
may be “commanded” to serve as a soldier under threat of death259, and while generally they may 
avoid service if they can find a suitable replacement, this option is removed when “the Defence of 
the Commonwealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms.”260 The implication 
is that the social contract establishes a citizens duty and therefore the use of mercenaries would be 
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unacceptable. Hobbes formulation of a social contract radically overhauled the perceived 
relationship between states and their citizens, espousing the most complete theory of state 
sovereignty to that point. In doing so the Hobbesian social contract offered a justification and 
support for Bodin’s earlier conception of the absolutist sovereign, to the effect that only through a 
strong and unified central figure, vested with the violence of the entire nation, could the security of 
a state be guaranteed.   
 
Over the succeeding century and a half however, the concept of the supreme sovereign was 
to come under increasing scrutiny as enlightenment theorists sought to further redefine the 
relationship between sovereign and citizen. Their formulations found reflections in the revolutions 
in America and France, which while rooted in a number of factors were both underpinned by an 
increasing call for representation within decision-making processes. Accompanying these political 
revolutions was a philosophical reimagining of the social contract in terms of a reciprocal 
relationship between sovereign, and citizen which began with the formulations of Locke and 
Rosseau but was picked up by John Stuart Mill in England,261 and Hamilton and Madison in 
America, 262  and came to shape Western political landscape as the competing arguments for 
liberalism and republicanism respectively.  
 
Locke’s Two Treatise of Government263 does not directly discuss the state monopoly on 
violence, the central aspect of Locke’s social contract is the postulate that the continuing consent 
of the citizen to being ruled is required for a legitimate and accountable state. The primary role of 
this state is to act as arbiter between competing claims between citizens; setting rules and settling 
disputes. However, within this Locke establishes that for the state to be capable of executing these 
rules they must exercise sole authority over the use of coercive force for the functioning of the 
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State,264 as “where there is an Authority… from which relief can be had by appeal, there the 
continuance of the State of War [Nature] is excluded”265 Beyond the state, however, Locke agreed 
with Hobbes that the executive was empowered to act independently as “prerogative powers by the 
executive would apply… to foreign affairs and war.”266 This suggests that with regards to the 
collective violence of the citizenship in defence of the state, Locke saw this as being wholly vested 
in the executive. Contained within this monopoly of violence, was an implicit understanding that 
“society expects its men… to go to war in its defence. A good citizen must have a sense of civic 
obligation.”267 Locke’s work, however, must be read in context and in particular with reference to 
the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 during which much of his work was written and which provided 
much of its inspiration. And it must be recognised that Locke’s executive is not the absolute 
sovereign of Hobbes’ Leviathan. Indeed, one of the central aspects of the Glorious Revolution was 
the prohibition on the King maintaining a standing army during peacetime without the consent of 
parliament.268 As such, although Locke saw the state as maintaining a monopoly on legitimate 
violence, it was understood that this was vested within a representative of the people and for the 
good of the people.  
 
Almost 100 years later, this approach was to be expanded significantly as Rousseau wrote 
Of the Social Contract which emphasised the importance of the general will of the population. For 
Rousseau, a social contract did not exist between citizens and a sovereign; but instead among all 
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citizens.269 Unlike Locke, however, Rousseau saw the provision of, and monopoly over, violence 
as one of the central requirements for a state or sovereign. The basic formation of the social contract 
was therefore to “find a form of association that will bring the whole common force to bear on 
defending and protecting each associate’s person and goods.” 270  For Rousseau, therefore, the 
monopolisation of violence as a key characteristic of any sovereign was self-evident, and the 
primary purpose of the social contract was to “prevent[s] the abuse of the sovereigns monopoly on 
armed force.”271 In order to achieve this, Rousseau believed that the sovereign should, rather than 
be an individual imbued with this power by virtue of personality, be a collective body which through 
acting in unity represents the general will.272 As such in forming the social contract, “[e]ach of us 
puts his person and all his power in the common under the supreme direction of the general will; 
and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”273 In doing this, 
Rousseau is able to both monopolise the use of force within a “sovereign” and democratise it to 
ensure that it works for the benefit of those who entrust their capacities within it. Beyond this, 
however, Rousseau, echoing the British Bill of Rights prohibition on peacetime standing armies, 
explicitly called upon the sovereign force to be reliant solely upon its citizens, as “regular troops… 
are only good for two purposes: to attack and conquer neighbors, or to shackle and enslave 
citizens.” 274  Furthermore, Rousseau believed that when “public service stops being the chief 
business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their money than their persons, the state is not 
far from collapse.” Giving the specific example, he continues [if] “they are needed to march out to 
war… [but] [t]hey pay troops and stay at home… they end up with soldiers to enslave their 
country.”275 Considering this it is clear that according to this formation of the social contract, the 
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citizen army, and the duty to serve in it, are not simply a judicious choice, but the very foundation 
of the social contract.276  
 
The development of social contract theory played a further role in the increasing state 
monopolisation of violence and the increase of citizen armies, as it was instrumental in influencing 
the growth of Romantic Nationalism during the Enlightenment period.277 Rousseau, in particular, 
relied heavily upon an understanding of a communal nationality, replacing imposed subjection, as 
the common bond between citizens necessary to generate the “general will” of patriotic duty 
towards protecting one’s own nation. 278  Aided by the expansion of enlightenment ideal of 
separation of Church and State, and the growing recognition of the power of a shared language, 
culture and history to bind people together, patriotism spread quickly across Europe and America. 
Indeed it has been suggested that the expansion of nationalist ideals was intentionally fostered with 
military factors in mind. 279  In particular, considering the separation of Church and State, 
nationalism was potentially considered essential to filling the void left by religion as a key 
motivating factor within nations. 280  From this point of view, argues Juergensmeyer, “secular 
nationalism, therefore, involves not only an attachment to a spirit of social order but also an act of 
submission to an ordering agent.”281  
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2.4 The Modern State: Monopolising Coercive Violence 
2.4(1) The Citizen Army 
Within 100 years, the effect of the combination of these practical changes and philosophical 
developments were evidenced as the concept of Westphalian Sovereignty, the Social Contract and 
Civic Nationalism converged in the French and American revolutions. The defining characteristics 
of these events, the call for liberty, equality and democratic representation formed the foundation 
of the modern state. Central to these ideals was a fundamental rejection of absolute monarchs who 
were unanswerable to the people and the establishment of Republics, effectively manifesting the 
competing ideals of Rousseau’s and Locke’s social contract.  
 
Considering the democratic ideals that inspired the creation of these newly formed 
republics, the importance of citizen armies, and militias, in both gaining and maintaining this form 
of representative government.282 The American Revolution was “the first major case… where a 
citizen army motivated by duty and patriotism fought an old-style army”283 with the advantage that 
it could “call upon the service of free citizens who had a stake in their society.”284 Civic duty in 
Madison’s, conception of representative government, included “a duty to defend [the citizens] 
community through active military service.”285 This duty, unlike previous military duties based 
upon feudalism etc., was explicitly designed to enforce the popular control of the government’s 
monopoly on violence. As such, the American model of armed forces was designed to consist of a 
citizen army supplemented by civilian militias with the explicit rejection of the use of mercenaries 
as a moral and political act. This view was echoed in the French Revolution when having disbanded 
the French Military and ancien regime, Secretary of the National Assembly Dubois-Crancé argued 
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that “in a nation that seeks to be free… every citizen should be a soldier and every soldier a 
citizen.”286 Stretching beyond the voluntary service expected in America, the French approach 
required all citizens to actively participate in the French war effort, from conscripting males of 
fighting age, to employing women to make tents for the military. Furthermore, as part of this 
nationalist approach, the National Assembly passed a bill preventing the use of foreign fighters 
within the regular French military.287 The use of citizen armies and militias, however, was not 
simply the civic duty but a fundamental protection from the absolutist sovereignty which preceded 
the revolution. Both the French and American leaders recognised that only the democratic control 
of state violence could protect the citizens from tyranny. As such, serving in the army or militia was 
simultaneously a duty towards one's country and an act of self-defence to control the state monopoly 
on violence. 288 
 
By the 20th Century, the concept of the state monopoly over coercive violence had largely 
been established as a norm within international law. Antimercenarism laws had been passed by 
Britain (1819), France (1804), United States (1794), Russia (1845) and Switzerland (1853) followed 
by most other European nations.289   
 
2.4(2) Public Policing  
Whilst social contract theory led to the state monopolisation on force, the position of the 
state as a bearer of responsibilities also led to the increasing belief in the need for representative, 
civilian justice systems, with public police forces performing a central role in this evolution. The 
harsh punishments that formed the basis of medieval security, came to be seen as a reflection of the 
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tyrannical nature of many of the absolute monarchs. From this point of view, Beccaria’s On Crimes 
and Punishments drawing upon enlightenment ideas of rationality, legality and crucially the social 
contract, proposed that the private citizens’ position within society required the administration of 
justice and punishment to be fair, just and proportionate. Accordingly, the imposition of 
punishment, and the harshness of the imposed punishment, is justified only with regard to 
preserving the social contract, with the harshness imposed to represent both a societal deterrent but 
also crucially, a proportionate repayment of the debt the criminal owes to society for his actions.290 
This treatise became the foundation upon which Voltaire,291 Bentham292 and Blackstone293 among 
others built their theories of modern criminal justice.294 Within this new system, however, the 
purpose of a police force was no longer to protect the interests of the Monarch or the businessmen 
that paid them, but instead to represent, protect and finally deter the local community from crime.  
Prior to this, in Britain, there had remained a steadfast reliance upon the system of Justices 
of the Peace and Constables that had formed the basis of the “public security” for nearly 800 
years.295 This system was supplemented by an array of private actors, the most notable of which 
were “theif-takers” and Posse Comitias who worked alongside or instead of the police. This system 
was based upon the series of regulated financial rewards, paid either by the crown, private 
individuals or insurance companies and offered for the capturing of criminals. When this approach 
was exported to newly inhabited areas of the Western states of America by migrants, this reward 
system would often lead to the creation of semi-official vigilante groups, who operated under the 
combination of civic duty and financial reward.  
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By the early 19th Century, as London faced several large-scale riots against working and 
living conditions in the city, the inadequacies of the system were revealed when army cavalry was 
brought in to quell a working-class protest at St. Peters field. The 1819 Peterloo Massacre left 11 
protestors dead and nearly 400 injured. The subsequent passing of the “Six Acts” left many in the 
ruling class to view Britain as dangerously close to the kind of political warfare that France had 
seen just 50 years earlier. In 1829 this culminated in the passing of the Metropolitan Police Act, 
establishing one centralised force, answerable directly to parliament through the Home Office. The 
measure originally met fierce resistance, being seen as an attempt to replicate the brutal and 
repressive security forces used throughout continental Europe. In the event, however, as the police 
were unarmed, and wore top hats, rather than protective helmets, to indicate the civilian nature of 
their role296 these suspicions were allayed, assisted by a fall in crime rates and restoration of order 
to the streets of London. Following the success, Birmingham followed suit in 1839, before the 
passing of the Country and Borough Police Act in 1856, extending the home office funding across 
the whole of Britain. By the turn of the 20th century the entirety of Britain was under a modern state 
police force, answerable to parliament through the Home Secretary.  
In America, attempts to institute central government police forces proved much more 
difficult, with political conflicts within States and cities producing significant variations within the 
manner of policing throughout the nation. For a period of the 19th Century, New York effectively 
employed two rival police forces, with conflicting state and city governments attempting to exercise 
their authority. Furthermore, as mass migration to America from European cities attempts to 
institute police forces representative of the local population were soon policing populations with 
whom they often had negative relationships. Boston, in particular, suffered from difficulties as the 
influx of Irish immigrants was met by the election of the Protestant Know Nothing party who 
effectively banned Catholics serving in the police.297 Furthermore, while the metropolitan police, 
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upon which almost all American police forces were based, had clear rules about being unarmed and 
using only proportionate violence, their American counterparts were overwhelmingly armed with 
both a club and a revolver. Many early American police forces, effectively insulated, or actively 
hostile, to the communities that they were policing were characterised by a lack of accountability 
and excessive use of force.  
 
2.5 The Exceptions (That Help Prove The Rule) 
While an examination of the development of the state monopoly over coercive violence, 
and particularly the reciprocal citizens’ rights that were implicit within this is illustrative, equally 
illuminating is an examination of the exception to this evolution. In particular, this section will 
consider how the continuation of the private coercive violence in the maintenance of the European 
Empires illustrates the extent to which a rule of coercive violence where the social contract is unable 
to form legitimate power.  
 
2.5(1) Coercive Violence and the Empire 
“While national sovereignty became an established notion in Europe, power and legitimacy 
of overseas empires could be instilled in other apparatuses than just the state.”298 
At the beginning of the 17th century, the European nations that formed a central part of the spice 
trade, began to challenge the monopoly the Portuguese had maintained over the East Indian spice 
ports299 the British East India Company and Dutch East India Company, formed in 1600 and 1602 
respectively came to play an increasingly important role. Originally established as trading 
companies, they most likely the first multinational companies, 300  however, before long these 
organisations, along with other similar companies, began to control the most powerful private 
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armies of the day. By the 18th century the British East India Trading company commanded an army 
of over 200,000 men; mercenaries from Germany, Japan and Switzerland among a large proportion 
of these.301 Many others were hired from the local populations that were considered loyal and 
trustworthy, including the Nepalese area of India. The loyalty, bravery and success of these 
Nepalese soldiers led to them becoming a permanent regiment of the British Army known as the 
Ghurkha’s, a position which remains today. These private armies in effect came to control the vast 
majority of the Indian Subcontinent, establishing port towns, forts and military garrisons in a 
manner to be expected of a sovereign.302 These companies in effect directly contradicted the state 
monopoly over coercive violence, along with potentially undermining the Doctrine of Neutrality. 
They were able to, and frequently did, declare war. For much of the 17th, 18th and 19th century, 
South East Asia was host to a number of battles, essentially fought between private companies and 
using mercenary armies.303 Furthermore, due to their unpopularity with the local population, when 
the Companies were not in direct conflict with each other, they used their military might to violently 
suppress the local population. In effect, their operations relied upon indefinite martial law, with 
capital punishment and torture central components within their criminal systems. Similarly, sieges 
and blockades were used to secure monopolies over the trading rights of local produce. The Bengal 
Famine of 1770, which resulted in the deaths of over ten million Bengalis, was the direct result of 
the actions of the British (then English) East India Trading Company, which sought to maximise 
its local profits through a combination of increasing taxation, eventually taking nearly half of all 
the local produce, and ordering the planting of the more profitable opium plant in the place of rice 
and grain.304  
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These trading companies provide an excellent comparison with the development of the state 
monopoly over coercive violence outside of the social contract. While the Company was viewed as 
a legitimate actor within the international sphere, and recognised by both other States, and rival 
Companies as essentially exercising sovereignty over their area of commercial activity,305 it is 
difficult to consider its position legitimate within any moral consideration. The relationship between 
these trading companies and the local population was clearly one of tyranny in which economic 
exploitation was maintained through a rule of pure violence void of any legitimacy.306 Owing no 
responsibility to the people of India, the British East India Company protected their shareholder’s 
investment through a rule of the iron fist. The eventual collapse of the East India Company in 1857, 
came not because the directors of the company realised their crimes, but because they allowed their 
monopoly over coercive violence to slip beyond their control. The increasing costs of hiring 
European mercenaries forced the Company to move towards employing the local population to 
supplement the British and numerous German forces that the Company had traditionally relied 
on. 307  By 1858, the local forces outnumbered British officers nearly 6 to 1 and structural 
reorganisation had given greater autonomy to local forces308 preventing them from being able to 
suppress the internal revolt. The then Manchester Guardian concluded that as a result of the revolt 
“[w]e sincerely hope that the terrible lesson thus taught will never be forgotten ... We may rely on 
native bayonets, but they must be officered by Europeans."309 The British Army, requiring all of its 
military capabilities, eventually suppressed the revolt, massacring at least 100,000 Indian soldiers 
alongside most likely millions310  of rebels and civilians.311  One outcome of the revolt was to 
demonstrate that this rule of pure violence was incapable of sustaining itself; the East India 
Company was disbanded and replaced by the direct rule of the British Crown. Although the eventual 
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truthfulness of the statement is at very least dubious, this rule was built upon a promise from Queen 
Victoria that “We hold ourselves bound to the Natives of our Indian Territories by the same 
obligations of Duty which bind Us to all Our other subjects.”312  
 
2.5(2) American Policing: The Role of Slave Patrols 
A further illustration, through omission, of the role played by the evolving social contract 
in the development of the state monopoly over coercive violence can be found in the establishment 
of American policing. The United States had traditionally viewed central authority with suspicion 
and adopting in effect early American policing was limited. That which did exist either replicated 
the community system developed in the United Kingdom, or was built on commercial 
arrangements. Suspicions of government power, predicated on their experience under British rule 
meant that government policing meant that the provision of security was considered a civilian duty 
with local voluntary watches common.313 One exception to this existed in many southern States 
where Samuel Walker identified slave patrols as the first publicly funded police agencies in the 
American South.314 Slave patrols were created to manage the economic interests of slaveholders 
and maintain the institution of slavery in the southern region of America; by maintaining control 
over slave populations and returning escaped slaves to their masters.315 Supported by statutes that 
made it legal “for any person, or persons whatsoever, to kill or destroy such slaves (i.e. runaways… 
without accusation or impeachment of any crime”316 this control was enforced with a singular 
degree of brutality and ruthlessness. As the slave population grew, the level of tyranny increased. 
In 1721, South Carolina, increasingly concerned with potential uprisings, made its entire citizen 
militia responsible for the surveillance of slaves.317And while the slave patrols were officially 
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disbanded following the Civil War, the remnants of these groups quickly came to resemble and 
operate in a way that was similar to some of the newly established police departments in the United 
States. As such, several scholars and historians assert that the transition from slave patrols to 
publicly funded police agencies was seamless in the southern region of the United States.318 While 
the transition from slave patrol to public police is easy to overstate, this role of the slave patrols 
demonstrates once again the central role of the social contract in establishing the modern state 
monopoly over coercive violence. The relationship between white citizens had placed legitimate 
power at the centre of society, and with it the belief that in protecting their rights and liberties, the 
use of coercive violence was to be exercised by a representative community. In comparison, black 
slaves, outside of the social contract were to be subjugated through the exercise of pure violence. 
 
2.6 Conclusions  
 Throughout this Chapter it has sought to discuss the extent to which this relationship 
between sovereign power and coercive violence is defined by the reciprocity of rights and duties 
between a ruler and their citizens. Through examining the changes that occurred within the social 
system, it demonstrated that the eventual monopolisation of violence developed in relation to 
evolving conception of the social contract and the emergence of the nation-state. By the turn of the 
19th century, the state monopoly over coercive violence had largely been established as a norm 
across Europe and the United States. As the enlightenment transformed the relationship between 
sovereign and citizen, the ability to exercise coercive violence increasingly became a symbiotic 
relationship, in which the sovereign right to exercise violence corresponded with a responsibility to 
use it only in defence of the general will of the population. Furthermore, as the state monopoly over 
coercive violence developed into an accepted norm, a corresponding doctrine of neutrality 
developed. This sought to prevent states from raising an army with another’s citizens, individuals 
from selling their services to another state, and individuals conducting military actions against a 
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state for their private interests. Internally, the role of the sovereign had morphed from absolute to 
representative and responsible, having responsibilities towards their citizens. Public policing, 
premised on representative and civilian justice systems had largely displaced the combination of 
local, community-based criminal justice and within the UK in particular, even the hint of martial 
law drew comparisons with tyrannical monarchs of the pre-enlightenment.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE STATE AND POST-MODERNITY: 
POSITIONING THE RISE OF PRIVATE  
COERCIVE VIOLENCE 
 
3 Introduction 
Despite the prominent position that private actors currently hold within the security 
landscape, the privatisation of coercive violence as discussed within this research has principally 
evolved to its current form in little over 30 years. The prevailing notion of the state’s monopoly on 
legitimate violence reached its apex following the Two World Wars, with states laying a direct 
claim to the violent potential of its citizens. Across much of the world through the establishment of 
public police forces and standing citizen armies, the provision of coercive violence was increasingly 
heavily controlled by Governments and their representatives. It is against this background that this 
chapter seeks to trace the rise of PMSCs; examining the major trends that have contributed to this 
position of modern PMSCs. It will seek to position these trends within the changing nature and 
capabilities of States, identifying the primary factors behind these.  
 
While the transformation of coercive violence, and the increasingly private provision of it, 
is indisputable the causes of this are more difficult to trace, with a variety of inter-related and co-
dependent factors contributing to varying degrees. In attempting to determine these factors this 
Chapter will begin by examining how the changing nature of states has contributed to the growth 
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of PMSCs. It will demonstrate how the ability of States to fulfil the roles traditionally considered 
the preserve of public authorities has diminished, leaving the space for private actors to expand. 
Thereafter it will consider how these changes were directly affected by the control over the 
instruments of coercive violence. It will both identify how these changes affected the ability of 
States to control coercive violence, as well as consider how the accessibility of the instruments 
violence, including trained personnel and weapons, that created an environment in which PMSCs 
could rapidly expand. The final factor this chapter will consider, related to the changes in state 
capabilities, is the increasing prevalence of neo-liberal policies and the corresponding growth of 
globalisation throughout the international community. It will consider the extent to which this has 
exacerbated the inability, or unwillingness, of states to fulfil their traditional state roles. While these 
considerations are by no means an exhaustive discussion of the changes influential in the 
privatisation of coercive violence they represent three of the most influential factors. And although 
they are separated into these three categories, they are highly inter-related and dependent upon each 
other. 
 
It will conclude by drawing together these factors in a thematic model, identifying the key 
themes consistent within these causes. It will seek to demonstrate that each of the factors is directly 
affected by the changing nature of sovereignty in post-modernity, highlighting that the weakening 
of the state has been accompanied by a growth of private coercive violence to fill the vacuum. 
Demonstrating that the growth of PMSCs has developed most rapidly in areas where there is limited 
state sovereignty and highlight the reverse relationship between the strength of the state and the 
function/violence of the PMSCs. 
 
3.1 Post War (In)Security: The Seeds of PMSCs 
Following the Allied victory in World War Two, the world was entering an entirely 
unknown age. Europe had lost its position as the financial and military capital of the world, its 
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armies decimated, and its economies largely reliant upon American loans. The Atlantic Charter,319 
the guiding document of the Allies post-war international policy established self-determination as 
a guiding principle of international law.320 The colonial empires that had controlled much of the 
world for the past 500 years were falling apart and with it, much of the civil and political 
infrastructure that had maintained it. The natural resources that had financially supported these 
Empires pre-War were increasingly moving away from the control of their colonial rulers. The 
transnational corporations that ran many of these ventures essentially on behalf of colonial regimes 
were increasingly unwelcome with independence, nationalist and socialist movements emerging 
across the globe. Finally, with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global superpower ensured 
that with the conclusion of World War Two, the whole globe essentially descended directly into the 
Cold War. 
 
The era was defined by a backdrop of rampant militarism, a reliance by smaller states on 
the two superpowers, and exponential developments in nuclear and other military technologies. 
Considering this, the post-war world was dominated by several key themes with security at the 
centre. The first of these was fast military expansions, with both the USSR and NATO expanding 
their military capabilities quickly, and consistently for the next 30 years. Alongside this, internal 
security took on an increasingly important role both sides of the Iron Curtain. Soviet control over 
the USSR was implemented through increasingly totalitarian means with the Ministry of State 
Security and GRU controlling almost all political and social activities. 321  In reply, the US 
government, following the National Security Act of 1947,322 was a military-focused response to the 
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evolving Cold War concept of national security.323 In achieving the grand strategic function of 
containing the USSR, the US national security state grew, at least in part, in relation to the Soviet 
“total security state.” 324  This pattern of increased centralised state control over security was 
replicated throughout much of the world, in particular, Western Europe. Many European states who 
were experiencing political upheaval in their Empires, resorted to martial law, internment camps 
and brutal repression. The British treatment of the Mau Mau in Kenya,325 and the French response 
to Algerian independence movements,326 represent just a small portion of the military operations 
undertaken by Colonial rulers. Those states that had achieved independence were quickly drawn 
into the spheres of influence of either the US or USSR, as the cold war increasingly transformed 
into a proxy-war. And both superpowers looking for stability and control turned towards 
authoritarian regimes. By the turn of the 20th century, therefore, across the globe States had laid a 
claim to the monopoly on violence. From strong public police forces, secret intelligence units and 
large standing armies, the provision of force both within a sovereign territory, and in the name of a 
nation, was expected to be controlled by Governments and their representatives. It is from this 
backdrop that this study must start to examine the trends towards the current state of private coercive 
violence.  
 
3.1(1) Changing Nature of Statehood in Post-Modernity 
Considering the central role that the development of sovereignty played in the development 
of coercive violence, it is unsurprising that this provided a central catalyst for this change. 
Specifically, it is essential to recognise a foundational transformation in the change in the nature of 
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states. As Robert I Rotberg, former President Emeritus of the World Peace Foundation notes, 
“[S]tates are much varied in their capacity and capability than they once were.”327 While the range 
of “population sizes, physical endowments, wealth”328 among other factors are increasingly diverse 
among the growing number of States. This transformation has been remarkably quick. In the years 
preceding World War Two, there were sixty-five recognised political states. By 1970 this number 
had jumped to ninety, and over the next forty years this number more than doubled, with 191 states.  
Alongside an exponential increase in the number of states, however, was a shift in the characteristics 
of these states, with the nation-state transformed from inherently large and powerful entity. Instead, 
many of these newly sovereign states were characterised by political insecurity and weak 
governance, without the levels of infrastructure established over hundreds of years in many of the 
older states. Two events are instructive in relation to both the increase in the number of states and 
simultaneously the characteristics of the newly formed states.  
 
3.1(2) Decolonisation 
Following the signing of the Atlantic Treaty in 1941,329 the Western Empires of Britain and 
France agreed to move towards a position of self-determination. The acceptance of this as a 
necessity within International Law was further strengthened with the passing of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.330 In the 30 years 
following World War Two, the vast majority of former colonies gained independence, with the UN 
General Assembly declaring these new states as sovereign and ratifying their borders. Many of 
these new nations, however, suffered from great instability with economic, cultural and political 
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divisions plaguing region where “states… are not states in the strictest sense… they do not possess 
authority, as distinct from mere power; they do not possess enduring legal and administrative 
structures.”331 While the Nation State had developed within Europe over centuries, beneath the 
colonial power, many regions of the world retained a “heterogeneous political heritage”332 that was 
“brushed aside in the rush by nationalists to seize the reins of power.”333 Noted Ghanaian historian 
Albert Adu Boahen noted that Independence created “new states with clearly defined (albeit 
inappropriate) boundaries in place of "the existing innumerable lineage and clan groups, city-states, 
kingdoms, and empires without any fixed boundaries."334 As a result of the manner in which these 
States were formed and their respective territories drawn, however, the withdrawal of the strong 
central power of the Colonial States invariably led to tensions among the artificial borders that 
failed to accurately reflect ethnic, tribal or cultural ties. The historical use of “divide and rule” 
policies to maintain colonial power had further caused lasting tensions that came to the forefront as 
the favoured groups were invariably able to gain control of the political and economic interests 
following independence. The German and subsequent Belgium preference for the Tutsi people of 
East Africa led to their establishment as the ruling class in Rwanda and Burundi despite numeric 
disadvantage and to this day rule fuels ethnic violence in the region.335 Furthermore, following 
independence, whilst some States managed to form representative democratic governments, the 
vast majority resorted to various forms of dictatorship, often propped up along ethnic or religious 
lines. Fearful of the threat from the “growing threats from their own subordinates”336 however, 
many rulers intentionally minimised the development of bureaucratic apparatus in fear it “might 
develop their own agendas”337 Regardless of this, democracy was largely unsuccessful with 72 
percent of African leaders leaving office through a coup between 1970 and 1989.338 In South East 
Asia, the cases of India and Indonesia, two well established and continuous democracies following 
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independence are vastly outnumbered by those neighbouring states who have fallen into autocracy 
and dictatorships. Combined with this was a rush to exploit the vast mineral reserves of many of 
these nations. With the process lacking in accountability and infrastructure an environment 
flourished in which powerful leaders were able to vastly expand their personal wealth and utilise 
this to buy support, as such large-scale corruption became the rule rather than the exception.339 As 
State assets were sold off the “incumbent elites” overwhelmingly took advantage of their positions 
to either acquire these at knock-down prices or else privately profit from the sale to a third party.340 
 
Alongside this, much of the potential for large-scale violence was exploited by the 
escalation of the cold war, with many conflicts transforming into asymmetric proxy wars between 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Angolan civil war is emblematic of this process, during which the ethnic 
tensions between the Ambundu, Bakongo and Ovimbundu people were exploited for the purpose 
of Cold War interests.341 The USSR, and Cuba in particular, were essential to the establishment and 
military support of the Ambundu backed People Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). 
This included financial and military aid, with over 30,000 Cuban soldiers taking part in the 
hostilities. Parallel to this was a much more illicit backing of the Ovimbundu backed National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola. Despite explicit Congressional refusal to support the UNITA 
rebels, the CIA and high ranking political leaders within the Reagan administration met with and 
provided backing to UNITA.342 Much of this was through third-party states, with Israel and South 
Africa, in particular, providing an indirect method of providing support.  
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3.1(3) Fall of the Soviet Union 
In 1991, the changing nature of states was further complicated with the fall of the Soviet 
Union. This directly affected the nature of statehood through the dissolution of the USSR into 
fifteen individual states. Followed soon after by the collapse of the Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
into a further nine smaller states. As with the former colonial states, these newly independent states 
of the USSR, and the international community, were faced with unique difficulties posed by their 
situations. The European Commission, in considering these difficulties, noted particularly that “the 
majority of contemporary states were not formally established as distinct entities” 343  instead 
transitioning from former Empires to the USSR.  As a result, many of these newly formed states 
faced difficulties transitioning to open democratic states, including a lack of any form of civil 
society, which had been intentionally repressed by the single party system with the bureaucratic 
arms of the State centrally controlled from Russia. Further difficulties were encountered through 
the lack of financial and commercial infrastructure suitable to incorporate into an international 
order, required for assistance from the IMF and WTO.344  
 
It is clear that following Independence of many former colonial or Soviet states there was 
a drastic shift in the nature of States within the international community. Alongside a dramatic 
increase in the number of countries was a significant change in the nature of countries. Prior to 
1945, the majority of States existed within designated physical parameters that had evolved over a 
period of hundreds of years. In comparison, many newly established States were arbitrary 
geographic spaces predicated upon the interests of external actors, without concern for the internal 
demographic or economic relationships of the citizens within these States. While historical States 
had developed systems of governance to suit the requirements and benefit their nation, these 
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infrastructures were not in place for many newly independent states whose administration was 
designed primarily to benefit external parties. Furthermore, the foundational requirement of the 
State was the ability to provide security for their citizens. In most of these newly independent states, 
these capabilities were absent. Vesting coercive violence in the local community was a direct threat 
to either the colonising states or the USSR. As such, much of the security had been provided by 
external forces, for example, the use of the British Army and Navy, the French Troupe Coloniales 
or Soviet troops and KGB agents.345 The majority of these withdrew rapidly upon independence. In 
the absence of this, many States were unable to fulfil their primary obligation of protecting their 
citizens, either internally or externally. Instead of seeking to replace the overall security apparatus, 
a task too complicated and expensive for many young States, there was a shift towards an increased 
use of semi-private violence with “Presidential guards a case in point…Sometimes it is not clear 
whether state formations have been appropriated for private interests… or substitute government 
functions.”346 In a number of Sub-Saharan African states, it has been suggested that “the armed 
forces have denigrated into self-serving corporations geared mainly at enriching their upper ranks… 
whose objective functions bear little relation to security, neither internal, nor external.”347 The effect 
was a proliferation of small states incapable of effectively controlling violence within their own 
borders and constantly threatened from outside.  
 
It is clear therefore that the independence movements associated with former colonial or 
Soviet States fundamentally transformed the conception of Statehood as imagined during the rise 
of the Nation State. As such, the ability of these newly formed States to exercise a monopoly over 
the use of coercive violence within their territory was increasingly limited. Many of these newly 
formed states lacked the infrastructure or capabilities required to control the use of coercive force. 
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Furthermore, many of the sovereigns within these new States lacked legitimacy and as such could 
often not command authority over the entire territory of their state. The social contract, that lay at 
the foundation of the concept of the nation-state, had not been allowed to develop in many of these 
states, with other social institutions more powerful than national concerns.348 
 
Alongside the direct changes to the nature and capabilities of States by the recognition of 
newly independent States, came equally important secondary effects. It is worth considering three 
of these in relation to the growth of the PMSC industry.  
 
3.2 Changing Military Power of States 
Following the end of the Cold War, many of the major nations sought to reduce military 
spending from the unsustainable heights of the 70s. As such, most NATO and former Soviet 
countries reduced their standing armies dramatically. Between 1989 and 1995 alone, as America 
reduced its standing army, over $30b was taken from the US Army budget, reducing it from $93b 
to just over $60b.349 As a result of these cuts, huge reductions took place in active troop numbers; 
the Brookings Institute, which tracks this data finding that the US Armed Forces reduced from 2.1 
million in 1989 to 1.37million in 2000. Similar cuts were common across many NATO states, with 
the United Kingdom reducing its armed forces from around 250,000 to around 120,000 troops 
during the same period.350  
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While reductions to NATO forces reduced significantly, the corresponding reductions 
within former Warsaw Pact nations were even more sweeping, with commentators suggesting that 
the speed and scale of the reductions had caused the Russian military to “deteriorate so badly that 
instead of providing security it has become a major source of insecurity”.351 The Russian national 
armed forces decreased from over 4 million in 1989 to just over 1 million in 2009,352 whilst its 
funding suffered a 90% decrease in relation to GDP. These reductions left Russia incapable of 
fulfilling its own security needs and unsuccessful campaigns in Chechnya were met with deep 
resentment among the Russian population.353 This increasing inability to ensure security within its 
own borders also helped create an environment in which Islamic extremism was able to gain a rapid 
foothold, with clashes in many Caucasus regions of Dagestan and Azerbaijan were indicative of the 
weakened position of the Russian Army.354   
 
Whilst the Russian army failed to control the countries South-East, much of its forces in 
the West had been lost completely being transferred to the newly independent Balkan nations, 
whose national armies essentially disintegrated following independence.355  Ukraine provides a 
unique example of the difficulties encountered by these newly independent states, who inherited 
large amounts of unsustainable Soviet military infrastructure. As Ukraine had been at the forefront 
of the Iron Curtain, it housed a disproportionate amount of Soviet military bases and equipment. As 
such, for a brief period between 1991 and 1993, it ranked as the third largest nuclear power in the 
world, with over 1,200 nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and 41 Nuclear Bombers, along 
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with the third largest Airforce in the World, despite having virtually no military infrastructure to 
support this.356 Furthermore, despite having a population of just over 50million in 1991, the army 
consisted of over 700,000 troops, nearly triple that of Britain despite having a smaller population.357 
By 1997 this number had been halved to under 350,000, a pattern replicated across many former 
Eastern Bloc countries.  
 
The downsizing of militaries was arguably most visible in the nations who had been at the 
forefront of proxy wars during the Cold War. As such, in assessing the state of African armies 
following in the mid 90’s the US Defence Intelligence Officer for Africa noted that:  
“Most African state armies are in decline, beset by a combination of shrinking budgets, 
international pressures to downsize and demobilize, and the lack of the freely accessible 
military assistance that characterized the Cold War period. With few exceptions, heavy 
weapons lie dormant, equipment is in disrepair, and training is almost non-existent… The 
principal forces of order are in disorder in many countries at a time when the legitimacy of 
central governments (and indeed sometimes the state) is in doubt.”358 
The stark nature of this military downsizing is evident when considering that for a period sub-
Saharan Africa “absorbed military equipment worth up to $5 billion a year… [b]y 1995, recorded 
values were estimated at $270million.”359 The effect of this has been that States have often “yielded 
the monopoly of legitimate violence” with both military and police forces contributing towards an 
effective security vacuum.360 
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These massive reductions in the militaries across the globe provided two of the key 
elements for the successful growth of PMSCs. The first of these was a huge number of well trained 
and professional soldiers who suddenly found themselves unemployed and available for hire on the 
PMSC Market. The abundance of ex-soldiers provided firms with the ability to move from simple 
guarding sector into the more professional security sector easily, and with relatively low set up 
costs. PMSCs became viable alternatives to public forces for large-scale security operations and 
often came with a significant cost benefit. Public forces were required to provide extensive training, 
long-term contracts and work benefits. PMSCs were often able to avoid these. They could hire 
quickly, raising a fully trained force within days, and through using short-term contracts were able 
to minimise expenses during quiet periods.  
 
3.2(1) Proliferation of Arms 
Alongside the reduction in state militaries, the fall of the Soviet Union provided another 
key ingredient for PMSCs to grow in the manner they have, specifically the proliferation of arms. 
During the Cold War, both the USA and USSR had transported large numbers of arms to third 
parties to conduct proxy wars. Between 1986 and 1990 the USSR exported between $11.6- $20 
billion of arms per year,361 with many these sales taking place between the USSR and other Soviet 
bloc or socialist countries. The Arab Socialist Iraqi government received over $10billion in arms 
from the USSR between 1982-1985 alone.362 The US similarly gifted, leased or loaned at least 
£12billion a year during the 1970s through it various military assistance programmes. In total, it is 
calculated that the USA sold or gifted more than £300billion of arms to over 120 countries from 
the period of 1954 to 1990.363 In a significant amount of these cases the recipients were either 
unstable states or non-state actors. This famously includes the CIA arming of the Nicaraguan 
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Contras,364 whilst in 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated that the principal 
objective of the military aid to Latin America was to assist "in the continued development of 
indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, in conjunction with the police 
and other security forces, the needed domestic security." 365  Similarly, during the civil war in 
Angola, the CIA estimated the USSR supplied over $2billion in military support to the embattled 
ruling MPRA.366 Many of these small arms and light weapons made their way onto the open market, 
the type now most frequently seen in PMSC.367 The standard Soviet weapon, the AK-47, is to date 
the most abundant weapon on earth with an estimated one AK-47 in operation for every 70 people 
on earth, while there are estimated to be a minimum 500 million small arms in private circulation 
at this time.368  
 
Similarly, with the end of the Cold War, many newly independent and financially weak 
Eastern European nations found themselves with huge stockpiles of weapons they no longer had an 
immediate need for. The vast majority of these arms found their way onto the commercial market. 
Many of these military grade weapons proved essential for moving PMSCs from the support roles 
they had previously been involved in, to the wholesale exercise of coercive violence in the manner 
traditionally associated with States.  
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3.3 Export of Neo-Liberal Policies and Globalisation 
The final factor that this study considers is the growth and export of neo-liberal policies 
and in particular the process of globalisation that is largely considered to have resulted from these. 
While the growth of neo-liberal policies can be traced to the 1980s and in particular the Presidency 
of Ronald Raegan and Prime Ministership of Margaret Thatcher, it was only following the end of 
the Cold War that it became the truly dominant ideology within the international community with 
the process of globalisation expanding rapidly. Specifically, as the United States was left as the 
world’s only true superpower, and Russia’s financial crisis prevented it from supporting its 
previously dependent States, the US was able to export its social and economic policies across the 
Globe. In contrast to the centrality of States within PIL however, has been the rapid growth of 
globalisation which, particularly since the decline of communism, has been advanced in large by 
powerful supranational organisations such as the IMF and World Bank Group.369 The adoption of 
these neo-liberal approaches by the World Bank, and IMF in particular, was essential to creating 
the environment in which PMSCs were able to expand in the manner they did. Alongside these 
supranational organisations, developed countries or trading blocks, notably the USA and EU have 
also sought to tie market access to the liberalisation and privatisation of public services. A central 
result of this change has been the ever-increasing role and power of MNCs primarily as a result of 
the neo-liberal policies, aggressively advanced by these supranational organisations.370  
 
In relation to the development and growth of PMSCs, the export, or neo-liberal social and 
economic policies, contributed in a number of significant ways.  The first of these is the changing 
position of states when considering power and authority, with private corporations and 
supranational organisations increasingly challenging the centrality and sovereignty of states. 
Specifically, the growth of these MNCs, directly interacts with the changing nature of states with a 
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significant line of academic thinking that suggests that this growth of MNCs directly contradicts 
the supremacy of states. Meanwhile, the increasingly important role of supranational organisations, 
including the IMF but also ICSID, is increasingly being viewed as antithetical to the ideals of liberal 
democracy.371  The unaccountable nature of many of these organisations, combined with their 
increasing power has led to a suggestion of a democratic deficit. 
  
 3.3(1) Multi-National Corporations and Supranational Organisations as 
(Quasi)Sovereigns 
One of the most visible effects of globalisation has been the rapid expansion of multi-
national corporations growing from 35,000 in 1990 to 75,000 in 2005. Furthermore, while this 
amounted to a 66% increase of MNCs in developed nations it represented a 700% increase in the 
number of MNCs in developing nations. As a result of this global liberalisation, MNCs now 
represent an increasingly powerful actor within the international community, with 51 corporations 
now worth enough to break into the 100 richest countries.372 The oil giant Shell, for example, would 
be significantly richer than several large European states including the Czech Republic or Croatia. 
Furthermore, due to the aggressive pursuit of these policies, many of these markets are liberalised 
before the states infrastructure and civil systems are able to support the presence of MNCs.373 
Investors in developing countries are often several times more economically powerful than the 
country they are investing in and as such are able to effectively force states into operating in a 
manner beneficial to the company rather than the state. There has been a growing acceptance across 
the political spectrum that MNCs now are “placed… on a level either equal to or above governments 
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as determinants of the economic… and political destinies of the nation-states.”374 As a result, while 
the nature of states was changing from large secure entities too often geographically or 
economically small and weak states, they were increasingly being asked to compete at an 
international level, with private organisations able to call upon significantly more economic 
resources. When considering the growth of PMSCs the growth of MNCs is notable for a number of 
reasons.  
 
Considering the leverage that MNCs often enter into negotiations with, there is a tendency 
to consider that they can operate outside of the legal system of the nation and are largely 
unaccountable to the government of the country. It ultimately falls upon the host-state to ensure that 
MNCs remain accountable within their operations, if a host-state is incapable or unwilling to 
establish accountability, this directly questions the sovereign power of that state. The primary 
reason that states are in practice unable to hold MNCs accountable is that the corporations often 
hold significant power, and therefore political influence, over the nations in other respects. Within 
manufacturing and production industries the ability to quickly move operations between countries, 
depriving the host-state of the income and jobs, gives MNCs a negotiating position from which the 
state may be under pressure to overlook their actions. Considering this, the UN Special 
Representative for Business and Human Rights John Ruggie noted that “some developing countries 
may lack the institutional capacity to enforce national laws… or they may feel constrained from 
doing so by having to compete internationally for investment” 375  Similarly, within mineral 
extraction, MNCs are often the only ones with the technical capabilities to conduct the operations, 
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leaving the country deprived of the essential income unless willing to overlook the MNCs 
methods.376  
 
Finally, most MNCs enter a country as a result of bilateral investment treaties (BIT). These 
treaties create enforceable rights for investors, which are thereafter strongly protected at an 
international level through supranational arbitration.377 In 2006 Ecuador was ordered to pay nearly 
$2bn, about 5% of its GDP, for breaching its BIT when it terminated an oil production 
investment.378 Furthermore, the results of being found accountable in these supranational panels 
can have a substantial lasting effect on international trade within that country.379 As a result of this, 
BITs often give MNCs substantial bargaining power at the expense of other interested parties, 
particularly local populations, and even the state government.380 As such, even if states were willing 
to initiate proceedings against the MNC they may well not be in a position to do so.381 
 
The increasing strength of MNCs relative to their host state has led to them becoming a 
chief employer of PMSCs. Within these industries there is a vast degree of variation in the security 
requirements, with company requirements ranging from simple protection from theft to the defence 
against armed insurgencies. Corporations involved in the extraction of natural resources such as oil, 
diamonds, and other minerals have in particular relied upon the more extreme end of private security 
in order to expand their operations. In recent years, exploratory drilling and mining operations have 
been established in areas such as Angola, Chechnya and Libya, in search of potentially high 
financial rewards. This has significantly increased the security risks to both staff and property, 
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which are often seen either as strategic targets by warring factions because the corporation has 
control over precious natural resources or ideological targets on the basis of the MNCs relationship 
to another country. When the host government is unable to guarantee security for these foreign 
investors, corporations are increasingly taking responsibility for their own security by hiring local 
or international security companies. Host governments have been similarly keen to see these bi-
lateral security arrangements occur as it secures foreign investment and strengthens the security 
position within the country. The Angolan government has gone so far as to make it part of its 
constitution that foreign investors provide their own security arrangements. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE MODERN SECURITY LANDSCAPE  
4 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, this study identified the factors that are considered to have 
contributed to the growth of PMSCs. The analysis demonstrated that over the past 30 years, in 
particular, the characteristics of the nation-state have fundamentally evolved, due to both internal 
changes in the capabilities and characteristics of states, and externally the growth in transnational 
actors, including supra-governmental organisations, and multi-national corporations. As a result of 
this, the state’s control over coercive violence has been increasingly diluted as private actors have 
sought to capitalise on the retreat of the state. This chapter will look to trace this transformation and 
provide a basis for which to critically analyse the legal and regulatory environment in which PMSCs 
currently operate. 
The first section of this chapter will therefore seek to examine and critically analyse how these 
changes have been reflected in the growth of the private security sector, and consider how this has 
culminated in what has been described as “global security assemblages”- complex hybrid structures 
of actors, knowledge, technologies, norms, and values that stretch across national boundaries but 
operate in national settings.”382 This modern security environment primarily traces its roots to the 
growth, evolution and eventual convergence of two sectors. This section will begin by examining 
how the growth of neo-liberal policies and concurrent expansion of multi-national corporations has 
been mirrored by private security guards, moving from traditional night-watchmen to transnational 
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security providers. Thereafter this chapter will examine how the changing state military capacities 
led to the emergence of Private Military Contractors as a supplement to national capabilities. It will 
examine how the success of these, combined with changing foreign policy, led to an increasing 
legitimisation of their activities reflected in their emergence as a central component of many 
western militaries. It will suggest that as a result of this legitimisation and the expansionist policies 
of Private Security Firms we have seen the convergence of Private Military and Security 
Contractors into a hybrid security sector, where traditional distinctions between military/civilian, 
security/warfare have been eroded leaving the legal and regulatory frameworks exposed an 
inadequate. Finally, this section will examine how these legitimised actors have been embraced by 
both supra-governmental organisation and NGOs in the search for operational security, positioning 
PMSCs as the answer to global insecurity. 
 
The second section of this Chapter will seek to provide an empirical equivalent to this 
conceptualisation and provide a practical basis from which this work can critically analyse the 
issues within the legal frameworks currently available. This section will, therefore, present three 
country-specific case studies, examining the hybrid security sectors that have developed. In doing 
so, this will demonstrate the range of actors currently operating within individual marketplaces. It 
will highlight the divergence of national regulations and examine the difficulties encountered both 
in enforcing these and in ensuring they protect their citizen’s fundamental rights. These case studies 
will, therefore, follow a clear format through which intra-national comparisons can be more clearly 
identified. They will begin by assessing the political and economic climate of the state, establishing 
the extent to which the factors considered in Chapter Four have affected the security landscape. 
From there the case studies will identify the primary security threats within each state, seeking to 
the key motivations for the current security sectors position. Finally, each case study will identify 
the major actors within each state. It will examine the primary roles of these actors including 
considering on whose behalf they are operating and the security threat they are responding to. 
Finally, it will highlight any problems associated with each actor, specifically noting claims of 
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illegal activities or human rights abuses and consider how each state has been able, or willing, to 
punish these infractions.  
 
4.1 Private Violence in the 20th Century 
4.1(1) Night-Watchmen Meet Globalisation 
Whilst post-WW2 the development of civilian police had largely taken over the security 
market in the Western hemisphere, there remained gaps in which the private market continued to 
exist. One of these gaps, was the common employment of private night watchmen, particularly by 
large factories and some larger stores. An examination of the evolution of one of these firms, 
Group4 provides an excellent illustration of how this local guarding developed into the transnational 
security industry we are concerned with here. Established as a subsidiary of Kjobenhavn Fredixberg 
Nattevagt, a Swedish guard company established in 1901, Group4 moved to the UK in 1950.383 
Group4 experienced significant and sustained growth, expanding into much of the European market 
by 1980. In 1981 however, the firm split with two brothers taking half of the company; one company 
remained Group4, the other becoming Securitas AB. Group4 subsequently undertook an aggressive 
expansion project, following a pattern of buying established security providers in markets they 
otherwise did not operate in.384 As such, they acquired interests in Saudi Arabia, Hungary and the 
UAE before merging with a similar security provider Falck becoming the second largest private 
security organisation in the world.385  In 2002, G4F finally moved into the American market, 
purchasing the company that held the contracts for the protection of US embassies. By this time 
G4F employed over 200,000 people in over 80 countries. Mirroring this growth was Securicor, a 
British based company who established in 1935 as a private police watch. Originally employing 15 
watchmen, by 2004 it had a staff of over 120,000 people, and having expanded into the cash security 
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for banks was transporting more money in Britain than any other company.386 G4F and Securicor 
merged in 2004 to create G4S, quickly becoming the largest private security firm in the world, and 
the largest single employer on the London Stock Exchange.387 In a similar manner, Securitas AB 
has continued to grow through a series of acquisitions, moving into the South and North American 
markets. The most notable of these was the purchase of Pinkertons, then the largest private security 
provider in the US.388 By the turn of 2010 a string of purchases in South America, including 
Colombia, Mexico and Peru, pushed Securitas annual revenue to over $9 billion.389  
 
4.1(2) Post-Colonial Africa - Remnants of Mercenaries 
Alongside security firms, it is also informative to consider the provision of violence on a 
greater scale. In particular, although for the most part post-1945, states were the principal actors 
within warfare, there remained a small number of notable mercenaries who continued to operate 
throughout the world. The mercenaries of the 20th century operated illicitly and were marginalised 
from society while previous mercenaries could expect to operate as part of large squadrons, or even 
trading companies, these men often worked alone or with small groups of likeminded ex-soldiers, 
offering their military expertise to local groups. The most notorious of these was “Mad Mike Hoare” 
an Irish born Commando, who raised through the ranks of the British military in WW2. 390 
Following attempts at civilian life as a safari guide, he instead offered his services as a commander 
to rebel groups seeking a foothold in Africa. Twice, along with a group of European mercenaries 
know as “the Terrible Ones” he led attempts to establish a separate Katanga state in Congo, 
essentially at the behest of mining firms.391 The defining factor of these post-WW2 mercenaries 
was their illegal and underground nature, although often backed by Western companies and 
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occasion Western Governments, with the CIA, in particular, being linked to their support, this was 
done unofficially and without record. The mercenaries were paid as individuals and with cash for 
their services.  
 
In 1989, this changed with the establishment of Executive Outcomes, considered the earliest of the 
modern PMSC era, and providing one of the most interesting accounts of PMSC activity.392 EO 
was formed almost exclusively of former South African Special Forces, including members of the 
“Civil Co-Operation Bureau”, the political assassination squad of the apartheid regime. 393 
Following the disbanding of the Apartheid era South African military, many of these redundant 
soldiers formed Executive Outcomes, with the aim of offering Special Forces training to newly 
established militaries.  Notably, they were registered in the UK with their head office listed as 
“Plaza 107” 535 King’s Road, London. According to an investigation by The Observer, Plaza 107 
was the registered head office of a string of international companies ranging from diamond mining 
to aviation services394  Due to these murky and unclear business relationships, there has been 
extensive speculation as to how these businesses were organised.395 In 1996, a UN report found that 
“Executive Outcomes is receiving about US$30 million and mining concessions in the Koidu 
district for its mercenaries operations.”396  
 
Regardless of their business practices, in the early nineties EO shot to prominence for its 
role in supporting the governments of Angola and Sierra Leone during bloody civil wars and were 
widely heralded as a stabilising force within the region, capable of preventing bloodshed in an 
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unprecedented manner.397 Indeed, after EO left both countries, they were replaced with UN forces 
who failed to maintain their success with both countries quickly plunging back into civil war.398 
However, it has been suggested that this stabilisation came at a significant humanitarian cost. 
Fighting against untrained and unorganised rebel forces, armed primarily with ex-soviet machine 
guns, EO’s professionally trained soldiers were armed with a combination of high-tech American 
and Soviet military equipment. 399  They were particularly known to operate sophisticated 
reconnaissance equipment and utilise heavy artillery and military helicopters to inflict huge damage 
on rebel forces. Through their connections with Ibis Air, Executive Outcomes was able to call upon 
the support of SU-25 bombers and Mig-27 ground attack planes. Their primary weapons, however, 
were ex-Soviet mi 24 attack helicopters, armed with four-barrelled Gatling guns and 40mm 
Grenade Launcher. Despite this, the rebels often operated within, or close to, civilian areas and the 
large-scale destruction caused by the attacks were potentially disproportionate to the military gains. 
Of particular concern was the widespread use of ex-Soviet “fuel-air explosive” bombs.400 These 
thermobaric weapons have a blast range of nearly 2km, incinerating those close to the explosion, 
whilst causing a vacuum at the edge of the blast range capable of rupturing lungs and crushing 
internal organs.401 While not explicitly outlawed, they are considered a significant human rights 
concern and due to the indiscriminate nature of their damage can constitute a war crime, unless 
used with discretion and precision. Alongside the manner of their operations, one of the most 
significant questions regarding the employment of EO relates to their payment. In particular, when 
EO were initially employed by the Angolan Government, their initial contract related to the 
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recovery of the Soyo Oil Fields which had recently been taken by Unita.402 Many of these fields 
were owned and operated by Western-based oil companies, with the implication that their 
involvement was central to the funding of EO. Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone, their funding relied 
primarily on the recovery of diamond fields from the RUF. Even when their operations were 
finished, however, the financial arrangements remained difficult to establish, with many EO 
employees remaining in the region as employees of subsidiaries of sister companies. Furthermore, 
their close relationship was maintained with many firms who benefited from their actions, including 
sharing an office with mining firms who gained contracts in Sierra Leone after their involvement.403 
 
These new “semi-legitimate” military contractors played a central role in several successful 
and attempted coups in the early 1990’s, with one such operation in Papua New Guinea causing a 
major international political incident. Sandline International, established and run by a former British 
Army colonel, were brought in to suppress an insurgency in a province of Papua New Guinea. The 
use of mercenaries to undertake this operation was opposed by the national military and the 
governments of neighbouring Australia and New Zealand. Indeed, Australia went so far as to 
scramble its air force to intercept Sandline’s transport of personnel and equipment. The eventual 
failure of the mission led to the resignation of the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.404 Despite 
this, Sandline would continue to operate as a Military Contractor, including working closely with 
Executive Outcomes in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
4.1(3) Military Contractors – The New Normal 
Following Executive Outcomes rise to increasing prominence in Africa, the concept of 
military contractors gained traction throughout the West, and when Europe was confronted by an 
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unconventional war they were largely unprepared for405 military contracting firms proved a popular 
option to Western Governments. During the Yugoslavian civil war; with two companies, DynCorp 
and MPRI playing a central role.406  Under UN Security Council Resolutions 1031407 and 1088,408 
NATO forces were mandated to provide limited military intervention through the UN 
Implementation Force (IFOR) and later Stabilisation Force (SFOR).  
 
           MPRI were originally set up by former high-level officials of the US Army to provide 
military training to American allies, with Taiwan and Sweden providing amongst their biggest 
clients. In 1994 however, the US employed MPRI to undertake border patrols to implement the UN 
enforced arms embargo. However, as the Yugoslavian Civil War began to turn against the US allies, 
an agreement was executed for the MPRI to provide advice to the Croatian Ministry of Defense for 
the development of “strategic long-term capabilities.”409 Emphasising the link between MPRI and 
the US military, the MPRI team was to be run by John Sewall who had been the US envoy to the 
area. Despite the contract not officially including any direct training of the Croatian military, 
observers have almost universally credited MPRI with training and tactical planning that helped 
turn the course of the Yugoslav War. In particular, having suffered consistent heavy defeats to the 
Yugoslav Army following the involvement of MPRI, the Croatians undertook an offensive 
operation called “Operation Storm” which according to military sources in the area was “a textbook 
operation…. Whoever wrote that plan of attack could have gone to any NATO staff college in North 
America… and scored an A-plus.”410 Which would be unsurprising, considering MPRI wrote the 
textbooks used in NATO colleges. Specifically, whilst the Croatian army was officially trained in 
Soviet-style attrition tactics, that had been common in the earlier battles, the Croatian military 
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employed a NATO-style combined offensive attack, that within a week recovered an area of 
territory that had been continually lost over the previous 6 months. Further speculation of MPRI 
involvement was triggered when the company won a contract to “Train and Equip” the Croatian 
army, despite never having been part of the official bidding process. And while officially, MPRI 
involvement was on behalf of the US, NATO and the UN, the funding for their involvement was 
discovered to have been donated to the region through, amongst others, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
and the UAE, who were keen to see a Muslim majority country as the figurehead of the western 
efforts.  
 
Alongside the direct involvement of PMSCs in military operations, contractors were used 
extensively as a training tool for local police forces. Part of the IFOR Mandate specifically called 
for the provision of training, through the UN International Police Task Force (UNIPTF), to the new 
national police forces411 and due to the actions of both sides during the war, there was particular 
emphasis placed ensuring that the police were trained to protect human rights.412 As the US does 
not have a Federal police force to provide such training, a $15million contract was given to the 
Virginia based PMSC, DynCorp, to recruit and train officers for the new Bosnian police force.413  
 
Following the involvement of MPRI in former Yugoslavia and DynCorp in Colombia, the 
prevalence of Contractors within the military increased significantly. When the US invaded 
Afghanistan and then Iraq, the military found itself stretched beyond a level it could manage, and 
the rapid expansion of military capabilities required to conduct these simultaneous wars fell 
squarely at the feet of contractors. In the decade following, the US government agreed contracts 
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worth over £100 billion to private firms for services in Iraq,414 whilst for a period as the war was 
winding down, private contractors outnumbered Coalition forces in both Afghanistan and Iraq.415 
The privatisation of the American military machine means that it is now impossible for large-scale 
troop deployments to occur without contractors. They are responsible for almost all support 
services, including building semi-permanent bases, running the canteen, and providing on-base 
security.416 They also engage in much more active roles, often providing “security” to American 
forces on the frontline, and in essence fighting alongside American troops. Amongst the roles these 
security contracts included were the extraction of injured troops from the battlefield. On one 
occasion, the extraction of a marine culminated in Blackwater guards engaging in an 18-hour 
firefight with over 300 insurgents. The Blackwater guards were able to call upon the assistance of 
their own company helicopters to provide aerial attacks and resupply the guards with ammunition 
and supplies, demonstrating the overtly military nature of their operations.417 
 
With this expansion of military contracting, transnational security services saw room for 
growth into the developing and lucrative field, expanding into territories and undertaking roles 
increasingly disparate from the traditional private guard. This expansion has required providing 
security in a range of scenarios that blur the lines between civil security and military. In 2008 G4S 
acquired ArmorGroup, a British Company with contracts from the US and UK governments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, along with permanent offices in Colombia, Nigeria and Sudan.418 G4S now 
operates a dedicated “complex environments” team staffed largely by ex-military personnel, their 
roles include de-mining, close protection and security envoys.419 It is this combination of large 
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multinational companies, with interests in wide-ranging activities that have come to represent the 
modern face of PMSCs.  
 
4.1(4) Private Contractors and Humanitarian Intervention 
The increasing legitimacy of PMSCs is potentially most evident in the increasing use of 
private security to support humanitarian operations. As a result of the upward trend in “incidents of 
major violence against humanitarian workers,”420  the use of PMSCs by NGOs is a gradually 
expanding security sector. As early as 1999 a report by the Canadian NGO CARE concluded that 
“the core dilemma for, from which all others arise, stems from the security vacuum engendered by 
the emergency itself and the unwillingness of internationally sanctioned, legitimate forces to 
address the need for security”.421 Not only is there an absence of humanitarian space in which to 
deliver emergency relief, but violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers have grown at an 
alarming rate. In 1998, the number of civilian UN workers killed exceeded UN military causalities 
for the first time. Recent conflicts in Syria and Libya have shown that civilians and aid agencies are 
increasingly considered strategic targets. Furthermore, the nature of warfare has increasingly placed 
civilian populations, and therefore the aid organisations, directly into danger. Since WWI the 
proportion of civilian casualties in war has risen from 5% to 80%. The safety of staff is now a major 
concern for donors and agencies alike. Faced with these increased security risks, humanitarian 
agencies are having to review their security arrangements, including the use of private security 
companies. 
 
Legally host governments are responsible for the security of humanitarian operations within 
its territory. However, where law and order have broken down or regions of their territory have 
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fallen under the control of insurgents and rebel groups, the government is often unable or unwilling 
to fulfil this obligation. In particular, it has been suggested that the withholding of humanitarian aid 
is increasingly utilised as a tactic of war. Increasingly, local and international private security 
companies are used in these situations to ameliorate the security problems faced and to provide 
protection to personnel and property. Often, the only other viable option would be to rely upon, and 
co-operate with, local security forces, insurgents or potentially multilateral peacekeeping forces to 
provide a security for the humanitarian mission and delivery of aid.  
 
4.1(5) Preliminary Conclusions 
It is clear from the above, that over the past 30 years, the security landscape both nationally 
and internationally has fundamentally transformed the position of the state and the bearer of 
instruments of coercive violence. Internationally, globalisation has transformed local night-watch 
companies into transnational security firms with capabilities often beyond those of the state. This 
growth has made them invaluable to both developed nations, where political policies have reduced 
the capabilities of the state and sought to establish private competition; but also in developing 
nations, where these external actors are able to provide services of which the existing state 
infrastructure is incapable. Alongside this, as the nature of warfare has transitioned from large-scale 
inter-state conflicts, to more frequently asymmetric and often intra-state, state militaries have 
demonstrated an inability to confront these security threats. The outcome of this has been that 
private actors, offering professional and highly specialised services, have increasingly been seen as 
the answer to these situations and the global security market has grown exponentially to meet this 
demand. The following section will examine how this growth has in fact led to increasingly 
divergent actors representing a variety of interests and offering a range of capabilities and 
professionalism. It will examine how this transformation has been represented in three states with 
a range of unique political, economic and security characteristics. 
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4.2 Case Studies on the Privatisation of Violence 
The following section of this study will present three case studies on private coercive 
violence within states. These cases studies will form the factual basis for the future examination of 
legal and regulatory frameworks of PMSCs, and provide the basis of the unique typological 
classification system that this thesis seeks to develop. They will seek to provide examples of the 
difficulties associated with the dispersion of coercive violence away from states and towards a range 
of private actors. In Chapter Five, this data will be used to provide references through which current 
legal and regulatory approaches can be analysed. Specifically, these case studies will seek to 
demonstrate that modern private coercive violence is a global phenomenon, with opaque unique 
characteristics and that as a result of this, traditional responses are incapable of confronting the 
issues posed by modern PMSCs. Specifically, applying arbitrary distinctions between types of 
contractors, or based upon the host-nation, fails to address the fluid modern security providers. It 
will suggest, therefore, that international responses are required and that these must be flexible, but 
detailed in order to effectively regulate and control the use of private coercive violence.  
 
4.2 Method Adopted Within the Case Studies 
In order for these case studies to provide an effective basis for this analysis, they must 
represent a broad and reflective overview of the modern security sector as a whole. Alongside this, 
they have also been chosen in order to best illustrate the issues and difficulties associated with 
private actors exercising coercive violence. As such, this study has identified the nations of Peru, 
Nigeria and Afghanistan. These nations all have significant, and growing, private security sectors, 
consisting of a broad range of the types of contractors currently prevalent within global security 
assemblages. Furthermore, the states themselves present a range of unique issues and 
characteristics. For example, Peru and Nigeria both have significant extractive industries, but these 
face divergent security threats. Similarly, both Nigeria and Afghanistan face internal terrorism, 
however, the factors responsible, and the responses to this, have been distinct. This research 
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originally included a case study on Papua New Guinea in place of Afghanistan. However, it was 
considered that the case studies were too similar to provide an accurate and illustrative overview of 
the PMSC industry. In particular, it was considered that Afghanistan offered an opportunity to 
include PMSCs used by Coalition forces, an important component in any study on PMSCs.  
 
These case studies were undertaken through a thorough review of existing literature on the 
areas included with the case studies formed from a synthesis of this information. As a result, it was 
essential to ensure that the literature relied upon was accurate and impartial in order to ensure these 
case studies were accurate. Much of the primary data relied upon was collected/collated by either 
supranational organisations, including the United Nations, and European Union. Alongside this, 
however, it was necessary to rely upon the work of NGOs and other academics, and in these cases 
the research was cautious in relying upon peer-reviewed and reputable NGOs.  
 
4.3 Case Studies 
4.3(1) Case Study One - Peru 
4.3(1)(a)Political and Economic Background 
The political and economic background of Peru is one still affected by the influence of 
external interests within the country. Following its Independence from Spain in 1852 Peru sought 
to establish a society rooted in the ideals of European enlightenment liberalism, with democracy 
and individual rights and equality at the heart of the society. Following the unsuccessful Pacific 
Wars against neighbouring nations, however, a feeling that Indigenous tribes were responsible for 
the defeats lead to their significant repression within the Peruvian state. One commentator at the 
time suggested that “The main cause of the big disaster of 1883 is that the majority of the population 
of Peru is formed by an abject and degradable race that you wanted to dignify.”422 As a result, 
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Peruvian society fundamentally transformed, with restrictions upon voting and political 
associations transforming the society and exacerbating long-standing divisions among the various 
sectors of Peruvian society. For much of the late 19th and 20th Century, Peru resultantly suffered 
from significant political turmoil with frequent and often violent transitions from far-left populist 
parties to military dictatorships. As a result, Peru had “13 constitutions, with only 9 of 19 elected 
governments completing their terms”423  
 
Democracy in Peru was finally restored in 1980 with the establishment of universal suffrage 
and multi-party elections held with the far left APRA’s Alan Garcia. As a result, hyperinflation 
crippled the economy with the international finance community largely withdrawing support from 
the State. Alongside this, the Maoist Shining Path, having refused to partake in the elections instead 
instigated a guerrilla war, targeting local Andean civilians. In 1990 the increasing militancy, 
corruption and economic crisis led to the popular election of the Fujimori whose promised counter-
insurgency strategy was coupled with implementing radical neo-liberal economic reforms. In 1992, 
Fujimori, citing the exceptional security concerns, suspended the constitution and for the next 8 
years ruled without any effective checks from the judiciary. The result of this was a violent and 
excessive crack-down, ostensibly on Shining Path, but with many innocent people simultaneously 
caught up in the violence. The level of this violence lead to extensive human rights abuses across 
the country with “widespread massacres, forced disappearances and the massive use of sexual 
violence and torture.”424 Prevalent to the extent that following his removal from office, Fujimori 
was tried and sentenced for Crimes Against Humanity and human rights abuses.425 Despite this, 
Fujimori’s reforms play an essential role in understanding the economic and political position of 
Peru to date. In particular, the embrace of neo-liberal economic policies and the accompanied 
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foreign direct investment in Peru continues to shape the economy to this day. At the heart of this 
approach was a classical liberal theory of reducing state involvement, in particular through 
privatising many of the national assets, and from 1991 “opened all sectors of the Peruvian economy 
to foreign direct investment” while “lift[ing] restrictions on remittances of profits, dividends, 
royalties” etc.426 The effect was to make “[t]he Peruvian economy… now dominated by the private 
sector… and intricately linked to the global order.” To the point that “Peru [became]… one of the 
most open and liberal economies… in the world”427 according to an IMF report. 
 
One of the most fundamental reforms undertaken within the program of liberalisation was 
within the mining sector. Mineral exports have consistently remained one of the centrepieces of the 
Peruvian economy, with the State believed to hold within the top ten global reserves of copper, 
gold, lead, silver, tin and zinc.428 Many of these reserves, however are held in the highland areas, 
traditionally home to the indigenous Campesino communities. From the first Constitutions of Peru 
in 1820, the legal system of Peru recognised unique communal land rights for the Indigenous 
populations, requiring the State to actively protect the community’s interests in the land. These 
ideals were continually reaffirmed throughout Peru’s constitutional history, through the 
implementation of “agrarian land laws” which recognised the autonomy of the community in 
choosing how to utilise the land. The implementation of the National Mining Cadastre Law, (Law 
26615) which sought to reform the antiquated mining concession process into a centralised and 
unified system combined with the Law for the Promotion of Investment in the Agrarian Sector 
which removed the communal aspect of land titles, separating the community land into individual 
plots. 429  As a result of these reforms, however, the new system “guaranteed national and 
transnational mining firms exclusive control of the necessary land resources to implement their 
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operations.”430 As a result, many indigenous communities who had competing rights to the land 
found themselves pushed off their ancestral homes without their consent or any form of 
compensation.  
 
One such investor was the US mining giant Newmont, which in 1993 acquired a majority 
stake world’s fourth largest goldmine, the Yanacocha mine. Opposition to the proposals came 
immediately from both environmental groups, and local indigenous Campesino communities, who 
communally owned a large proportion of the land outlined for development and who have, with a 
degree of success, argued the land was illegally sold without their permission.431 Considering this, 
the Yanacocha project has been targeted by protestors since its opening with protestors numbering 
into the thousands at regular events from 1993 onwards.432 Since 2004 when plans were announced 
to expand the mines onto neighbouring mountains, large-scale protests have flared up with 
regularity. Both the size and regularity have increased significantly since 2010 when Newmont 
announced an intention to open the “Conga Mine”433 located at the convergence of the five major 
river basins, essential to the local farmers and fishers.434 This opposition has increased following 
several incidents at the Yanacocha mine including a large mercury spill in 2000 in which over 
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150kg of mercury were spilt during transport,435 while the use of “cyanide leaching”436 to separate 
the gold has been blamed for the loss of agriculture and fishing.437 
 
In recent years, changes have been made to the Agrarian Land Law, which have sought to 
redress some of the problems faced by indigenous communities from the increased extractive 
industry. In particular, since 2012, a consultation law has required indigenous communities be 
consulted prior to any planning stages for operations on ancestral lands.438 This has bought Peruvian 
law into line with the International Labor Organisations Convention on Indigenous Peoples. Despite 
these changes, however, mining concessions now cover nearly 30 million hectares, or one-fifth of 
the Peruvian land mass.439 Furthermore, the consultation requirement has been criticised as it is 
advisory only440 and as a result in some regions this proportion rises up to 50%441 with social 
protests therefore continuing.  
 
Despite the economic reforms, many Peruvians found their standard of life severely limited 
as inflation has remained a constant problem throughout the past twenty years, with gas and 
electricity prices rising by 3000% and 5300% respectively, as the previously government controlled 
and subsidised industries were sold to private companies.442 Despite a period of relative growth 
income inequality remains significant with a particular gap between urban and rural populations. 
While overall poverty fell to a quarter in 2012, some indigenous communities continue to 
experience poverty rates above 60%.443 One of the effects of this rural poverty has been a turn back 
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towards the production of Cocoa plants, with an estimated 60% of the world’s cocaine now grown 
in Peru.  
 
4.3(1)(b) Security Threats in Peru 
Crime 
One of the foremost factors in the growth of the private security sector in Peru is the 
prevalence of crime, both low-level and organised. The percentage of people who were victims of 
a criminal act in Peru, is consistently one of the highest in the Latin America region, with one study 
suggesting that 36% of Peruvians were a victim of a crime in 2014 alone.444 The United States lists 
Peru as a “critical” state in regards to the incidences of crime and restricts travel within Peru based 
upon criminal activity. Similarly, the UN considers the homicide level in Peru to be above the 
threshold for endemic. The crime level is inextricably linked to two factors. The first of these is the 
level of income inequality within both urban and rural areas. In urban areas, in particular, low-level 
crime is overwhelmingly associated with individuals from poorer neighbourhoods. Within this, 
mugging, robbery and burglary are particularly common. Alongside this, however, is the growth of 
high-level organised crime, including the increasing drug trade, illegal mining, and stolen antiques 
among others are estimated to be worth $5billion a year. In rural areas, in particular, the increasing 
involvement of international cartels combined with a growing relationship between farmers and 
Shining Path militants has led to an increasingly violent drug trade.445 These high levels are crime 
are further exacerbated by the prevalence of firearms, in particular, illegal firearms, with over 1 
million firearms in private circulation.446 
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Mining Conflicts 
One of the most significant security threats within Peru is the escalation of mining conflicts 
within the indigenous Campesino communities. Following the changes to Peruvian land law, 
multinational corporations were quick to acquire interests in mining operations the overwhelming 
majority of which is on traditionally Campesino land. While originally, many of the Campesino 
communities welcomed the extractive corporations, with the Peruvian government promising that 
the additional revenue would be reinvested in the local communities. Furthermore, with 
unemployment in the areas disproportionately high, the promise of the job creation by the foreign 
investment ensured that the majority of the operations began peacefully. Within years, however, it 
became clear that the economic benefits of many of the mining operations were removed from the 
area, with little or no additional social spending in the regions. As a result of the increasing job 
opportunities, migration to the regions grew, increasing the strain on local infrastructure and 
services, whilst being blamed for an increase in “overcrowding, rising crime, violence, alcoholism 
and prostitution.”447 Alongside this, many of the mining projects have had serious environmental 
impacts, causing secondary problems for the local communities. One of the most common of these 
is the pollution, or sometimes poisoning of the local water supplies, with acid leaking a particular 
concern. As many Campesino communities are heavily reliant upon fishing for both food and the 
local economy, the destruction of local fish supplies has caused several major social conflicts.448 
As a direct result of this transition, conflict within the communities surrounding extractive 
industries has grown exponentially, with the Ombudsman for Human Rights reporting that there 
are more than 200 active conflicts surrounding mining operations.449 As a result of these social 
conflicts, the most recent statistics from2012 found these conflicts to have caused “24 deaths and 
649 injuries”450  
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The response to these mining conflicts has been criticised by NGOs and the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights,451 who have argued that the government have sought to criminalise 
protests.452  Specifically, it has been claimed that the public authorities have in a “systematically 
and recurring way” brought “baseless criminal actions” 453  against community organisers and 
human rights defenders as a method of undermining and intimidating the local community and 
discourage any further protests. These have included among others teachers, academics and human 
rights defenders.454 As a result, there are currently around “400 protestors and HRDs… facing court 
proceedings… initiated by mining companies, their staff or the public prosecutor” taking advantage 
of vaguely drafted laws on offences including terrorism, rebellion and “resistance to an official 
order”455 
 
Guerilla Warfare 
Internal conflict has plagued Peru for much of the past 30 years, with the extreme Maoist 
Shining Path responsible for the majority of the violence. A truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in 2003, found that between 61,000 and 77,000 people were killed during the 20-year insurgency.456 
Of this, over half were believed to have been killed by Shining Path who frequently targeted rural 
farmers and Campesinos who, if they failed to respond to their calls for “peasant uprisings,” they 
believed were engaged in a form of feudal capitalist oppression.457  Whilst this insurgency was 
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largely considered to have been defeated by 2000, over the past five years there have been renewed 
acts of violence by militias linked with Shining Path. One of the key reasons behind this has been 
the shift of Shining Path into the narcotics industry. With much of their traditional Andean 
heartlands now being used to cultivate Coca plants, Shining Path have moved away from their 
Maoist traditions and “is now a new organization in that it is now a group completely involved in 
all levels of the chain of production of narco-trafficking.”458 Furthermore, rather than relying upon 
violence to intimidate local populations, the vast wealth accumulated from the production of Coca 
have according to one study on their re-emergence allowed Shining Path to  
“stockpile ever more sophisticated weapons, hire new recruits, and invest in improving 
organizational networks. These activities have also provided the necessary funds to finance 
the co-optation of peasants, allowing SL to disavow its previous hostile attitudes towards 
the peasantry”459 
As a direct result of this, the security situation in many of the regions associated with Shining Path 
have deteriorated significantly over the past 5 years with a renewed level of violence and 
insurgency. While much of this increased violence has taken the form of traditional narco-
trafficking, including contract killings and wars over territory, this has been accompanied by 
significant high-level political violence. Much of this has been the result of weapons and training 
from the similarly narco-communist FARC in Colombia who are believed to have flown shipments 
of weapons and financial support to SP when seeking to re-establish themselves.460 In particular, 
they have been noted to target military and police personnel although they have also resorted to 
kidnapping mining employees for ransom. In one of the most notorious of these incidents, 71 pipe-
installation employees with Argentinian company Techint were kidnapped with a ransom 
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request.461 As a result of this, security in the rural Andean mountains remains precarious with the 
Peruvian military and police stretched and unable to fully secure the region. 
 
4.3(1)(c) PMSCs and the Legal Environment 
In light of the above considerations, the provision of security has become an increasingly 
important consideration, with the use of PMSCs in Peru attracting significant academic attention 
due to the wide range of actors engaged in the market. In particular, when considering the range of 
services and providers within the private security sector there are two primary legal environments 
that interact with the use of PMSCs. The first of these are regulations upon the establishment of 
Private Security Companies. In particular, there are limited specific regulations concerning the 
registering of PMSCs, who are regulated through the Ministry of the Interior.462 Whilst the Minister 
of the Interior is responsible for regulating and controlling PMSC activity, the most recent UN 
working group on the use of mercenaries, described the legal condition surrounding PMSCs as a 
vacuum.463 In 2015, Peru undertook a radical overhaul of these regulations following criticism by 
the Organisation of American States and UN over the actions of a Peruvian PMSC Forza Security. 
In particular, Forza were found to have systematically intimidated, followed and bugged the offices 
of human rights defenders and their lawyers. As a result, Peru enacted National Decree No 1213 on 
the Regulation of Private Security Services. Under this legislation, private security firms must 
obtain an operating license from the Superintendencia Nacional de Control se Servios se Seguridad, 
Armas, Municiones y Explosivos de Uso Civil (SUCAMEC), a section of Peruvian Ministry of the 
Interior specialised in the regulation of PMSCs.464 Part of gaining this license requires the meeting 
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of a series of professional and bureaucratic standards, including “to ensure the appropriate training 
of its agents as well as the adequate monitoring of their work.”465 Thereafter are required to register 
with the National Register of Data Management who work alongside the SUCAMEC to oversee 
and follow up on their suitability, including “monitoring and inspection at any time.”466 Whilst 
PMSCs by law must register, the requirements are light and the Ministry responsible lacks the 
manpower to conduct the biannual inspections it is supposed to undertake, with official figures 
suggesting up to 250,000 people are employed within the security sector.467 Furthermore, whilst 
PMSCs are limited by law as to the type of weapons they are authorised, this system suffers from 
both a lack of reporting and difficulties establishing ownership, with most corporations using a 
combination of PMSCs and police/army alongside each other.468 
 
Alongside the establishment of private security contractors, following the growth of 
neoliberal policies and associated government budget cuts, Peru has been at the forefront of a trend 
to subcontract out, or third-party finance their otherwise public security forces, with up to 50% of 
the whole budget for some regions coming from private sources469. Within Peru, these have been 
facilitated by two aspects of Peruvian law. The first of these, a recursos directamente recaudados, 
meaning literally “resources directly collected” allow regional divisions of the police and army to 
sign contracts with private companies or individuals for specific security services with the 
money/resources counted as part of the defence budget. For the Police forces these agreements can 
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take the form of either individual moonlighting by officers, or through an institutional agreement 
between the local police authority and a private organisation. The legal status of these agreements 
are established through governmental decrees dependent upon whether they are individualised or 
institutional agreements. In the case of moonlighting by officers, no official government law 
regulates the moonlighting by officers and it is believed that “almost all officers use their spare time 
to work as private guards”470 Following a nationwide strike by police officers the government 
effectively sought to encourage this471 by instituting a one day on, one day off shift pattern the 
Peruvian National Police implement providing individual officers considerable time to undertake 
private guarding.472 Furthermore, in an attempt to streamline the moonlighting process, the Peruvian 
government has excluded public security employees from the registrations and training 
requirements of private security guards. The lack of regulatory oversight of these moonlighting 
officers causes the separation of their duties to be almost indistinguishable. In particular, the officers 
are not prevented from wearing their regular uniform or carrying their police-issued baton and gun. 
As such “[f]rom an outside perspective moonlighting officers become virtually indistinguishable 
from their on-duty counterparts.”473 The regulation for institutional agreements is slightly strict with 
governmental Decree No. 004-2009 regulating the “provision of extraordinary services additional 
to normal police duties.” 474  These allow for private companies to agree either permanent or 
occasional contracts under which the local police federation will provide a pre-agreed number of 
police to undertake security for a private client.   
 
Alongside this, as part of counter-terrorism movement pressed for by the USA475 to counter 
Maoist “shining path” rebels, Peru introduced a law, allowing private companies whose work was 
essential to the finance or infrastructure of the country, or whose operations utilised potentially 
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dangerous materials or explosives, to directly fund the police or local army to provide security for 
their work or installations.476 Considering the broad scope of this, it has been used extensively by 
extractive industries from oil, natural gas and mining. Considering the use of the police and army 
by private organisations it is important also to consider laws Peru has recently passed in relation to 
the civil liability of the public security forces. Specifically, Legislative Decree No. 30151 grants 
immunity to both army and police personnel for causing death or injury through the use of guns or 
other weapons whilst on-duty.477 This law has provoked criticism from a wide range of NGOs along 
with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Furthermore, due to the nature of the drafting 
of the law, even if the army or police are undertaking work for a private client, so long as the 
agreement is at an institutional level, the employee will be considered on-duty and therefore 
immune from prosecution.  
 
4.3(1)(d) Types of PMSCs Present in Peru 
a) Police 
One of the largest sectors of private security within Peru is through the private 
supplementary contracting of the public police forces for private roles. Many of the roles undertaken 
by these police are primarily defensive guarding duties. Specifically, considering the 
indistinguishable nature of on and off-duty police officers the presence of an individual in police 
uniform is often considered an effective form of security through deterrence. Considering this, it is 
estimated that two-thirds of bank security is conducted by police officers moonlighting 
independently for the banks.478 Parallel to this, however, is the use of police by private organisations 
in more volatile situations can cause difficulties in establishing the rule of law and the State’s role 
in public security. As an example of this like many other large extractive projects in Peru, 
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documents have shown that a large proportion of the security for the Yanacocha site is provided 
through a series of contracts with the local police force.479 As such, when in 2011, local protesters 
marched upon the mine, it was the local police, operating under an auxiliary contract with 
Yanacocha mine, who were sent to disperse the group. During the violence, the police 
systematically attacked three Campesino communities accused of organising the protests.480 In the 
wake of these protests, independent journalists and human rights activists were targeted by the 
police, with excessive force and extra-judicial detention reported.481 Amongst these one human 
rights activist accused the police of torturing him while detained on the mining site.482 The police 
have used both non-lethal and lethal crowd dispersal equipment. Fatalities have therefore become 
common, with five protesters killed in July 2012 alone, whilst in May of 2015 four protesters 
died.483 In a neighbouring site at the Antapaccay Mine, the use of Police operating under private 
contracts resulted in as similarly troubling outcome. In May 2012, over 2000 police were drafted in 
to provide additional security following local protests against planned expansion of the mine. 
During the protests, indigenous protestors clashed with the police occurred and the police opened 
fire with tear gas and live rounds, killing three protesters and injuring scores more, while 26 
individuals were arrested. Those arrested were kept on the mining site and according to a local 
report “there is documentary evidence that the civilians arrested were physically and 
psychologically mistreated and tortured.484 Similar stories have been documented across much of 
Peru485 with it estimated that there have been over 30 large scale institutional contracts agreed 
between the police and multinational corporations.486 
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b) Armed Forces 
To date, the use of the military as a form of private security has been largely concentrated 
in the Southern Highlands regions of the VRAE, with security against the re-emerging Shining Path 
along with local Campesino communities whose ancestral lands many of the pipelines run through. 
The private contracting of the army is conducted at an institutional level, with companies 
contracting directly with the regional army officials to provide an over-arching security solution for 
the company. Many of these contracts include the company funding an entire battalion of soldiers 
in exchange for a focus on protecting their assets. During one investigation into the prevalence of 
these relationships, Professor Maiah Jaskoski found that in the VRAE (Valley of the Apurimac and 
Ene Rivers) of Peru, all of the army’s counterinsurgency bases protected a private gas pipeline 
owned by the, with further forces based at all fourteen installations along the pipeline. 487 
Considering the Peruvian militaries history in the region, in particular, the widespread human rights 
violations that took place during the fight against Shining Path, the return of the military to the 
region has been controversial. This has been further exacerbated by the passing of an Amnesty Law, 
that prevents the military from being tried in a civil court for injuries or death that occur while 
soldiers are on duty, regardless of proportionality or justification. 
 
a) Private Security Services 
  Alongside the large number of police officers employed privately, there is an increasing 
market for specialist Private Security Firms. These in particular in the urban centres where crime 
and gangs have increased over the past decade. In Lima, around 60% of the population employ 
some form of private security. There are over 500 registered private security firms who employ 
nearly 90,000 contractors,488 on top of the moonlighting police officers. As such, there are as many 
private security guards in Peru as there are police. Within these, nearly 50% are employed by just 
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six firms including the international giants Securicor, G4S and Prosegur accounting for the majority 
of these. One recent study on the private security sector in Peru identified three key customer bases, 
with individual needs. The first of these are government contracts which are believed to account for 
nearly “30% of the total security market”489 This is primarily a result of the neo-liberal economic 
approaches adopted by successive governments in which public contracts have increasingly been 
offered for public bidding. These services are almost exclusively defensive guard duties, in which 
personnel act as a visual deterrent, including guarding many of the governmental buildings and 
providing security for ministers during transport.  
 
These private security firms are also regularly contracted by multinational organisations to 
provide security to their sites, usually supplemented by local public forces as considered above. As 
such, the Yanacocha mining development, also directly employs more traditional PMSCs through 
Forza Security Services, a local subsidiary of Securitas. 490  Throughout their employment at 
Yanacocha, Forza have been dogged by complaints, with their conduct being scrutinised within 
Peruvian parliament,491 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,492 and the UN Working 
group on the Use of Mercenaries.493 In particular, Forza have been accused of operating a highly 
sophisticated espionage operation, aimed at intimidating and repressing the work of community 
activists and environmental defenders. Using wiretaps, private investigators and paid informants, 
Forza have been found to track, threaten and blackmail senior individuals within the Yanacocha 
protest movement. More alarmingly, Forza has been accused of falsely presenting opposition 
leaders as members of the Maoist terrorist organisation Shining Path, as a result of which many 
have been extra-judicially detained under Peru’s harsh anti-terrorism laws.494 Furthermore, their 
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close working relationship, with the police paid to protect Yanacocha, has also led to questions as 
to their involvement in several fatal incidents involving protesters.495 Following the 2005 shooting 
of a protester allegedly by police subcontracted to Yanacocha, an “investigation of Forza’s 
warehouse, located on Yanacocha's property… found war ammunition” illegal under the state small 
arms law.496  
 
Finally, these firms may be employed by individual clients, primarily for home guarding 
duties. These clients are usually wealthy and often employed by multi-national corporations based 
in the country, while gated communities, with communal security guards, are growing in popularity 
among the middle class.497 
 
b) Rondas 
One final consideration when considering the security market in Peru is the presence of 
Rondas Campesinas, and Rondas Urbanas. Roughly translating to rounds, Rondas were established 
to provide additional security to local indigenous communities who were disproportionately victims 
or crime and due to underrepresentation within the police force held the view that they were not 
afforded the same protection.498 With Urbanisation in the early 2000’s these Rondas were copied 
by urban communities and organised as a form of community watch. The members are usually paid 
a small amount for taking part with a tax levied upon all the houses covered by their watch. Despite 
the community nature of the Rondas, the lack of official oversight has often left them able to commit 
human rights abuses with relative impunity. One particularly common feature of these Rondas is 
the use of immediate and public corporal punishment against suspected criminals.499 In many 
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regions Rondas are easily identifiable by the presence of their whip, which is used to extract 
confessions and administer punishments. This form of vigilante justice runs directly contrary to the 
rule of law and poses significant questions for the Peruvian states commitment to human rights.  
 
4.3(2) Case Study Two Nigeria  
4.3(2)(a) Political, Economic and Social Background  
As is common among African States, both the history and current position of Nigeria is 
intimately linked with the with European Colonialism. Originally, under the control of the Royal 
Niger Company, the current State of Nigeria was established as a protectorate of the British 
Government in 1914. The British utilised a form of “indirect rule,” where an overarching national 
legal and governmental system premised upon the British system was combined with the 
maintenance of local traditional systems of Tribes and Chieftains. This Protectorate of Nigeria 
consisted of between 250 and 400 separate ethnic groups with a wide variety of customs, religions, 
practices and hierarchical structures. By the end of World War Two, Independence movements 
grew across the country. The British, seeking to retain some control instituted a federal system of 
governance, with each state increasingly independently governed, with the federal government 
reduced in importance. While calls for Independence continued to grow, the federal system had 
created a heavily unbalanced hierarchy among the ethnic groups. As a result, “in each of the three 
Regions of Nigeria… either a minority or group of minorities… described fears and grievances 
which they felt would become more intense when the present [colonial] restraints were removed”500 
with powerful groups within each of the regions accused of persecuting and repressing minorities. 
As such, the process of Independence was stalled while the British Government undertook the 
“Willink Minorities Commission” seeking to consider geographical or constitutional changes to 
provide safeguards to these minorities. Despite these difficulties, by 1960, Nigeria gained 
independence as the Federation of Nigerian states. The Ethnic tensions remained with two particular 
                                                     
500  The Willink Commission Final Report, Conclusions and Recommendations 1 <http://eie.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/TheWillinkCommissionReport_conc_recom_lt.pdf> accessed 24 July 2016 
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difficulties. The first of these was a religious split between the Muslim dominated North, and the 
Christian dominated South. Compounding this, by 1960 Nigeria’s economy was increasingly 
prospering on the back of oil discoveries all of which were located in the Southern Regions, the 
central Government in contrast with a majority of representatives from the North Region and 
located in the far West. Just six years after independence a military coup, often referred to as the 
“Igbo Coup” 501  sought to replace the federal system with “a unitary State with the Igbo 
predominating in its governance”502. A counter-Coup by Northern tribes quickly followed during 
which recriminations against the Igbo, resulting in the massacre of between 30,000-50,000 Igbo 
civilians living in the North. The resulting Biafran War, in which the South-Eastern Igbo dominated 
regions sought independence lasted until 1970 when the Government based in Lagos, with 
substantial support from Britain, was able to break the Biafran resistance and regain control over 
the whole territory. The war is estimated to have cost nearly 3 million lives directly through conflict 
and indirectly through starvation and disease.  
 
While ethnic tensions had sparked the war, it was oil that had ensured it continued, with 
potential control of oil resources causing foreign governments to back opposing sides for the 
opportunity to exploit post-war resources. At the beginning of the war, the majority British 
controlled Shell and BP joint-venture owned and controlled the vast majority of Nigeria’s oil, as 
such the British Government strongly supported the Federal governments’ military campaign 
through military assistance and training. Following the war, Nigeria experienced an unprecedented 
economic boom with the subsequent discovery of further oil reserves in Biafra and the neighbouring 
Niger Delta, consisting of the single largest deep-water discovery to date. In the 50 years since oil 
was discovered in the Niger Delta, conflict and instability have plagued the nation continuously.  
 
                                                     
501 Odeyemi, Jacob Oluwole, ‘A Political History of Nigeria and the Crisis of Ethnicity in Nation-Building’ (2014) 3 
International Journal of Development Societies 87 
<http://www.baraka.consulting/uploads/A%20Political%20History%20of%20Nigeria%20and%20the%20Crisis%20of
%20Ethnicity%20in%20Nation-Building.pdf> accessed 24 July 2016. 
502 Ibid. 
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4.3(2)(b) Security Threats in Nigeria 
One of the most consistent factors in the instability of Nigeria is rampant corruption and 
ethnic favouring. Successive military coups followed by authoritarian Juntas sought to exploit the 
nation, primarily for personal profit with loyal supporters receiving financial rewards. Between 
1979 and 1983 alone it was estimated that $16 billion in oil revenue was lost to corruption. In 2014 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. was found to have lost $35 billion in money due to 
government negligence. 503  In the Niger Delta area this has ensured that whilst the region is 
responsible for the vast majority of Nigeria’s oil wealth, it remains amongst the most 
underdeveloped areas of the country with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
describing the region as suffering from “administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and 
services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic 
conflict.” 504  Outside of the Niger Delta region income inequality remains a consistently 
destabilising factor as “Despite its oil wealth and large economy, Nigeria’s population is among 
Africa’s poorest, and the distribution of wealth is highly unequal.”505  
 
In light of the kleptocratic nature of much of Nigeria’s political system, the use of public 
security forces to undermine opposition to these authoritarian regimes, in particular, the use of 
police and military to break up large protests fundamentally undermined the public support and 
trust in the public security services.506 It has been suggested that as result of “the demand for 
                                                     
503 Aaron Sayne, Alexandra Gillies and Christina Katsouris, Inside NNPC Oil Sales: A Case for Reform in Nigeria 
(National Resource Governance Institute, August 2015) < 
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/NRGI_InsideNNPCOilSales_CompleteReport.pdf> accessed 9 April 
2016 at 9. 
504  ‘Niger Delta Human Development Report’ (United Nations Development Programme, 2006) 9 
<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_hdr_report.pdf> accessed 24 July 2016.  
505 Lauren Ploch Blanchard & Tomas F. Husted, ‘Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy’ (Congressional Research 
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506 Monsuru Adegboyega Kasali, ‘Analyzing the Evolution of Private Security Guards and Their Limitations to Security 
Management in Nigeria’  (2012) 1(2) African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies 32, 40. 
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security and inability of the public security agents to meet the security needs of various segments 
of the public have necessitates the growing acceptance of… private security guards.”507  
 
The economic equality of the Nigerian state has been further exacerbated by a series of 
“Structural Adjustment Programs” implemented as a requirement for World Bank assistance508 in 
response to the oil crisis of the 1980’s which left the Nigerian state in severe economic shock.509 
These programs committed the Nigerian government to reducing public expenditure on key service 
areas including health, education and even security. As a result of this lack of funding, the Nigerian 
Police Force is stretched and overwhelmingly concentrated in the strategic areas of Lagos and the 
Niger Delta. Despite this crime remains a constant threat within both urban and rural areas with the 
U.S. Government listing the countries Crime Rating as Critical with “armed muggings, assaults, 
burglaries, car-jackings, rapes, kidnappings, and extortion” common throughout the country.510 
 
Beyond criminal enterprises, ethnic and religious conflict remains a serious danger 
throughout much of Nigeria with the renewed armed struggle in the Niger Delta, being joined by 
the rise of Islamist Terrorism in the Northern Territory. Boko Haram are currently the deadliest 
terrorist organisation with estimates suggesting they were responsible for 5,100 deaths in 2015 
alone. Since gaining international notoriety for kidnapping 300 Christian school girls, the Northern 
Region of Nigeria has become increasingly violent and inaccessible. In particular, there has been a 
move away from conventional terrorist attacks towards an “offensive to seize and hold territory.”511 
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The UN now classes large swathes of the Northern Region completely inaccessible with many more 
areas limited in safe access.512 
 
After a period of peace in the Niger Delta, violence has once again erupted within the area. 
With the region home to over twenty ethnic groups, and 1,600 autonomous communities,513 the 
perceived inequitable share of the oil wealth has raised ethnic and tribal tensions.514 Finally, an 
assortment of disastrous environmental practices has left the region amongst the most polluted areas 
on earth. Continuous,515 and now chronic oil spills have left over 15 million barrels of oils to pollute 
the land.516 A recent UNEP study concluded these spills contributed to a 10% decrease in vegetation 
over just a four year period,517 describing the destruction of the mangrove, which is relied upon 
heavily by the local population for fish and vegetation518, as “disastrous” with the region suffering 
from “extreme distress” to “total destruction” 519 . The scale of the environmental disaster 
surrounding the Niger Delta was such that the UN Environment Panel suggested setting aside $1 
billion as a starting point for the environmental clean-up of the region.520 After failed attempts of 
the Nigerian government to distribute resources to the region local militias re-emerged in the form 
of the Niger Delta Avengers. Alongside the conflict within the Delta region, the coastal waters 
alongside Nigeria remain some of the most dangerous in the world. The Gulf of Guinea, the stretch 
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of water the Delta enters, was the location of 30% of piracy attacks between 2003-2011, second 
only to waters of Somalia.521  
 
4.3(2)(c) PMSC and the Legal Environment 
Considering the political, social and economic backdrop it is unsurprising that there is an 
ever-expanding market for private security throughout Nigeria, with it being suggested that 
“security is now the second largest money-spinner in Nigeria, surpassed only by oil and gas.”522  
The industry ranges from protecting oil exploration in the Niger Delta, where PMSCs are not only 
popular but essential for oil operations, to the modernisation and professionalization of the 
traditional “mai-guards” or local watchmen.523 Up to 50% of the residents of Lagos are estimated 
to employ private guards in one form or other.524 This is reflected in recent statistics suggesting that 
around 2,000 individual companies are registered within the security sector in Nigeria employing 
almost 100,000 contractors525. This represents the second largest market for multinational PMSCs 
after Iraq.  
 
Despite the size of the industry, however, the legal framework within which they operate 
is limited and ineffective. The primary legislative regulation of PMSCs within Nigeria is Private 
Guard Act (1986).526 Written before the wholesale growth of multinational PMSCs this law was 
designed primarily to regulate the use of Mai-guards within cities. This act establishes that anyone 
who “perfrom[s] the service of watching, guarding, patrolling or carrying of money” must be 
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registered as a company under Nigerian Law527  and have applied for and been granted a licence to 
undertake private security. These licenses must be renewed every two years but there is little 
indication of an oversight procedure.  
 
The law further states that for a company to be registered under the Act t must be “wholly 
owned by Nigerians”528 with the licensing authority further required to reject any application in 
which “any director of the company or the person applying for approval… is not a citizen of 
Nigeria”529 Despite this, however, a study of PMSCs in Nigeria identified that “there is nevertheless  
an expanding presence of international security personnel and companies operating through various 
intricate ownership arrangements, ‘sister’ companies, or embedding their personnel as employees 
of their clients.” 530  As such, from 2002 onwards Outsourcing Services Limited operated a 
nationwide PMSC despite being part of Gray Security, a South African PMSC.531 Gray Security, 
was eventually bought out by G4S, the British based PMSC, who now employ over 7,000 
contractors across Nigeria.532 A Nigerian investigative journalist reporting on the Niger Delta found 
no less than 10 foreign PMSCs including G4S subsidiary ArmorGroup, and Erinys International, 
both known for their roles in Afghanistan and Iraq.533  
 
Alongside the regulatory framework for establishing a PMSC the Private Guard Act 
(1986)534, also seeks to establish a minimum behavioural standard for PMSCs.535  The first of these 
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is that all PMSCs registered in Nigeria must undergo company training from a syllabus approved 
by the Minister of Internal Affairs. However, the rigorousness of this oversight has been questioned 
with little indication of the standard of training required and no national framework.536 
 
Furthermore, under the original provision of the act private security personnel are 
prohibited from carrying firearms at any time in Nigeria. This restriction was loosened in 2004 with 
“certain specified persons employed by private security companies” allowed to “carry and use arms 
while on duty.”537 These regulations are however still relatively strict with the requirement to 
register both weapons and ammunition every month. Despite this, specifications as to the type of 
weapons allowed prevent them from being effective against many of the security threats PMSCs 
are utilised for, in particular, the more conflict-ridden areas. For this reason, the national police and 
army are often required to co-operate and second forces to PMSCs, with the distinction between 
actors becoming increasingly blurred on occasion. One example of this fusion of personnel is 
provided by Abrahamsen and Williams’ analysis of Chevron Nigeria Ltd.’s contract with G4S. 
Included in the contract, is agreement provision that G4S, through their Nigerian subsidiary OLS, 
will supply heavily armed rapid response boats and employ ex-South African naval personnel to 
patrol swamp land within the delta and provide escort for oil supply vessels.538 However, each 
morning OLS specify the number of Nigerian soldiers to work on board the vessel, who are to take 
control of the boat when “a life-threatening situation develops.”539 Similar arrangements exist for 
almost all organisations working within the Niger Delta region, with the employing firm often 
paying the Government forces a weekly stipend and also provide food and accommodation.540 
Furthermore, whilst police or army employees retain their own organisational structure and 
hierarchy, when working with PMSCs their “operational authority is in the hands of a senior 
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company security official” and so that they are “instructed to comply with the company’s guidelines 
for use of force.”541 Alongside these secondment contracts between Government forces and a 
PMSC, private companies can also directly employ their own forces who are then trained and 
registered by the police, with the authority only to carry weapons and exercise police powers on the 
property of their employer.542 It is estimated around 5,000 of these supernumerary police officers 
are currently registered in the Niger Delta, with Shell employing 1,200 alone.543  
 
4.3(2)(d) Types of PMSCs Present in Nigeria 
Considering the fragile nature of Nigerian society, and the unwillingness and inability of 
the Federal Government to fully protect the collective security of its citizens, private coercive 
violence is endemic throughout all aspects of society.  This thesis will seek to examine some of the 
variations within these security providers, and consider some of the effects and problems that have 
arisen within each type. 
 
a) Local Guarding Watch Groups 
The most numerous of the types of PMSC within Nigeria are Local Guarding Watch 
Groups. These are primarily based upon a traditional conception of community security where 
either individual wealthy homeowners or collections of neighbours organise together to “provide 
security for residents especially at night, but sometimes during the day.”544 In recent years these 
watch groups have largely split into two distinct types. The first of these are corporate arrangements 
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with a focus on manned guarding. The majority of these are concentrated in urban centres where 
crime and gangs have increased over the past decade. As such, in Lagos, almost 50% of the urban 
population employ some form of private guarding company. These services are almost exclusively 
defensive guard duties, in which personnel act as a visual deterrent, including guarding many of the 
governmental buildings and providing security for ministers during transport.  
 
The second group of community guarding groups are increasingly prevalent are the 
informal security companies. These groups are often formed from within the ethnic population that 
they operate in with and often operate in a vigilante manner in response to perceived crimes against 
their community.545 The most notorious of these groups are the O’odua People’s Congress and the 
Bakassi Boys. The semi-organised vigilante groups are employed by both local communities and 
occasionally local public authorities to supplement the Nigerian National Police. Although 
originally these groups were little more than local ethnic militias, often responsible for mass killings 
and extortion, some attempts to regulate these community groups. In some states this has been 
through the passing of laws effectively incorporating these community groups into the local law 
enforcement, for example through the passing of Anambra Vigilante Law No.9 of 2000.546 As part 
of these reforms, the community guards were required to wear official uniforms as well as use 
marked vehicles. Despite this, these groups, however, are notorious for their violent and 
extrajudicial methods of enforcing community crime control. Although they no longer carry 
machetes and carry out ‘sleeving’ the act of chopping a hand off, they continue to publicly exercise 
corporal punishment through whippings and beatings.547 Furthermore, there are still regular cases 
of “innocent civilians have been killed with… guns and other dangerous weapons by some 
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overzealous… guards.” 548  Furthermore, these groups have been accused of disproportionately 
targeting other ethnic groups and accepting bribes for preferential treatment, as a result “the 
unlawful activities of Bakassi Boys have made public acceptance that the group previously enjoyed 
to rapidly dwindle.”549 
 
a) Local Militia 
Related to these community guarding groups are local militia, who are employed to provide 
security services. Unlike community guards, they play a much more pro-active role in providing 
security and are more prevalent in rural areas where the security situation is more complicated. To 
date, many of these militias have been employed by multinational corporations as local security 
forces, with the express intention of providing security against social unrest, community violence 
and terrorism. Despite this, the informal nature of the militias, and the lack of regulatory oversight 
means that they often operate in a manner closer to a criminal organisation than a security force. 
When the NGO Platform produced a report on Shell’s security budget in the Niger Delta, one of 
the most troubling aspects of its findings was the high level of unaccounted for security payments. 
Specifically, in the Niger Delta alone Shell listed $75 million in “other” security payments.550 
Analysis of this expenditure revealed several channels of expenditure that produced serious 
accusations of human rights abuse and corruption. Amongst the most serious to arise from these 
was that Shell had, through subsidiary groups, provided significant funding to local militia groups 
to support their violent campaigns against rival militias who opposed the oil extraction. 551 
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One specific allegation relates to the use of “community engagement payments” in 2007 
intended to benefit from Shell’s "development plan." four local tribes, known as the Joinkrama 4, 
in areas surrounding the Adibawa oil field, Despite the locally elected chief (Chief Walters) asking 
for the money to be distributed between the four communities equally, Shell instead directed all of 
the money to just one of the four communities.552 Following protests at the decision, the three other 
communities have come under constant physical attack from armed militia loyal to the one tribe 
who have burned vehicles and looted villages.553 In 2005 this led to the deaths of 6 people, and the 
demolition of 300 homes.554 The violence flared again in 2007 following local community elections. 
The aftermath left at least three dead and forced many more to live in makeshift camps, many for 
several years.555 These militia attacks continued, with several community leaders who opposed the 
financial payments murdered with their bodies dumped in prominent positions as warnings. 
Throughout the violence, and despite the widespread reports of human rights abuses by militias, 
Shell continued to pay the local groups including payments of over $135,000 in 2010 alone.556  
Alongside this, the Wikileaks embassy cables reveal that Shell routinely paid individual 
militants, some of whom were linked with warlords, up to $300 per month, to offer "protection" for 
their sites.557 The cables suggested that this was a common method of providing security for oil 
companies working in the area, a claim the Managing Director of Shell Nigeria has admitted to, 
reasoning it was impossible to distinguish between legitimate security contractors and warlords558. 
These reports support evidence from the Platform report which found that Shell frequently used 
community payments to fund local militia known for their dismal human rights records.559 Under 
one such agreement, Shell paid a local militia in the Rumuepke region over $50,000 for services. 
Violence committed by the group led to the death of 60 civilians and the burning of an entire 
                                                     
552 Ibid at 37-39. 
553 Ibid at 38-41. 
554  John Ighodaro, ‘Nigeria: Six Feared Dead in Communal Clashes’ All Africa (March 8, 2005) 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/200503080292.html.> accessed 23 June 2016.   
555 Platform: Counting the Cost (n 551) at 38.  
556 Ibid.  
557 Platform: Dirty Work (n 543) at 8. 
558 Ibid at 9. 
559 See Platform: Counting the Cost (n 551) at 42. 
 
149 
 
village.560 However, it was not until the violence spread onto Shells property and a Shell engineer 
had his hand chopped off by a militiaman, that the company decided to terminate the funding.561  
 
b) Supernumerary Police 
Alongside these private security providers, however, one of the largest sectors of the private 
security industry in Nigeria are the “supernumerary police officers (SPO).” These SPOs are 
primarily utilised by multinational corporations, with the majority of their contracts operating in 
Niger Delta. One of the largest benefactors of the SPO services has been Shell who employ 1,200 
of these SPOs.562Based directly on the sites of Shells operations, including on drilling platforms 
and around refineries. Shell maintains that these SPO do not generally carry arms and act primarily 
as a visual deterrent to thieves targeting oil and machinery for sale on the black market.563 Despite 
this, Shell admits that this policy is flexible,564 and it has in the past imported over 100 semi-
automatic machine guns for use by their SPOs.565 Regardless of the armed status of the SPOs 
however, they pose significant questions regarding an appropriate public/private split. In particular, 
whilst SPOs are legally classed as Shell employees, and work under the direct supervision, control 
and guidelines of Shell, 566 they operate and exercise the authority of the Nigerian national police. 
This includes wearing a government-issued uniform,567 badge and carrying the standard police issue 
baton.568 While the UN Rapporteur to the Region called for the practice to be “given up” entirely569 
almost 15 years ago, the practice remains unchanged. As such, local activists have continued to 
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campaign on the basis that this relationship gives undue influence to corporations over essential 
public services. 
 
c) Joint-Task Force 
Similar to the SPO, the Nigerian military is often required to supplement its budget through 
direct employment with private actors, primarily large multinational actors. One such employer is 
the American oil company Chevron who operate oil drilling sites throughout the Niger Delta region. 
As a result of their contract with the JTF, Chevron are able to call upon JTF boats to escort and 
protect their supply ships. As part of this agreement, Chevron are able to specify the number of JTF 
forces they want and the specific mission they will be undertaking on a daily basis. In practice, this 
means that the JTF forces are often working alongside, and taking their orders from Chevrons 
private security.570 Furthermore, independent research by “conflict resolution experts”571 claimed 
that JTF General Elias Zamani…  charged oil companies an unaudited ‘stipend’ that included “fuel, 
stores and an estimated $258,000 per month in cash.”572 US cables suggest that cash was used to 
pay much of the JTF’s charges, providing ample opportunities for corruption.”573   
Similar agreements are in place for almost all of the MNCs operating in the Niger Delta. 
As such, alongside their own security forces, a significant section of Shell’s security budget in the 
Niger delta goes towards financing and utilising a Nigerian government initiative called the Joint 
Task Force (JTF). Since its inception in 2003, Shell has invested around £600 million into 
supporting this taskforce, including providing the force with gunboats, helicopters and heavy-duty 
vehicles,574 thereby ensuring that over 700 of these heavily armed soldiers currently work in close 
                                                     
570 Abrahamsen & William (n 385) at 141. 
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proximity to Shell's operations.575 On the basis of this expenditure, it is clear that the JTF are 
considered central to Shell's security operations in the Niger Delta region, and only last year Shell 
decided that a more focal role for the JTF would, along with better community relations form the 
central pillar of its new security framework.576  It is however notable that the JTF have been 
routinely accused of serious and repeated human rights violations, in particular, its disproportionate 
use of force in response to unrest, including having been accused of extra-judicial executions and 
torture along with using collective punishment of entire communities to enforce compliance. 
Amongst the most serious is the allegation that in 2005 in response to a militant attack, the JTF 
unilaterally invaded the town of Odioma leaving 17 dead, whilst the town and many local 
livelihoods were burned to the ground.577  Even more seriously, in 2010, in response to a similar 
militant attack, it is claimed the JTF killed over 100 people when they invaded a small town. 
Furthermore, Amnesty International report that rape is commonly used as a weapon by the JTF to 
coerce or intimidate local populations.578   
 
d) Mercenaries  
The final group of private security contractors that are necessary to consider within Nigeria, 
is the increasing use of foreign mercenaries in the fight against Boko Haram. According to Nigeria’s 
Chief of Defense Intelligence, these troops have been contracted by the Army with the sole purpose 
of training the Nigerian military. However, while the Nigerian government has yet to confirm the 
presence and use of mercenaries, repeated reports by newspapers and NGOs, backed up by 
photographic evidence, have universally come to the conclusion that mercenaries have been used 
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on the frontline of the fight in active combat roles.579 The use of these mercenaries has essentially 
been a return to the position of Executive Outcomes of the late 80’s and 90’s. Specifically, it is 
alleged that many of the mercenaries are former soldiers of the South African Defence Force, from 
the pre-apartheid era. These mercenaries have been credited with turning the tide against Boko 
Haram, having been engaged in the months prior to national elections. It is suggested that these 
mercenaries operate as the vanguard of the Nigerian army, moving into a territory undercover and 
crippling the Boko Haram infrastructure before the Nigerian army move in to complete the 
operation. The mercenaries are believed to be operating much more sophisticated equipment than 
even the Nigerian Army and are able to call upon air support and heavy artillery within their arsenal. 
As a result of the secrecy surrounding their operation, there is little verifiable data regarding the 
impact these mercenaries are having upon the civilian populations, however, it is clear that their 
tactics have effectively turned the tide against Boko Haram.  
 
 
4.3(3) Case Study Three: Afghanistan 
4.3(3)(a) Political, Economic and Social Background 
There are few countries in the world whose history can rival Afghanistan for insecurity and 
violence. The current state, geographically resulting from the “great game” rivalry between the 
British Empire and Russia, has been plagued by insecurity and civil strife since its conception. Since 
its unification in 1747 there have been just four peaceful transitions of power.580 Much of this is 
underpinned by a complex ethnic makeup, with at least fourteen recognised ethnic groups.581 Many 
of these ethnic groups have links with populations in other countries with Afghanistan often finding 
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itself a staging ground for proxy conflict. Furthermore, due to Afghanistan’s location as a central 
hub in Central Asia, it has been seen as an area of strategic importance for both trade and security. 
As a result of this, for the past 40 years, Afghanistan has been in a constant cycle of violence. 
Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, the violence “left a million dead and created the world’s 
largest refugee population, with around six million refugees in Iran and Pakistan.” 582  The 
Mujahideen an ultra-conservative religious guerrilla force, originally covertly backed by the CIA, 
Saudi Arabia and others as a bulwark as Soviet influence,583 established Afghanistan as a centre of 
Jihad, attracting fighters from across the globe to wage holy war.584 The civil war was eventually 
“won” by the Taliban, who comprised partially of remnants of the Mujahideen, were quick to 
establish Afghanistan as a haven for Sunni Islamic terrorism. 585  This exacerbated already 
significant religious tensions that had historically plagued Afghanistan, with these competing 
groups funded by Iran on one side, and Pakistan acting primarily as a proxy for Saudi Arabia on 
the other. 586  Throughout the 1990’s the UN repeatedly criticised Afghanistan for harbouring 
terrorists587 and following the September 11th attack, the US, citing self-defence through Article 51 
of the UN Charter588 invaded Afghanistan. In the period since, the political, economic and social 
situation in Afghanistan has been dominated by the ongoing military operations. The UN considers 
Afghanistan to have the second highest refugee population per capita, following only Syria589 
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Elections have successfully taken place on three occasions since the invasion, with peaceful 
transitions from power, however, allegations of corruption have plagued the process.590 Corruption 
has plagued Afghan society in general with the NGO Transparency International rating it as 169 of 
176 countries.591 Bribes were estimated to be worth $3.9 billion in 2012, nearly 20% of the GDP.592 
It is unsurprising therefore that when surveyed 56% of the population deemed corruption to be one 
of the most important issues for their country. 593  Considering this history of turmoil, it is 
unsurprising that the economy of Afghanistan is almost wholly under-developed. A large proportion 
of the population continues to rely upon traditional agricultural products and subsistence farming.594 
There is little of a formal economy, with over 90% of the Afghan Governments income coming 
from international donors595 amounting to a total of $57 billion in international donations since the 
U.S. invasion in 2001.596 It is suggested that without any additional complications the Afghan 
economy will be self-sufficient by 2024 at the very earliest.597 Parallel to the state economy exists 
an expansive black market economy, dominated by the production of opium. The country accounts 
for almost 50% of the worlds heroin production. The trade is the primary financial support for the 
Taliban598  insurgency which has gained significant ground in the past five years, with opium 
production increasing by 43% between 2015 and 2016 alone.599 However, many farmers from the 
poorest regions of Afghanistan also rely on the income from opium production, with estimates 
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suggesting more than 3 million people from farming families are financially reliant on opium 
production.600 
 
The political and economic insecurity of Afghanistan has led to it becoming one of the least 
developed countries in the world. The UNDP rates it as “Low Human Development” ranking 169 
of 188.601 The average life expectancy at birth is just 60.7 years, and while infant mortality has 
dropped from a high of 122 per 1,000 in the 1990’s it remains in the worst five in the world at 
66.3.602    
 
4.3(3)(b) Security Threats in Afghanistan 
Insurgency 
Considering the recent history of Afghanistan, security threats remain both significant and 
varied. The most substantial of security threats remains the insurgency that has continued since the 
US Invasion in 2001. In 2016 the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented 
11,418 civilian casualties, fatal and non-fatal, as a result of conflict.603 The Taliban account for the 
majority of insurgent violence, however, since 2015 the ISIS-affiliated ISKP have maintained a 
presence in the Khorasan Province and are increasingly targeting civilian populations. Among the 
threats posed by civilians from insurgents is the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which 
accounted for 31% of civilian causalities attributed to the anti-government elements.604 These IEDs 
are indiscriminate in nature and even when intended for military personnel often result in civilian 
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casualties.605 Increasingly, insurgents have favoured “suicide and complex attacks” those where 
armed insurgents conduct large-scale attacks or hostage taking. Many of these are targeted at 
security forces with the indiscriminate nature of the attacks causes mass civilian casualties as 
collateral damage, however, there has been a rise in sectarian attacks targeted directly at civilians. 
In one such attack, ISKP targeted a Shi’a minority protest killing 85 and injuring a further 413.606 
Similarly, in Kandahar 18 men and boys were executed, and a further 11 injured, for having 
connections with the local police forces.607 Alongside attacks on civilians, the Afghan security 
services face daily violence. In many regions, even loose association, or perceived collaboration 
with the security services puts individuals at risk of death. In October 2016, insurgents from IKSP 
executed 26 shepherds in response to perceived collaboration with the Afghan National Army. 
 
Lack of Effective Security Services 
These effects of these insurgencies are compounded by the weakness of the Afghan state 
security services which following the removal of the Taliban, was rebuilt from scratch. Prior to 
2014, much of the security sector in Afghanistan was directly supported by NATO through the 
International Security Assistance Force. In 2012, over 130,000 NATO troops were deployed to 
Afghanistan,608 both combatting the insurgency and providing security to the large population 
centres. When the ISAF mission was ended to be replaced by the much smaller Operation Resolute 
Support, the security environment in Afghanistan worsened significantly. Despite investment of 
over $60 billion,609 the Afghanistan National Security Forces remain under resources, trained and 
staffed. The national security forces are divided between the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) 
and the Afghanistan National Police (ANP). The ANA is responsible for the majority of offensive 
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operations against the insurgents consisting of over 180,000 troops and despite some success in 
defeating the internal insurgency it still faces significant difficulties. High soldier turnover, over 
33% leave within one year of joining. This has resulted in a disproportionately large amount of 
funding being focused on recruiting and retraining personnel with combat effectiveness and 
professionalism being sacrificed.610 Desertion remains common throughout the ANA, becoming so 
widespread that the President of Afghanistan passing a law granting amnesty to soldiers who had 
deserted to save resources. 611  The effectiveness of the ANA is further compromised by an 
undersized Air Force, consisting of just 104 aircraft, has significantly limited the available air 
support to the ANA during combat operations.612 Overall, the increasing effectiveness of the ANA 
is mitigated by the asymmetric nature of the warfare as the insurgents increasingly retreat to 
complex cave networks and rely on guerrilla attacks. The use of IEDs and suicide attacks continue 
to pose a significant threat and the level of casualties among the ANA remains high. There was an 
average of more than 330 casualties per week in the fight against the Taliban during 2015, and 
incidences of violence have been increasing year on year.613 
 
Parallel to the ANA, the AFP take responsibility for providing security to the major 
population centres and the transport networks. Despite this central role in the Afghan security 
sector, the AFP is plagued by difficulties leading to it being described as “the weak leak in security 
sector reform” in Afghanistan.614 Just 70% of ANP trainees are literate, and most undertake between 
15 and 40 days of training before returning to their local community.615 The ANPs difficulties are 
exacerbated by the fact that while classed as police they undertake an overtly military role at the 
forefront of the fight against insurgents. Their training is primarily provided by the U.S. Military 
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with “operational policy, force structure, and standardized training and professionalization, were 
modelled on military rather than civilian police institutions.”616 However, while this has created a 
military focused police force, the equipment and support services have been insufficient to fulfil 
this role. The ANP have suffered “three times as many casualties as the Afghan National Army”617 
and during the period from March to September 2014 alone, 1,368 ANP officers were killed and a 
further 2,370 were injured.618 Beyond these institutional problems, the ANP has been plagued by 
widespread allegations of corruption, drug trafficking, and a lack of professionalism. The British 
Foreign Office estimates that 60% of ANP operating in the Helmand province are drug users619 
while in many communities the reputation for bribery and extortion has led to them becoming less 
popular than the Taliban. 
 
Drug Trafficking and Related Organised Crime  
The growth of Opium production has led to Afghanistan facing a consistent threat from 
violence related to international organised crime. UN reports have identified Mexican drug cartels 
and Russian Mafia among the buyers of Afghanistan’s opium and an increasing competition for 
resources has led to Afghanistan becoming a staging ground for a growing number of international 
mafia and cartels.620 A report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime identified at least 
9 tons of heroin trafficked from Afghanistan to America via Mexican cartels.621 Its land borders 
with Turkey and the Caucasus have caused competition between Russian and Turkish gangs for the 
lucrative European market. These gangs have bought with them unique security threats in order to 
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secure their trade routes. These often include extortion and kidnapping, while the border 
populations can be forced to pay protection money to either the gangs, or commonly the Taliban.622  
 
Kidnapping and Extortion 
Beyond security threats tied to the insurgency, kidnapping and extortion present one of the 
most significant issues faced by both Afghan citizens and foreign visitors. The lack of an effective 
civilian police force has allowed mid-level organised crime in the form of kidnapping and extortion 
to flourish. Residents of Kabul have identified it as one of their biggest security concerns,623 with a 
kidnapping occurring daily.624  While many of the victims are local businessmen, with money 
changers particularly vulnerable, their family members are also targeted. Foreign visitors are 
similarly targeted, with aid workers particularly vulnerable. In these cases, the original kidnappers 
will often sell the victim to an insurgent group rather than seek a ransom directly,625 with a high 
proportion being killed.626 The ANP have belatedly identified the need to crack-down on this and 
last year 3,000 kidnappers were arrested,627 however, despite this improvement it remains a constant 
security threat. 
 
4.3(3)(c) PMSCs and the Legal Environment 
The legal environment in which PMSCs operate has undergone a significant transformation 
in the past 16 years following the U.S. invasion, with the current position remains opaque. For much 
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of the decade following the 2001 invasion it was largely perceived that PMSCs operated in a legal 
and regulatory vacuum.628 The first legal regulations of PMSCs were established in 2008 with the 
assistance of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. These regulations 
remain in force today, although they have been significantly revised by further regulations, and they 
are therefore necessary to consider. Under this law, PMSCs were required to possess an operating 
license from the Secretariat of the HCB, with the approval of the Council of Ministers. 629 
Distinctions in the requirements for gaining an operating license vary depending on whether the 
PMSC is considered a National Security Company (NSC), or a Foreign Security Company (FSC).630 
FSCs are required to demonstrate transparency and good security practices with a guarantee from 
the countries which the company operates in.631 In comparison, LSCs are required to demonstrate 
that their staff have not been suspected or accused of human rights violations. 
 
Certain requirements of PMSCs are consistent regardless of whether national or foreign. 
Article 19 establishes that contractors can only carry weapons in specific areas established in their 
operating license,632 while under Article 10 PMSCs could not employ more than 500 people without 
specific agreement from the Council of Ministers. Articles 19-27 set out more general regulations 
for PMSCs, including a list of prohibited activities. Included within this are participating in political 
activities, buying or selling weapons and wearing uniforms that may be confused with those of the 
ANA or ANP.633 Notably, considering frequent allegations of ethnic or tribal violence, the list of 
prohibitions make explicit reference to “recruiting people collectively from one tribe or party.”634 
Any PMSCs found to be in breach of these regulations is liable to be stripped of its operating 
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license. In these cases, NSCs would have their weapons repossessed by the Minister of Interior, 
while FSCs would be required to remove all legal weapons from the country or else submit them to 
the MOI. 635  By August 2009, 52 companies had been granted operating licenses for PMSC 
activities. However, while these attempts were notable, they were considered to have failed in 
effectively regulating the PMSC market. While PMSCs operating in Kabul generally complied with 
these regulations this was not replicated in the rural regions. The UN Working Group on 
Mercenaries identified “500 security operating in the Eastern region which were not registered… 
by comparison, there were only six PMSCs registered with the MoI.636 
 
The perceived failure of this regulation, with the view that FNC were not taking this 
regulation seriously, led President Karzai to seek their complete abolition. Through Presidential 
Decree 62, Karzai implemented a 12 month “Bridging Period” until March 2012, after which 
PMSCs would be deemed illegal under Afghan law. This decree contained two significant caveats. 
In “commitment to the principles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations” the decree 
exempted Embassies and entities accredited with diplomatic status.637 These retained the ability to 
contract up to 500 contractors, or 1,500 with the imposition of significant fines so long as the PMSC 
was in good standing and holding an operating license issued prior to Degree 62. 638 The second 
exemption on the ban existed for “development programs, ISAF and coalition forces”639 who for a 
period of two years cold continue to contract PMSCs for security operations. Ultimately this two 
year period was softened with reviews at 3-month intervals following the bridging period “until the 
APPF is judged capable of assuming all ISAF relevant security requirements.”640 Ultimately, the 
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deteriorating security conditions hindered this approach and by 2014 only 5 of 43 ISAF bases were 
protected by the APPF.641  
 
Beyond these two caveats, PMSCs remained banned under Afghan law. Instead, following 
Presidential Degree 62, the Afghanistan Government established the Afghan Public Protection 
Force, with the intention of providing state-backed contracted security services to private clients. 
Their role has variously been described as “to provide “public protection” but not “law 
enforcement”642 and as a “state-owned enterprise… to provide contract based facility and convoy 
services.”643 During the one year transition, pre-existing NSCs were allowed to register as “bridging 
tashkil’s” essentially establishing them as subcontractors of the APPF, with the intention of 
transition to members of the Force after the bridging gap.644 Alongside this, however, some PMSCs, 
primarily FSCs, were allowed to register as Risk Management Companies (RMC), who continue to 
provide security through “lightly armed expatriate consultants or Afghans.”645  In 2014, following 
mixed outcomes in establishing the APPF, the organisation was fully incorporated into the ANP.646 
Due to force limitations, however, parallel to this the signing of Presidential Decree 66 over-ruled 
Decree 62, allowing U.S. and NATO forces to “contract with Private Security Companies based on 
their security requirements” indefinitely. 647 Overall, the current status of PMSCs under Afghan law 
is unclear. PMSCs continue to provide the majority of services to both foreign diplomatic and 
military installations and personnel. In theory, PMSCs remain banned in other circumstances, 
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163 
 
however, the so-called “bridging tashkil’s” remain in existence to date under the authority of the 
NAP, operating as hybrid public-private security contractors.  
 
4.3(3)(d) Types of PMSCs Present in Afghanistan 
Due to the constantly evolving nature of threats and the legal framework in which PMSCs 
operate in Afghanistan, this section will consider types of PMSCs that both currently operate or 
have operated, in particular those since the U.S. Invasion in 2001. The security market can crudely 
be divided into four primary sectors in which private actors play a substantial role. 
 
A) Private Military Contractors 
The first of these is the provision of support for NATO militaries, most significantly the 
U.S. and Britain. At their height over 28,000 armed PMSCs operated in Afghanistan under contract 
from the U.S. Department of Defence, equating to almost one-quarter of the entire military force.648 
Among the tasks these contractors undertake is co-ordinating counternarcotic operations with 
contracts worth over $1.7 billion awards between 2002 and 2013. These official figures, however 
are likely under representative as much of the use of PMSCs is classified, with the C.I.A. also 
employing a large contingent of contractors to assist their work. These forces are comprised 
primarily of ex-military personnel from NATO countries however, there is an increasing tendency 
to recruit from cheaper markets with Colombian and Nepalese contractors forming a substantial 
proportion.649 These forces undertake a range of roles but are largely focussed on providing fixed-
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site security and convoy security. The fixed-site security even extends to owning and running 
private bases, with Academi (formerly Blackwater) possessing a “10-acre forward operating base 
in Kabul, Afghanistan”650 from which U.S. Special Forces undertake covert operations,651 and 
counter-narcotics operations are planned.652 Beyond these guarding roles, however, it has been 
suggested that the use of PMCs by the U.S., in particular, has a more sinister role in the War on 
Terror. Evidence suggests that the C.I.A. have used PMCs to both conduct rendition flights into and 
out of Afghanistan653 and to undertake enhanced interrogation of suspected terrorists at C.I.A 
“Black Sites”.654 Equally disturbing are reports that the C.I.A. contracted the PMSC Blackwater to 
conduct covert surveillance, and potentially assassinations, of Al Qaeda leaders.655  
 
b) Private Guards 
The second sector in which PMSCs operate is the provision of private guarding to VIPs 
and important structures. Included within this are foreign diplomats, dignitaries and due to their 
exemption from Presidential Decree 62, this remains common throughout Afghanistan with the 
majority of foreign governments relying upon primarily foreign PMSCs to provide security for both 
their buildings and personnel. In 2015, G4S signed a £100million contract with the British Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office for security services in Afghanistan656 and will guard all FCO sites in 
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656  ‘G4S Wins Security Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan’ (G4S, Sept. 11, 2015) 
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the country. These roles have also included providing security during travelling, and there have 
frequently been accusations of these PMSCs blocking entire roads, barging other drivers and even 
arbitrarily opening fire on civilians perceived as threats.657 
 
Beyond government officials, many multi-national corporations and NGOs continue to rely 
upon private guards to protect their staff, with foreign workers often at an increased risk of crime 
and kidnapping. These groups are often registered as RMC in order to circumvent the prohibition 
on PMSCs. Despite this, these RMCs continue to provide almost identical services to the PMSCs, 
with the flexibility of the requirement of “lightly armed” providing scope for various forms of 
actors. An example of such is Afghan Wantan Risk Management, who wile registered as an RCM 
offer essentially private security services including “close protection services” and “quick reaction 
forces.”658 Among their clients they include the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation, who they 
have a contract with to provide oil and gas “exploration in hostile environments and geographically 
inaccessible regions”659 With the incorporation of the APPF into the ANP it is suspected that these 
forms of private guards will grow as the government seeks to attract foreign investment into the 
country.660 
 
c) Militia Companies 
Along with official or legitimate PMSCs, following the U.S. invasion, the United Nations 
found that many community militias and tribal warlords began advertising their services as PMSCs 
“represent[ing] an opportunity… to continue their activities legally.”661 Under these arrangements, 
the employers, ISAF forces, the Afghan or provincial Government and multi-national corporations 
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would pay these militias in order to provide security in one specific region. Examples of this include 
the use of Afghanistan Navin, a “PMSC” owned by “former mujahideen commander Lutfullah” 
who provide 500 security guards to the Bagram Airbase.662 +On occasions, multi-national PMSCs 
have even sub-contracted these militia to undertake their security services for them. UPSI, an 
American based firm with contracts with the World Bank and United Nations was found to have 
made agreements with Northern Alliance militia to provide the personnel for their security 
contracts. 663  In one of the more embarrassing incidences, an investigation by the US Senate 
Committee on Armed Services found ArmorGroup (A subsidiary of G4S) subcontracted their role 
providing security to Shindand Airbase to two local warlords who “turned out to be in conflict with 
each other.”664 This led to clashes between the two and culminated in the assassination of one of 
the warlords.665 A scathing report by the United States House of Representatives concluded that the 
security contracts awarded for the U.S. supply chain in Afghanistan had “fuel[led] warlordism, 
extortion and corruption, and it may be a significant source of income for the insurgents.”666 Since 
2015, with the withdrawal of many NATO forces, these militias have played a more central role in 
the provision of security,667 with the Afghan government increasingly relying upon them to provide 
security in rural regions.  
 
Since the beginning, however, the use of militias and warlords as PMSCs has been 
accompanied by allegations of grave human rights abuses, including the use of torture and arbitrary 
detention, while some minority communities have accused the militias of committing ethnically 
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motivated violence. The Kandak Amniante Uruzgan, a 2,000 strong security firms used by Dutch 
and Australian forces in the volatile Urzugan region is operated by a Commander Matiullah Khan 
who “led… hit squads that killed stubborn fathers than did not want to surrender their land, 
daughters, and livestock.” 668  One of the most powerful militias employed by the Afghan 
government, the Junbish militia have been accused by UNAMA and HRW of killing 18 civilians 
and injuring a further 45 ethnic Pashtuns based on their perceived allegiance with the Taliban.669 
Despite these numerous reports of criminal behaviour, however, no militia commanders have been 
arrested or tried for the actions of their forces. It is generally accepted that these forces act with 
almost absolute impunity and no legal accountability.   
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4.4 Conclusions on the Modern Security Markets 
Throughout this Chapter, the research has sought to critically analyse the modern 
phenomena of PMSCs. This intended to provide an analytical background against which an 
evaluation of existing legal and regulatory frameworks could be measured and a unique typological 
framework could be established. Through conducting three country case-studies, this research 
looked to identify trends and highlight the difficulties posed by modern security assemblages.  
 
Among the preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from these case studies, three in 
particular stand out as central to the analysis that this work is seeking to undertake. The first of 
these is that traditional discourse on PMSCs which focuses on a clear distinction between security 
services provided by the state and those provided by private companies is increasingly tenuous. 
While existing research has been heavily focussed on the effect of states employing private actors, 
there is an increasing need to consider variations within these relationships. In particular, the de 
facto control of state security services by private companies provides equally important questions 
about the control over state functions, principally coercive violence, and the manner in which they 
remain responsible for their actions. Similarly, the use of PMSCs by private companies provides 
the very real prospect of them exercising features of sovereign power over local populations. The 
case studies of both Peru and Nigeria identified situations in which MNCs were able to effectively 
control geographical areas through the use of both PMSCs and sub-contracted state security forces 
undermining social and political structures upon which the states are built.  
 
Alongside this the case studies appear to identify a need to further examine the dichotomous 
categorisation of PMSCs as either military or security actors with this approach incapable of 
precisely analysing the activities of PMSCs. The modern state faces an increasingly complex range 
of security threats with the effect that the actors operating within security markets is progressively 
diverse. This was frequently evident within the case studies where private security guards or police 
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were employed to counter asymmetric threats, as faced by an increasing number of states, resorting 
to the use of military-style tactics and warfare-like violence. One of the most significant findings 
in relation to the increasingly blurred lines between military and security contractors is the 
correlation between the type of violence used by the PMSC and the lack of popular support or 
legitimate power possessed by the employer. All three case studies identified increasingly violent 
tactics being utilised not only in response to higher security threats, but more concerningly in 
response to legitimate popular opposition to the political system or external commercial interests. 
As a result, a comprehensive analysis of the privatisation of violence requires a more nuanced 
approach if legal and regulatory frameworks are going to effectively confront the issues highlighted 
within the case studies and adequality examine the modern relationship between coercive violence 
and power. 
 
Finally, the case studies have highlighted that the privatisation of the state monopoly over 
coercive violence is more complex than often presented within PMSC research. While the 
outsourcing of military roles remains a central issue within the PMSC market, any comprehensive 
analysis of the privatisation of violence must consider the increasing use of PMSCs to fulfil a wider 
range of traditional state activities. In particular, while the use of PMSCs for external military 
activities has prompted questions regarding the accountability for their activities, the use of PMSCs 
internally poses a no-less significant issue. The control of public security services by a combination 
of companies and private contractors poses significant questions for the democratic control over 
public security that evolved as a key structural component in the development of the modern state 
that the international legal system is developed from. 
 
If this research is therefore to fulfil its objectives it must do so in a manner that effectively 
addresses these key outcomes from the case studies. In critically analysing existing avenues of 
accountability it is important that this research considers the full scope of PMSC activities in order 
to comprehensively and appropriately evaluate the existing legal regime. Similarly, if this research 
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is to propose modifications to the current PMSC discourse, including the development of a 
classification system, it must do so with explicit reference to both the breadth and function of the 
privatisation of violence.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
APPLYING TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORKS TO 
NON-TRADITIONAL PRIVATE ACTORS 
5 Introduction 
Throughout Chapters One to Four this research has investigated the increasingly complex 
nature of the contemporary private security markets, establishing that global security assemblages 
currently consist of a wide variety of both actors and activities, being utilised by both states and 
private actors in increasingly complex hybrid organisational systems. It is imperative therefore that 
this work examines the manner in which PMSCs or those who engage them can be held accountable 
for the activities of their contractors in order to ensure that private violence is not used as a 
mechanism for avoiding responsibility. In doing so, this chapter will consider the existing legal 
position of private actors, and highlight how the modern security landscape can create disparities 
in the effectiveness of mechanisms for legal accountability. It will seek to critically analyse the 
ability of existing approaches to establishing accountability for, and regulating, private coercive 
actors. It will seek to demonstrate that the state-centric structure of existing legal frameworks 
inevitably leads to inequitable enforcement with significant gaps in enforcement that weaken and 
undermine the current legal regime.   
 
Positioning the Legal Analysis 
Throughout Chapters One to Four this research has sought to demonstrate that the current 
security markets and the contractors engaged within them have a potentially transformative effect 
on the power structures on which the modern state is conceived. Theoretically it was proposed that 
172 
 
the ability to not only monopolise coercive violence but externalise it from the local population has 
the potential to redefine the relationship between coercive violence and legitimate power, 
subverting the structural accountability implicit within the development of the nation-state. 
Furthermore, through both historical and qualitative analysis the research established that the 
growth of PMSCs has coincided with a redefining and repositioning of the state both internally and 
externally through the growth of MNCs and transnational organisations capable of exercising 
authority in the manner historically reserved for sovereigns. Through both the general global trends 
and the more specific national case studies it was possible to identify a direct link between the 
growth of PMSCs and the weakening of the structures perceived to confer legitimacy to the power 
being exercised. As a result, this research argues that it is key that there exists legal avenues of 
accountability and regulation beyond the state in order to ensure that this form of coercive violence 
is not utilised to circumvent internal accountability and undermine the social structures on which 
the state is founded. To this end, this chapter will look to consider how existing international 
avenues of regulation and legal accountability are capable of filling the gap left by the modern state.  
 
Structure and Justification of the Analysis 
Considering the complex background against which this chapter seeks to analyse the 
applicability and effectiveness of existing legal and regulatory approaches, it is necessary that this 
section establishes and justifies the research structure, design and scope. The starting point for this 
is limiting the scope of this investigation to the international sphere; focussing only on international 
legal instruments and international regulatory frameworks. This approach has been chosen with two 
considerations in mind. The first of these is that as Chapter Four identifies, PMSCs are an 
increasingly global phenomenon with transnational operations prevalent throughout much of the 
security industry. As a result, relying upon state regulations would result in an unequal level of 
protection between nations. With security increasingly important both as a distinct commodity and 
a requirement for further investment, national approaches can be regularly affected by attempts to 
attract foreign investment, changes in the security threats and political transformations. As a result, 
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the consistency and reliability of state approaches is often limited and provides little valuable 
analysis of an overall effectiveness of current approaches. Secondly, Chapter Four demonstrated an 
identifiable trend that the most extreme use of PMSCs frequently corresponded to areas where the 
local community was most strongly at odds with operations that were politically or financially 
important for the government. The level of protection offered by states can therefore vary drastically 
with the use of coercive violence appearing to undermine the legitimate governance that effective 
state laws would rely upon. Focussing on states alone to regulate PMSCs would potentially leave 
citizens vulnerable to their state acting illegitimately on behalf of external interests at their expense. 
Similarly, while international human rights has often been cited as a potential avenue through which 
PMSCs may be controlled, 670  the state-centric nature of the regime significantly limits the 
effectiveness of its application. While, ostensibly an approach to holding states individually 
accountable for their failure to protect their citizens rights, the enforcement activities rely 
overwhelmingly on the state. While it is likely that international human rights have been beneficial 
in establishing international norms and standards,671 its effectiveness in holding uncooperative 
states accountable is in practice marginal. Instead, it is only through an independent and external 
approach, beyond the direct influence of the state or organisation that it is seeking to hold 
accountable, that any uniform and consistent approach could exist.  
 
As a result, this research focuses on strong international frameworks, considering the extent 
to which these avenues of legal accountability are in practice capable of independently holding both 
PMSCs and their employers responsible. This will critically analyse the capacity of these 
mechanisms to establish accountability at an institutional level, in a manner most suitable for 
attributing culpability and effecting change. When approaching this question, this work must 
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consider the complexities implicit in attributing accountability where the conduct includes multiple 
actors and complex, non-linear command structures. Thus, within international law there exists a 
general acceptance that in such circumstances, it is those “most culpable,” rather than those who 
simply physically commit the act, who should bear the greatest responsibility.672 This research will 
therefore seek to examine methods through which the individuals most culpable, may be held 
legally accountable and simultaneously ensure that in future PMSCs act in a responsible manner.  
 
In order to achieve these aims, this chapter identifies several approaches within the 
international sphere that provide the possibility of regulating the activities of PMSCs. The first of 
these is considering how international law is able to hold PMSCs, or the relevant actors, legally 
accountable when they fail to adhere to minimum legal standards. Parallel to this, it is necessary to 
consider how international instruments have sought to positive regulate the conduct of PMSCs, and 
their employers. Specific focus will be given to the “Montreux Document, on the Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private 
Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict”673 and the International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Providers,674 as the two most complete attempts to regulate the PMSC market.  
 
In relation to international law this research proposes two mechanisms that offer the most 
appropriate forums in which to consider the accountability of PMSCs or their employers. The 
starting point for this will be seeking to establish the extent to which a state employing PMSCs can 
be held accountable for the actions of their contractors internationally. Specifically, it will consider 
the practicalities of utilising the doctrine of state responsibility for the conduct of PMSCs in 
                                                     
672 See for example Security Council Resolution, S/Res/1503 (2003) specifying that the ICTY should “concentrat[e] on 
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violation of customary international law or international humanitarian law. Through examining this 
approach, the chapter will consider the extent to which international law is able to indirectly enforce 
state compliance with international norms. If effective this approach could be seen to minimise the 
regulatory benefits of the privatisation of coercive violence, often presented as one of the key factors 
in the use of PMSCs for states. While this would not entirely replicate direct state control over 
security forces, an effective system of state responsibility would continue to hold the state 
ultimately responsible for the actions of those PMSCs that it has either employed or allowed to 
operate within its borders. In order to critically analyse the effectiveness of state responsibility in 
achieving this, this chapter will examine the legal relationship required between PMSCs and the 
state, and the likely factual circumstances and evidentiary burdens necessary for the doctrine to 
engage. Through applying these requirements to the examples identified within the case studies, 
this section will demonstrate the inherent weaknesses within this approach. Notably, as a result of 
the control requirements established by international tribunals, any reliance upon state 
responsibility could act as an incentive to states, to further disassociate PMSCs from their control, 
effectively rewarding recklessness.  
 
Considering these limitations, it will thereafter move on to examine the extent to which 
individual military and political leaders may be held accountable for the actions of PMSCs 
conducted on behalf of their states under international criminal law. Unlike human rights, 
international criminal law offers the significant benefit of presenting the opportunity to hold 
individuals accountable even when the state is non-cooperative.  However, in order to critically 
analyse the extent to which this may in practice become an effective mechanism it is necessary to 
discuss the various “modes of accountability” utilised in international criminal law and consider 
how existing circumstances, drawn from the case studies, may fit within these modes. This will 
focus on the doctrines of perpetration by means, command responsibility, joint criminal enterprise 
and finally the control theory of co-perpetration. It will seek to establish the differing evidentiary 
burdens within each of these and consider how these may be practically applicable to the factual 
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circumstances encountered within PMSC activity. This will highlight the difficulty posed by 
PMSCs when standards designed for strict hierarchically answerable military structures are applied 
to indirect and opaque voluntary relationships as presented by PMSCs.   
Having examined the possibility of holding PMSCs, and their employers legally accountable for 
criminal behaviours and human rights abuses, the chapter will consider how the international 
community has sought to prevent these from occurring in advance. It will therefore consider the 
role of international frameworks in regulating and overseeing the use of PMSCs. It will consider 
both the text and the context of both the Montreux Document675 and the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Providers.676 It will consider the rules established within both of these 
and will critically analyse the intention behind these rules and the planned effect of them. From this 
it will move on to consider the effectiveness of these instruments. Specifically, it will consider how 
these instruments are capable of adapting to the significant variations within the types and activities 
of modern PMSCs as highlighted within the case studies.  
 
5.1 State Responsibility for PMSCs 
When considering the legal accountability of PMSCs, one of the most frequently cited 
manners in which to establish criminal liability under international law is through the doctrine of 
state responsibility. Because of the supposed monopoly over coercive violence that sovereign states 
have maintained within the sphere of public international law,677 it is a well-established principle 
of customary international law that states are responsible for upholding their international 
obligations. As a result of this, states in violation of these obligations are legally compelled to take 
action to stop the violation and thereafter responsible for making reparations. Furthermore, in 
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relation to PMSCs, this international responsibility will extend to certain violations of international 
law by private actors, dependent upon the extent to which they can be linked to that State.  
 
Although the doctrine of state responsibility is accepted as customary international law, in 2001 
after more than 40 years of working on them,678 the International Law Commission adopted the 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for International Acts (ILC Articles).679 Whilst, the ILC 
Articles were never formally adopted by the UN, they are considered to represent an accurate 
codification of the existing customary international law. As such, their principles remain 
enforceable680 and have been cited by the International Court of Justice when considering state 
responsibility.681  
 
In applying these rules to PMSCs, the first thing to note is that the ILC Articles do not 
themselves establish what are considered international wrongs; instead focusing upon setting out 
the “general conditions under international law for the State to be considered responsible.”682 As a 
result, it is first necessary to establish the kind of action that may be capable of engaging state 
responsibility before considering the circumstances under which the action may be attributed to the 
state.  
 
                                                     
678 Daniel Bodansky & John R. Cook, ‘The ILC’s State Repsonsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview’ (2002) 96 
American Journal of International Law, 773, 773. 
679 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,  
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf.> accessed 5 July, 2015. [hereinafter 
ILC Articles] 
680 For further discussion of the position of the ILC Articles within international law see David D. Caron, 'The ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Form and Authority’ (2002) 96 American Journal 
of International Law 857, 865. 
681 The ICJ cited an earlier draft text of the ILC articles in Gabčíkovo-Nagyamaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) ICJ 
Reports 1997, 7, 38–41. 
682 ILC Articles (n 679) at 31. 
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5.1(1) International Wrongful Acts  
According to Article 2 of the ILC Articles, conduct constitutes an internationally wrongful 
act when the act or omission breaches an international obligation of that state.683 Article 3 however, 
goes on to clarify that this characterisation is governed by international law. Specifically, a 
comparison cannot be drawn between whether an act would be considered unlawful within a State, 
for the purpose of deciding whether it constitutes an international wrong. Furthermore, due to the 
sui generis nature of PIL, establishing the legal foundation for the standards that attract 
responsibility is particularly complex with the wording of the treaties ensuring that legal obligations 
remain intentionally flexible. Within human rights, for example, even the strongest treaty, the 
ICCPR, stipulates only that State parties are under a duty to respect, and implement national 
legislation to “give effect to the recognised in the convention.”684 As a result, when considering the 
legal responsibility of states for the actions of PMSCs, it is likely that international human rights 
generally will struggle to be effective. In relation to PMSCs therefore, there are two sets of 
international obligations that are particularly relevant to consider in relation to state responsibility.  
 
5.1(2) Conduct Capable of Attracting State Responsibility: 
Geneva Conventions 
The conducts most likely of being an intentional wrong, capable of attracting state 
responsibility are breaches of the Geneva Conventions representing the fundamental rules of 
international law regulating the conduct of parties during war, specifically seeking to limit the 
barbarity of war, and protect individuals not directly involved in the conflict. As a large proportion 
of the Geneva Conventions are considered to be customary international law and as such, are non-
derogable, binding all nations, providing an ideal foundation for state responsibility. In relation to 
                                                     
683 ILC Articles (n 679) at Art 2. 
684International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 
999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Article 2(1). 
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PMSCs, it is clear from their past conduct that several of these Conventions are likely to be of 
particular relevance.  
 
Under the First Geneva convention, representing the duties owed to soldiers hors de 
combat,685  all wounded or sick soldiers must be treated with a minimum level of respect. 686 
Specifically, they should not be killed, further injured or tortured whilst under the protection of the 
opposition forces. Furthermore, to the maximum extent possible they must be cared for and treated 
medically by the party under whose power they may be, who should not act, or omit to act, in any 
manner that may significantly negatively affect the health of those being held.687 Considering these 
circumstances, it is clear the First Geneva Convention would have been invoked during the Abu 
Ghraib prison case. In particular, it is clear that both CACI International and Titan employees were 
responsible for conduct that further injured the prisoners both physically and mentally,688 in a 
manner amounting to torture. Similarly, the allegation that CACI Int’l contractor Steve Stefanowicz 
explicitly ordered for medication to be withheld from a detainee suffering from appendicitis would 
have been a serious violation of the requirement to provide medical treatment.689 Whilst there has 
been debate within America as to the position of detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay,690 
the US has repeatedly emphasised that all Abu Ghraib detainees were prisoners of war, under the 
protection of the Geneva Convention.691  
 
                                                     
685 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 
12 August 1949. [Hereinafter First Geneva Convention] 
686 First Geneva Convention (n 98) Art. 3(1) 
687 Ibid at Art. 3(1)(a) 
688 See Tabuga Report  (n 42) 16; see also Fay Report (n 43) 69, 78, 99. 
689  Mark Benjamin & Michael Scherer, Big Steve and “Abu Ghraib” (Salon, March 31, 2006)  
<http://www.salon.com/2006/03/31/big_steve/> accessed 14 June 2013. 
690 See Erin Chlopak, ‘Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and Human Rights Obligations 
under the Geneva Convention’ Wash. Coll. Of Law Human Rights Brief, Vol. 9(3); See also Donald Rumsfeld called the 
detainees “unlawful combatants” who “do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention” Katherine Q. Seeyle, ‘A 
Nation Challenged: The Prisoners’ (NY Times, Aug 12, 2002) available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/12/world/nation-challenged-prisoners-first-unlawful-combatants-seized-
afghanistan-arrive.html> accessed 13 June 2013.  
691 See CRS Report for Congress, ‘Lawfulness of Interrogation Techniques Under the Geneva Convention’ (Sep. 8, 2006) 
available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32567.pdf>  accessed 13 June 2013.  
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Similarly applicable to PMSCs is Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which is 
present in all the Treaties and Additional Protocols. This lays out the minimum standard of 
protection afforded to civilians including the basic provision that no person shall be subjected to 
physical suffering or murder. 692  Furthermore, included within this definition the Convention 
prohibits the use of torture or even corporal punishment whilst under the protection of any party.693 
Whilst there are many instances in which PMSCs could have been implicated in such actions, the 
clearest contractor violation of Common Article 3 would be the actions of Blackwater at Nissour 
Square, where 17 individuals were indiscriminately killed. Particularly, as it was clear that these 
individuals were taking no part in the hostilities and therefore civilians, Blackwater were prohibited 
from willful killing, which it is clear from both the eye-witness events and official reports, were the 
intentions.694  
 
The final section that is potentially relevant when considering the work of PMSCs is the 
principle of proportionality in attack. In particular, it is now a well-established doctrine of both 
codified and customary international law that attacks should be proportional to the military 
objectives. This principle, found in the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions695 has 
according to the ICRC been declared that through state practice become a tenet of customary 
international law applicable to both international and non-international conflict.696 As a result, the 
use of force in the knowledge that it will cause excessive loss to civilian life or property compared 
to the military outcome is legally prohibited and can be classed as a war crime. The most notorious 
example of this is the British registered Executive Outcomes who have repeatedly been accused of 
using excessive force whilst undertaking operations in both Sierra Leone and Angola. In particular, 
                                                     
692 Common Article 3, Geneva Conventions available at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/App1.pdf> accessed June 
17, 2013. 
693 Ibid. 
694 See  Scahill (n 20) at 3-9, for a detailed and accurate description of the Nisour Square shooting; Ibid at pages 9-13 for 
details relating to several repeated cases in which Blackwater were implicated in seemingly unprovoked “wilfull killings”. 
695 Additional Protocol I (n 19). 
696  Customary International Law, Rule 14, Proportionality in Attack available at <http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14>  accessed July 14, 2013. 
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it was alleged that their use of helicopter gunships, cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives whilst 
engaging UNITA were not executed within this principle causing significant and disproportionate 
loss of civilian life and property.697 Furthermore, similar claims have been made against MPRI for 
their role in the Croatian offensive, Operation Storm during the Yugoslavian civil war, and 
Blackwater during several Iraqi operations.698 
 
5.1(3) Conduct Capable of Attracting State Responsibility: 
Convention Against Torture 
Outside of the Geneva Conventions, the most likely international obligation capable of 
attracting state responsibility is the UN Convention Against Torture (CAT) 699  which is now 
considered to be established as customary international law and therefore non-derogable, binding 
all nations. As the debate surrounding US enhanced interrogation highlighted there is not yet a 
standard legal definition of conduct amounting to torture and as a result establishing whether 
specific conduct amounts to a violation of the Convention requires a degree of subjective analysis. 
Despite this, there are circumstances discussed within the case studies that would almost universally 
be considered to have violated the CAT. The role of private contractors at US black sites as part of 
the American CIA’s program of extraordinary rendition would almost certainly have amounted to 
torture.700 Evidence that detainees were transported from both Pakistan and Afghanistan to C.I.A. 
Black sites Under Article three of the CAT, a state is prohibited from transporting of individuals to 
any state where there are substantial grounds for believing they would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.701 Therefore, even if DynCorp employees were not directly involved in the 
torture or interrogations, they would be in breach of the CAT.  
                                                     
697 See Alex Vines, ‘Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in Africa in the 1990s’  p. 54 
698 Genocide Victims of Krajina v. L-3 Communications Corp. & MPRI Inc., United States District Court, Northern 
District of Illinois Eastern Division, Case No. 1:10-CV-05197, 17 Aug, 2010 available at < http://www.veritas.org.rs/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/tuzba-usa.pdf> accessed 8 July, 2013; see also Scahill (n 20) at 3-6, 9-12, 186-188,  
699 United Nations, Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
A/RES/39/46, 10 Dec, 1984. [hereinafter UN Convention Against Torture] 
700 See Infra ‘DynCorp in Extraordinary Rendition’ at page 22 and fn. 77-81. 
701 UN Convention Against Torture (n 112) Article 3. 
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5.2 International Law Commissions Draft Articles and 
Customary International Law 
Considering the significant evidence that PMSCs have been responsible for conduct that 
would be considered an intentionally wrongful act it is necessary to examine the practicalities of 
attributing this conduct to a State. The foundation for attributing the conduct of PMSCs to a State 
can be found within the ILC Articles with Articles 5 and 8 in particular, providing potential avenues 
for States to be held responsible for the actions of PMSCs. 
 
5.2(1) Article 5 
Under Article 5 of the ILC Articles, a state may be held responsible for an intentionally 
wrongful act if the “person or entity… is empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements 
of the Governmental authority.”702 This is however significantly restricted, as it applies only to acts 
taking place whilst the individual is acting “in that capacity”703 The primary difficulty encountered 
when attempting to utilise Article 5 is that it remains unclear as to what represents an element of 
government authority. In the commentary attached to the ILC Articles, the authors provide the 
example of a “parastatal entities” and address the increasing privatisation of state functions704 as a 
situation in which governmental authority may be deduced. Specifically, the commentary states 
“private security firms may be contracted to act as prison guards and in that capacity…. Exercise 
public powers such as detention.”705 The use of PMSCs by Coalition forces as prison guards during 
the Iraq War, including their notable presence during the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal,706 
would therefore seem likely to have fallen under the governmental authority. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that PMSCs undertaking interrogations were acting with governmental authority as 
                                                     
702 ILC Articles (n 679) at Article 5 
703 Ibid 
704 ILC Articles (n 679) at 3. 
705 Ibid at Para 1. 
706 Antenor Hallo de Wolf (n 31) 
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questioning enemy combatants, particularly with a view to obtaining information linked to national 
security, is a fundamentally governmental function.707 As a result, in certain situations it may be 
possible to attribute PMSC activity to a state through Article 5 however, there must exist a 
fundamental link between the function of the PMSC and a governmental function. Whilst it is 
therefore generally accepted that foreign policy is primarily a state function, this alone is not closely 
enough linked to governmental authority to invoke state responsibility.708 
 
5.2(2) Article 8  
Outside of Article 5, the ILC Articles also provide a limited set of circumstances through 
which a state may be responsible by virtue of their control over the circumstances under which the 
wrongful act occurred.  In considering whether it is possible to invoke state responsibility in this 
many through Article 8, the fundamental question becomes one of attribution. In particular, the ILC 
Articles state that for a state to gain responsibility, it must be shown that the person or entity is 
“acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”709 It is generally considered that this description can be broadly split into two categories. 
 
  In relation to PMSCs, the first of these would be when a state explicitly instructs a private 
contractor to undertake a course of action that the state is aware, would breach an international 
obligation. Whilst such explicit instructions are likely to be rare, there are examples when this may 
well have been the case in, for example, DynCorp’s role in the CIA's extraordinary rendition 
program.710 Therefore considering that these instructions would have explicitly contradicted the 
                                                     
707 See Jackson Maogoto & Benedict Sheehy, ‘Private Military Companies & International Law: Building New Ladders 
of Legal Accountability & Responsibility’ (2009) 11 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 99, 101. 
708  See generally Case Concerning The Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua V. United States Of America) 1986 I.C.J. 14, [hereinafter Nicaragua Contras Case] paras. 75-79. 
709 ILC Articles (n 679) at Article 8.  
710 See supra “DynCorp in Extraordinary Rendition” at page 21.  
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US's obligations under the CAT, it is likely the act could invoke state responsible under the first 
heading of the ILC Article 8.   
 
In general, however, it is the second heading of Article 8 that is most frequently suggested 
in relation to PMSCs. Under this, a state can be held responsible for the actions of a private 
contractor if it can be shown that the person or entity was operating under the control and direction 
of the State at the time of the violation. Although yet to be considered in relation to PMSCs directly 
the doctrine was discussed at length by the ICJ in relation to the United States funding of the UCLA 
in the Nicaragua Contras case.711 Specifically, in relation to state responsibility, the ICJ considered 
the degree of control the state was required to exercise over the private entity in order to attract 
legal responsibility. Despite the central importance that the degree of control required plays in the 
attribution of state responsibility, the exact extent of control required is difficult to pinpoint. To 
date two varying degrees of control have been utilised with differing rationales and based upon 
differing legal sources, with both attracting a variety of judicial and academic backing.  
 
The first test was proposed by the ICJ when considering state responsibility for the US 
funding of the Contras in Nicaragua. The ICJ held it was necessary to show the Contras were “acting 
as an organ of the US government,”712 and therefore, found it necessary that the US must have 
exercised effective control over the specific illegal actions.713 Specifically, the court found that for 
the Contras actions to be attributable to the US, it must be shown that they "directed or enforced 
the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by Nicaragua."714 
The Court found it insufficient that the US funded, trained and equipped the Contras, even though 
it accepted the Contras could not have operated without the backing of the United States. This test 
in effect requires a degree of control similar to that found under the first heading of Article 8, 
                                                     
711 Nicaragua Contras Case (n 120). 
712 Ibid at 65. 
713 Ibid at 63-67. 
714 Ibid at 64, para. 115. 
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requiring the act to have been under the complete control of the State. This test was most recently 
reaffirmed as the degree of control required by the ICJ in the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnian Genocide).715 The ICJ concluded 
that the conduct of a private entity could not be attributed to a state simply on the basis that they 
were “completely dependent” upon that state. Furthermore, the Court held that the “effective 
control” was exercised…. in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred.”716 
Therefore under the “effective control” test, for a state to be responsible for the actions of a PMSC, 
it would have to show that the abuse was directly orchestrated by the state. This was indicated in 
the Contras case, where the Court held that the United States was responsible for the actions of the 
“Unilaterally Controlled Latin Assets.” This group of agents operating within Nicaragua were found 
to be under the direct control of the CIA, and therefore operated “according to the “planning and 
direction” of organs of that state”717 and capable of creating responsibility. Thus whilst it is clear 
that the “effective control” test will limit the circumstances in which states can be held responsible, 
it will not entirely preclude liability. Instead, the decision to attribute responsibility to a state will 
rely upon the amount of control the state has in “planning and directing”718 the actions of the PMSC. 
It is clear for example, that the role of DynCorp in extraordinary rendition would certainly come 
under the effective control of the state. It is less clear though how this would apply to CACI Int’l 
and Titan, however, it is possible that their actions at Abu Ghraib could similarly be attributed to 
the US. Specifically, although the personnel were acting ultra vires, the close and intricate 
connection between the contractors and military personnel in the base suggests a relationship 
similar to that of planning and directing may well have been present.  
 
                                                     
715 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro) 26 Feb, 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 43. [Hereinafter ICJ Genocide Case] 
716 ICJ Genocide Case (n 127) para. 401. 
717 Antonio Cassesse, “The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgement on Genocide in Bosnia, 
[2007] 18 EJIL 649, 652. 
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186 
 
Despite, the seemingly settled position of the effective control test, there remains 
significant academic and judicial criticism of the appropriateness of this test, including by the Vice-
President of the ICJ. 719  As a result of this disagreement, when the control requirement was 
considered in ICL, the ICTY in the case of Tadic criticised the effective control test as unduly 
strict.720 The Court reasoned that the purpose of state responsibility was to prevent “States from 
escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry out the tasks.” 721 
Furthermore, the Court in Tadic found that differences in organisational structures could necessitate 
differing control tests. Specifically, it held that within groups with a hierarchical structure such as 
military or paramilitary organisations, it would be sufficient that a state exercised overall control 
over the group.722 The Court emphasised that within such a command structure, “control manifested 
itself not only in financial, logistical and other… support,”723 noting for example, that in Tadic, 
soldiers could be transferred between forces, as necessary for the military objectives. As a result, 
the Court found that even though the forces were not under the direct control of Tadic when the 
crimes took place, they were under the overall control through the hierarchical structure.724  
 
Whilst this position seemingly directly opposes the view of the ICJ, the ICTY provided 
strong evidence that such an approach was correct; citing repeated international and regional 
decisions in support of the overall control test. Specifically, the Court noted that such a test had 
been repeatedly invoked in relation to war crimes committed during World War Two,725 European 
Union litigation726 and was even previously adopted by the ICJ in the Hostages Case.727 As a result, 
despite the recent decision of the ICJ in the Genocide Case, overall control retains significant 
international academic and judicial support as the appropriate test. Considering this, it is clear that 
                                                     
719 ICJ Genocide Case (n 127), Dissenting Opinion of Vice President Al-Khasawneh, at 201. 
720  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 15 July 1999. [hereinafter ICTY Tadic] at para 118. 
721 Ibid 
722 Ibid at para. 118-121. 
723 Ibid at para. 156. 
724 Ibid at para. 120-123. 
725 See generally ICTY Tadic (n 132) para. 126-127 in which the Court undertakes a thorough and detailed investigation 
into the legal precedents for the “overall control” test. 
726 Ibid. 
727 Ibid. 
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in relation to PMSCs the “overall control” test would prove significantly easier in successfully 
attributing their actions to the employing state. In particular, a state employing a PMSC would be 
considered to exercise overall control of contractors, in as much as they are responsible for deciding 
the missions and jobs the contractors undertake. Furthermore, under the Tadic test, states would be 
responsible for the actions of PMSCs, even if outside the normal scope of their employment, 
providing an effective mechanism for ensuring states remain liable for the conduct of their foreign 
affairs.   
  
188 
 
5.3 International Criminal Law and Criminal Responsibility.  
 
5.3(1) Background of International Criminal Law 
Before considering the potential use of international criminal law to PMSCs, it is necessary 
to understand the definitional difficulties the increase in private actors presents for international 
criminal law. International humanitarian law (IHL) was developed over centuries following the 
Peace of Westphalia to limit the excesses of warfare that had been witnessed particularly following 
the reformation. As a result, modern international criminal law is designed to punish the gravest 
breaches of IHL primarily under the assumption that these would be directly attributable to either a 
state or an organised opposition force, both of which would be personally motivated and involved. 
The proliferation of PMSCs often undermines these presumptions, with significant consequences 
for the international legal accountability, international humanitarian law and human rights. Primary 
among these effects of this, it is the increasingly opaque position of Contractors if captured. ICL 
distinguishes between the obligations held by, and towards lawful combatants and those held by 
other parties to the conflict including civilians. Despite persistent attempts to clarify the legal 
position of PMSCs under IHL there remains significant ambiguity. More importantly for this study, 
IHL developed to punish serious violations of international law under the presumption that these 
would usually be attributable to public militaries, or other public security forces, from the state in 
question. In relation to PMSCs however, there is often no direct or personal link between the actual 
physical perpetrators (APP) and those responsible for the overarching situations under which the 
violations took place.  
 
Considering these changes within the legal and political landscape it is necessary to 
consider the practical application of ICL to PMSCs. It is first important to note that regardless of 
the differences between PMSCs and state forces, it is well established under ICL that any individual, 
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regardless of position or motivation728 is individually liable for grave violations of human rights.729 
Consequently, whether an individual is a member of state military apparatus or PMSC they can be 
held liable under ICL for crimes they physically perpetrate. This study, however, suggests that the 
reliance upon individual liability alone is contrary to the intention and purpose of ICL. While 
disparities between states in regard to prosecutions at the international level plague ICL generally, 
they may be further exaggerated when applied to PMSCs, who need not be tied to a specific nation. 
Considering this, as scholars have suggested that the actions of Blackwater, CACI and Titan 
contractors in Iraq could amount to war crimes, 730  the practical application would be highly 
selective. British and South African contractors of these PMSCs who were individually 
implicated731 could theoretically be brought before the ICC however, as the US is not a signatory 
of the Rome Statute, their American colleagues could not even in the case of identical conduct.732   
 
Potentially more disturbing is the possible secondary effects of relying solely on individual 
responsibility. The prosecution of individual PMSC contractors could lead to the more professional 
and regulated contractors refusing to engage in potentially dangerous situations. However, if ICL 
failed to affect those employing or funding them, their use would be unlikely to decrease and 
instead, knowing they were invulnerable firms may choose to contract with less scrupulous actors, 
increasing the possibility of unlawful actions taking place. Such difficulties are already visible in 
the use of PMSCs by private actors where, in particularly dangerous areas, PMSCs have 
subcontracted protection to local militias often to the extreme detriment of human rights 
protections. This is exemplified by the situation in the Niger Delta when BP employed the PMSC, 
                                                     
728 See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-A, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, holding that orders, even 
upon threat of death was insufficient to dispose of individual liability. 
729 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, Article 
25(2). 
730 See Antenor H. de Wolf, ‘Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War From the Perspective of International and 
Human Rights Law’, (2006)13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 315, 327). 
731 Blackwater employees present at the Nisour Square massacre were of both American and South African nationality, 
see also Scahill (n 20) at 264.  
732 Chia Lehnardt, ‘Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel Under International Criminal Law’  (2008) 19 
European Journal of International Law 1025, 1032. 
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G4S to protect oil insulations.733 Due to security concerns, however, G4S subcontracted out their 
operations through their wholly owned Nigerian subsidiary Outsourcing Ltd., who employed a local 
militia to fulfil the contract. As a direct result of this, however, these security services have been 
implicated in significant human rights abuses. 734  Similar difficulties were encountered when 
multinational agro-business Syngenta hired the PMSC, NF Security to protect farmland in Brazil, 
resulting in several murders and the illegal evictions of entire tribes.735  
 
Fundamentally, it is clear that individual responsibility alone runs contrary to the primary 
intentions of ICL which international tribunals have repeatedly stressed is that those “most 
responsible” are of primary concern.736 Almost universally, this has been interpreted as meaning 
those responsible for the planning and ordering rather than merely the physical perpetrators.737 The 
reliance upon individual liability would run counter to this intention, allowing states or companies 
to act with impunity by employing PMSCs to undertake activities they cannot be liable for. It is 
unfortunate in the context of those most responsible for PMSCs, that ICL does not as yet recognise 
legal persons and as such, corporations cannot be found criminally liable. During the drafting of 
the Rome Statute, this was a contentious issue, with corporate criminal responsibility increasingly 
common within states. 738   Furthermore, it is notable that during the investigation of crimes 
committed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the prosecutor explicitly investigated the role of 
corporations.739 While this unfortunately limits the scope of ICL in establishing accountability for 
                                                     
733 Supra at Section 4.3(2)(d) 
734  UN, Small Arms Survey: Protected but Exposed, Multinationals and Private Security (2011) available at 
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-05-EN.pdf> 
accessed 28 May, 2013. 
735 Small Arms Survey 2011 (States of Security, Cambridge University Press, 2011) 150  
736 See e.g. Security Council Resolution 1503 (2003) specifying the ICTY  should “concentrate[ing] on the prosecution 
and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes.” 
737 See generally Linsey Raub, ‘Positioning Hybrid Tribunals Within International Criminal Justice’ (2005) 41 Journal of 
International Law and Politics 1013.  
738 See Andrew Clapham, ‘The Question of Juridiction under International Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons 
from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court’, in Menno T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.), 
Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law (2000) 139-195. 
739 Communication Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, July 16, 2013 available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B080A3DD-7C69-4BC9-AE25-0D2C271A9A63/277502/16_july__english.pdf 
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PMSCs employed by corporations, their remains the possibility of charging individual directors or 
executives if criminal liability can be established.  
 
In light of this, ICL has developed theories under which those bearing ultimate responsibility can 
be held accountable; this section will examine the extent to which these can be utilised in the case 
of PMSCs.  
 
5.3(2) Perpetration by Means 
The most direct manner in which an agent may be held accountable for the actions of a 
PMSC is through the doctrine of perpetration by means740 as codified in the Rome Statute through 
Article 25(3)(a). Under this approach an individual can be held accountable for acts committed 
“through another person.”741 Whilst clear in scope, this approach has in practice been ineffectual in 
establish liability with the required level of control over the unlawful action extremely high, acting 
as a barrier to prosecution. Specifically, under this approach, the act must have been the result of 
an explicit instruction to the APP, who must act upon this, required to be acting directly under the 
agent responsible.742 This situation is unlikely to occur in the case of PMSCs where traditional 
hierarchies are uncommon. The problems with this approach are evident in considering the Abu 
Ghraib torture scandal where CACI Int’l and Titan were employed to conduct interrogations on 
behalf of the US Government.743 Under US Army Regulation 715-9 however, the perpetrators were 
explicitly not under the supervision of the Department of Defense but underemployed within a 
parallel contractor structure. Furthermore, as their role did not explicitly Call upon them to engage 
                                                     
740  See Keving Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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742 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sept. 1998, para. 483. 
743 Benedict Sheehy & Jackson Maogoto, ‘Private Military Companies & International Law: Building New Ladders of 
Legal Accountability & Responsibility’ (2009) 11 Cardozo J Conflict Resolution 99, 110-1. 
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in acts of torture,744  perpetration by means would be incapable of holding anyone in the US 
Government or military.  
 
5.3(3) Command Responsibility 
Among the alternative approaches to establishing liability, command responsibility it the 
most accepted, drawing upon the traditional military doctrine that individuals in positions of 
command are expected to take responsibility for their subordinates. This belief is a fundamental 
component of international law going as far back at least as Grotius, who espoused the doctrine in 
his seminal work On The Laws of War and Peace,745 though many consider the doctrine to predate 
even that.746 Within modern ICL, command responsibility (CR) was first applied in the military 
tribunals of several Axis leaders following WWII. Most significantly, CR was relied upon by 
prosecutors in the trial of General Yamashita, stemming from his “failure to discharge his duty as 
commander.”747 Like perpetration by means, CR is now statutorily incorporated into the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) under Article 28.748 In relation to PMSCs this 
approach is now more advantageous following the expansion of the class of potential commanders, 
in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Celibici, 749 to include those acting 
in civilian positions.750 Despite this, however, the complexity and indirectness of the command 
structures often utilised in the employment of PMSCs creates unique difficulties for courts. When 
PMSCs are used by States, the contracts are often awarded by multiple agencies for the same task 
making deciphering the command difficult. Similarly, when PMSCs are employed by private 
companies, it is often through a network of subsidiaries which would complicate the process of 
                                                     
744 Ibid at 111. 
745 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (Originally published 1625) 523. 
746 The doctrine is generally attributed to Sun Tzu’s, The Art of War published in the 6th Century B.C. 
747 Major Williams H. Parks, ‘Command Responsibility for War Crimes’ (1973) 62 Military Law Review 1, 10. 
748 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, Article 
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within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control” 
749 Prosecutor v Mucic et. al., Case No. IT-96-21, Judgement (Feb. 10, 2001).  
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establishing direct command. Despite these difficulties it is worth considering how CR may be 
practically applicable to PMSCS, with two requirements necessary to engage CR, namely 
knowledge and control.751  
 
When considering the level of knowledge required of an individual within a position of 
command under international criminal law the most recent interpretation was provided by the ICC 
in the trial of Bemba Gombo752 where the ICC proposed that the doctrine requires that the superior 
either knew, or should have known, about the illegal conduct.753 In a significant development the 
ICC further states that actual knowledge can be inferred, particularly through an “established 
reporting and monitoring systems”754 Citing the decision of the ICTY in Blaskic, the ICC held that 
a failure to attempt to “secure knowledge of the conduct” would suffice.755 However, it is unclear 
how these requirements would be applied to PMSCs who often operate with less linear command 
structures. In particular, when employed by states, private contractors tend to operate parallel to, 
rather than under, the military command structure and therefore it is unclear whether commanders 
could be expected to actively oversee the conduct of all contractors. Within commercial settings, 
the use of PMSCs is often a removed from the central function of the company. The use of local 
militia by Shell in the Niger delta illustrates the difficulties with this approach as it remains unclear 
whether Shell have a duty to oversee these private actors in particular in relation to a positive duty 
to secure knowledge, and more significantly at what level of leadership this duty would displace.  
As a result of these difficulties, this approach has been heavily criticised in several international 
tribunals with it particularly contested that positive obligations, whilst suitable for military 
commanders were overreaching in relation to civilian leaders.756 When this approach was adopted 
                                                     
751 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (n 155) Article 28(a) and 28(a)(i). 
752 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08 
753 Ibid at para. 341; citing  ICTY, Prosecutor v Hadzihasanovic et al, Case No. IT-01-47-T, "Judgment", 15 March 2006, 
para. 94. 
754 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, at 152 
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by the ICTY the words “should have known” were removed from the final Statute.757 Similarly, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that within civilian positions negligence 
alone was insufficient, requiring negligence “so serious as to be tantamount to acquiescence or even 
malicious intent.”758 This question is particularly relevant where varying different departments or 
organisations act within a group. may be liable for the contractors. Unlike traditional military 
structures, which are designed with rigid hierarchical structures in place making ignorance to the 
knowledge difficult. In comparison, the level of information provided by PMSCs is likely to be in 
line with guidance required by the employing company, who could, therefore, avoid liability by 
establishing limited reporting procedures, effectively relying upon a “no questions” policy.  
 
 Beyond the degree of knowledge, CR requires that the superior be capable of exercising 
control over the APP of the crimes, with this condition encountering similar difficulties to when 
attributing state responsibility. To date, the exact degree of control required is unclear and courts 
have interpreted this as both overall control and effective control. When this requirement was 
considered under ICL in the ICTY case of Tadic (although not actually a CR case) the effective 
control test as heavily criticised as unduly strict for military organisations.759 Instead, it has been 
suggested that where groups operate a clear hierarchical structure such as military or paramilitary 
organisations, it is likely that the overall control test will be applicable. It remains unclear how this 
form of hierarchy would be interpreted beyond explicitly military organisations. The level of 
knowledge of a superior in a private company is likely significantly less, or at least different in 
nature, than in a comparable military company. Furthermore, the appeal judgement stated that 
attributing state responsibility required “disregard[ing] legal formalities” in favour of formulating 
                                                     
757 U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Courtt, Summary 
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758 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, (Judgement), ICTR Trial Chamber, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 489. 
759  Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, 15 July 1999, para. 118. 
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a “realistic concept of accountability” 760  an approach that the appeal court controversially 
concluded should similarly apply to criminal liability.761  
 
This statement has been considered problematic, diminishing the concept of culpability to 
a mere “legal formality.” Considering the range of punishments that can attach to these crimes, 
many human rights advocates would decry such a rationale. Furthermore, in both Blaskic762 and 
Bagilishema,763 the counsel for the defendants raised the Tadic statement arguing that it undermined 
the fundamental nature of criminal justice764 and preventing the right to a fair trial, with both courts 
eventually distancing themselves from this approach, cautious that it may be used as an excuse to 
undermine the legitimacy of ICL. 
 
Regardless of the tests applied, however, there remain questions about the application of 
CR to PMSC activity. Unlike public organisations the relationship between the employer and 
PMSCs is a voluntary association, and as a result, control alone may not be an appropriate test 
leading to anomalous results. Under this approach, a state agent or company executive with full 
prior knowledge of serious criminal activity but without direct control over the perpetrators is 
considered less culpable than one who by their own negligence is unaware but would otherwise be 
in full control. While this approach can be justified within strictly hierarchical organisations, it is 
questionable whether this justification extends to situations in which the association is economically 
motivated. These issues are further compounded by CRs failure to differentiate levels of culpability 
instead charging all defendants as principals. There remain arguments over the extent to which 
holding a civilian leader, or company director equally as culpable as the APP can be justified on 
the basis of their negligence. Clearly, applying such a strict doctrine to increasingly flexible 
                                                     
760 Ibid at para 121. 
761 Ibid. 
762  Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic, (Appeal Judgement), IT-95-14-A, International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia. 
763 The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema (Appeal Judgement: Reasons), ICTR-95-1A-A, International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. 
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scenarios related to PMSCs is always likely to encounter difficulties, and attempting to circumvent 
these has the potential to disregard fundamental aspects of criminal.  
 
5.3(4) Joint-Criminal Enterprise 
 In light of the problems faced in applying perpetration by means and command 
responsibility, ICL has sought to rectify these through the development of joint-criminal enterprise 
(JCE). This abstract concept was accepted within the ICTY, despite the lack of a statutory 
foundation. Instead, following the high-profile acquittal in Tadic the tribunal felt it necessary to 
supplement the modes of liability already encompassed in the Statutes. As such, it took inspiration 
from prosecutions in for the Nuremberg tribunals on the basis of a previous “common plan,” and 
inferred this to be an established principle of customary international law.765 The ICTY identified 
three distinct paths under which a person may be liable for a joint criminal enterprise,766 however, 
for the purpose of establishing accountability for the actions of PMSCs, it is Extended JCE 
(commonly referred to as JCE-III) that is of particular concern767  
 
Under extended JCE, an individual may be liable for a crime committed by another member 
of the original criminal enterprise even if their eventual actions were beyond the common plan, on 
the condition that it was a natural and foreseeable act.768 The ICTY clarified this requirement, 
finding that so long as the defendant had been reckless in engaging with the common plan and had 
reconciled themselves with the action, they would be equally liable.769 Furthermore, the court 
suggested that when the mens rea requirement is fulfilled, criminal liability can be established even 
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if the actus reus is physically perpetrated by non-members, so long as it was ordered by a member 
of the JCE.770 Under this mode of accountability however, the other members of the JCE can be 
charged only for the act of ordering rather than the eventual crime/771  In relation to PMSCs, 
therefore, this doctrine offers the benefit, in comparison with CR, of requiring a lower degree of 
control, allowing the employer of a PMSC to be held accountable for their contractors even when 
there is not the degree of effective control, or the contractor was operating ultra vires. Due to this 
scope, JCE-III is frequently cited as a potential mode of liability more suited to PMSCs.  
 However, while this approach is attractive from a prosecutorial point of view, there remains 
opposition to its application within ICL that must be considered. Primary amongst these is that such 
expansive liability has been condemned for removing individual culpability as the basis for criminal 
liability.772 These criticisms increased substantially following the perceived use of overly expansive 
indictments by the ICTR. Several of these indictments contained the criminal enterprise of 
“conspiring to eradicate the Tutsi people” which the court held could amount to a “nationwide 
government organised system”773 Despite the uniqueness of many international crimes, culpability 
remains an essential component of criminal liability. This formed the basis of several objections in 
ICTY appeals chambers.774 More recently the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
have explicitly rejected the availability of JCE-III, stating that at the times of the crimes of the 
Khmer Rouge it did not form part of customary international law.775 Considering this opposition 
the legitimacy of JCE-III is currently questionable and its continued use of JCE-III could potentially 
aid states in refusing to co-operate with future prosecutions.776 
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 Despite this reduced mental element required for JCE III, it is possible that the evidentiary 
burden on PMSCs could still be restrictively high. Specifically, in many cases, the employer could 
argue that the original plan that they agreed to was legal under international law and it is thereafter 
upon the prosecution to prove otherwise. As a result, the ICTY Appeal Chamber in Gotovina & 
Markac,777 held that even the forcible expulsion of ethnic Serbs would only amount to a JCE if the 
“conduct could only… be explained as JCE-Activity” and not as legitimate warfare tactics.778 In 
this, the Croatian government successfully argued that de-arming and removing potential 
combatants from the theatre of war could be considered a legitimate warfare tactic779 suggesting a 
restrictively high evidentiary burden.  
 
Applying these requirements to the case studies demonstrates that many of these 
circumstances would fail to meet the burden of an illegal plan. While it is clear that many of the 
militias and warlords contracted as security by the US in Afghanistan engaged in activities that 
breach IHL, the US could legitimately claim that their original plan, to provide logistical security, 
was not a criminal enterprise. Ultimately, the applicability of JCE to PMSCs suffers from two 
seemingly axiomatic problems issues. On the one hand it is too strict in considering whether the 
original plan or association is a criminal enterprise, with many cases potentially falling at this 
hurdle. Conversely, however, this mode of liability can be too liberal in disconnecting individual 
culpability from liability. Considering this JCE has suffered continual academic and legal backlash, 
falling out of favour with many international criminal tribunals. 
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5.3(5) Control Theory of Co-Perpetration 
 Considering the criticism of JCE-III, while the Rome Statute explicitly refers to liability 
through “contributing to a common plan” 780  the ICC has been reluctant to expand upon this 
approach. The Lubanga781  pre-trial chamber therefore determined that Article 25(3)(a), whilst 
closely akin to JCE, is a “residual form of accessory liability.”782 Drawing upon a theory of co-
perpetration developed by German jurist Claus Roxin, the ICC charged Lubanga under the doctrine 
of control theory of co-perpetration.783  This approach prioritises control as the key aspect in 
ascribing liability between principles and accessories to a crime. In relation to PMSCs, applying 
overall control as the active component allows courts to allocate principle liability between the 
PMSC and their employer depending upon the individual facts of each case. Considering this, if the 
contractor were employed to conduct illegal activities the employer would be principle actor 
whereas if, the contractor acted ultra vires in conducting the illegal act they would be the principal 
actor.784 
 
  In adopting this approach however, the ICC departed significantly from Roxin’s original 
conception. According to the traditional theory the mens rea of co-perpetration required awareness 
of a common plan and an intent to commit the crime in question.785 In contrast, the ICC held that 
dolus eventualis was sufficient to establish accessorial liability, transforming the necessary mens 
rea from intent to advertent recklessness.786 Under this approach, in situations in which there is a 
common plan, the mens rea requirement will be fulfilled so long as the defendant was aware of the 
possibility of the crime and had reconciled themselves with this risk.787 This approach may provide 
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advantages to establishing liability for PMSCs as in contrast to JCE-III, their original agreement 
need not be expressly criminal.788 Returning to the case of US employment of Afghan warlords, 
there is little doubt that US officials were aware of the possibility of criminal actions and had 
reconciled themselves with this risk. Significantly, however, this mens rea would only invoke 
accessorial liability which it is suggested would more accurately reflect the party’s culpability. For 
example, therefore, when examining the case of the JTF in Nigeria, considering the previous 
allegations of serious breaches of ICL by the JTF, it is likely that the relevant Shell executives 
would be considered to have been reckless, and would consequently be criminally liable. 
Furthermore, as CTCP distinguishes between primary and accessory liability, it would be possible 
to charge senior JTF agents as primary, while holding reckless corporate executives liable as 
accessories, more accurately reflecting their moral culpability. In the infamous Abu Ghraib torture 
case, the employment of untrained interrogators, along with the authorisation of “enhanced 
interrogation” techniques would almost certainly fulfil the advertent recklessness in relation to the 
furthermore blatant abuses at the jail.   
  
Beyond the mens rea requirements, modern CTCP can now be distinguished from Roxin’s 
original conception by the establishment of individual liability for indirect co-perpetration 
(IDCP).789 It has been suggested that this expansion fundamentally alters the nature of CTCP, 
effectively removing the control aspect.790 Despite criticism, this approach to IDCP has resulted in 
the conviction of high-level civilian and military commanders on the basis of the actions of 
individuals under the control of their co-perpetrators. This has been particularly successful in 
situations where multiple agencies or groups have been responsible for individual tasks, all of which 
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are necessary for the completion of the eventual crime, although only one actually commits the 
offence. Although never brought to trial due to death, such liability was alleged against Patasse in 
co-perpetrating with Bemba-Gombo. 791  Although Patasse’s forces were never alleged to have 
committed the crimes, their presence and failure to act allowed the MLC to commit crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. 792  This approach presents several advantages in holding PMSC 
employers liable for the actions of their contractors where they were under a positive duty to protect. 
This is particularly relevant to the employment of PMSCs by states, however where a corporation 
utilises a PMSCS the host state retains a duty to ensure they act in accordance with IHL and IHR.  
  
 Finally, in considering the application of Roxin’s CTCP it is necessary to consider the form 
of conduct required by the PMSC in order to engage liability. To date the ICC has approached this 
by requiring that the defendant's conduct was “essential” to the commission of the crime.793 This 
has been decided through a process of hypothetical reasoning, asking whether the crime would have 
occurred without the co-perpetrators action. 794  This approach was adopted by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua Contras case where it was established that without US funding the Contras could not 
have undertaken their activities.795 In light of the widespread knowledge of the criminal acts and 
human rights abuses being undertaken by the Contras,796 the US would almost certainly have to be 
considered to have reconciled itself with the action. If this case had been brought in ICL, US agents 
could, therefore, have been held accountable as accessory co-perpetrators with the Contras acting 
as principles. It is possible that similar principles could be applied to the use of Peruvian police and 
armed forces by Newmont Mining in Peru. The allegations of torture and extra-judicial executions 
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of Campesinos were widespread, and Newmont must have reconciled itself with these acts. As the 
police and armed forces would not have been in the area but for their contract with the mineral 
companies, these crimes would not have taken place.  
 
5.4 International Regulatory Frameworks: The Montreux 
Document 
 
5.4(1) Background to the Montreux Document 
Among the most comprehensive international attempts to regulate the PMSC market was 
the adoption of the Montreux Document, On The Pertinent International Legal Obligations and 
Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During 
Armed Conflict.”797 This was written and prepared by the International Committee for the Red 
Cross and the Government of Sweden, with the input of 17 other nations. Included within these 
were the UK and USA, as the largest employers of PMSCs, alongside nations with a history tied to 
the PMSC industry including Angola, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan.798 Since the Documents 
publication, a total of 53 states have joined as signatories while the European Union, NATO and 
the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe have also joined as participants. As a 
result, the Montreux document has been described as “the most legally significant” document in 
relation to PMSCs.799 Despite this, however, it is important to understand several critical caveats to 
the effectiveness of the document in regulating the role and activities of PMSCs. The first thing to 
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note is that the Montreux document is that it is not in itself a legally binding document. The preface 
of the Document is explicit in stating that: 
“this document should therefore not be interpreted as limiting, prejudicing or enhancing in 
any manner existing obligations under international law, or as creating or developing new 
obligations under international law”800 
Instead, therefore, it seeks to present a “compilation”801 of the existing international obligations and 
an overview of suggested good practice for states to implement. The Document places the onus on 
states to enact the necessary legal instruments required to fulfil their obligations under the 
Document. As a result, “each State is responsible for complying with the obligations it has 
undertaken pursuant to international agreements to which it is party.”802 This is composed of both 
pre-existing legally binding instruments and a series of voluntary proposals for states to adopt. The 
Montreux Document therefore does not seek to directly regulate PMSCs or establish a model 
regulatory framework for PMSCs, but is instead an attempt to clarify state’s responsibilities in 
respect to the use and presence of PMSCs and fulfil their obligations under international law.  
 
Considering these significant caveats, the starting point for analysing the applicability and 
effectiveness of the Montreux document in regulating the actions of PMSCs is understanding that 
the Document relates only to the use of PMSCs during times of armed conflict. The regulations 
within the document, therefore, are designed to apply only in situations legally classed as armed 
conflicts. Before considering the content of the Document, it is necessary to establish the 
circumstances in which they would be applicable. The position of Armed Conflict within 
International Law was most recently discussed by the 2008 International Committee of the Red 
Cross’ Opinion Paper “How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian 
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Law.” 803 The Geneva Conventions identify two distinct types of Armed Conflict; International 
Armed Conflict, and Non-International Armed Conflict and the Montreux Document would 
therefore only apply to the use of PMSCs in one of these two situations. Armed conflict is defined 
within Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions as situations;  
“of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The 
Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance".804 
This has been clarified in preceding jurisprudence. Most notably the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia where the Court held in the Tadic case that "an [international] armed conflict 
exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States." It is essential to clarify that this 
requirement relies upon the use of “armed force” as a general rather than the use of a States armed 
forces specifically, as the former of these would prevent the inclusion of PMSCs entirely. Instead, 
the ICRC Opinion Paper refers to the works of both David Schindler805 and H.P. Gasser806 to clarify 
that “any kind of use of arms between two States”807  creates an international armed conflict. 
Furthermore, “[i]t makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes 
place.”808 It appears clear therefore that if a State were to contract a PMSC to use any armed force 
against another state, this would be sufficient to engage Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, and 
the Montreux document would, therefore, be applicable to this situation. Compared to International 
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Armed Conflict however, the position of Non-International Armed Conflict is more opaque 
applying a much stricter interpretation of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. This 
requires the conflict to occur between the “High Contracting Party… armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol."809 These situations must be distinguished from “internal 
disturbances and tensions [or] isolated and sporadic acts of violence.”810 It is this distinction that is 
key in establishing whether a situation would reach the threshold of an internal armed conflict as 
required for the Montreux document to engage.   
 
The ICRC Opinion Paper suggests this distinction be drawn on the bases that the “hostilities 
must reach a minimum level of intensity” and that the non-governmental group involved possess a 
“certain command structure and have the capability to sustain military operations”811 Crucially, this 
suggests that a situation will only reach the status of a Non-International Armed Conflict when the 
hostilities are so significant that the government is required to use “military force against the 
insurgents, instead of mere police forces” 812  In relation to PMSCs, the requirement that the 
government exercise military rather than police force could prove a significant obstacle in engaging 
the Montreux Document. This is particularly evident when considering the case studies relating to 
the use of PMSCs by governments to supplement national police or militaries. When the 
International Criminal Court was asked to consider the possibility of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in the Niger Delta, 813  the Office for the Prosecutor concluded that “[a]vailable 
                                                     
809 Additional Protocol II, art. 1, para. 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
 
810 Additional Protocols, supra note 3, art. 1(2) (“This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and 
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed 
conflicts.”). 
811 See Opinion Paper (n 803) (quoting D. Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols, RCADI, Vol. 163, 1979-II, p. 147.)  
812 Ibid.  
813  See generally, Situation in Nigeria (Article 5 Report, International Criminal Court, 2003) <https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/docs/sas%20-%20nga%20-%20public%20version%20article%205%20report%20-
%2005%20august%202013.pdf> accessed 14 May 2015.  
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information on the violence… is insufficient to conclude that an armed conflict of non-international 
character took place” 814  as although the non-governmental groups possessed a degree of 
organisation and capabilities for military violence, there was no evidence that the conflict was of a 
sufficiently sustained and intense level to meet the requirement of “protracted armed violence.”815 
Considering the factual circumstances, it is even more unlikely that the situation in Peru would 
reach this threshold, where the level of organisation within the groups and the military capabilities 
are both substantially more limited. There are, however, clearly circumstances in which PMSCs 
have been used in circumstances that have amounted to both International and Non-International 
Armed Conflict. Most notably, the increased Coalition reliance on PMSCs during the Iraq War, and 
the continued use of PMSCs by regional authorities acting on behalf of the Afghan Government to 
combat the Taliban insurgency.816 It is likely therefore that the Montreux Document would likely 
be applicable to the actions of PMSCs in a limited number of cases, in which the level of violence 
is sufficient to create an Armed Conflict. Despite these limitations, it is important to consider how 
the provisions of the document and examine how their effects on the use and employment of 
PMSCs.  
 
5.4(2) The Montreux Document 
The Document starts by establishing a distinction between the types of states involved in 
the PMSC activities. The Document distinguishes proceeds from the basis of drawing a distinction 
between Contracting States, Territorial States and finally Home States.817 Contracting States are 
classed as those who employ the PMSC,818 whether to operate within their own territory or during 
                                                     
814 Ibid at 31. 
815 Ibid at 32. 
816 See e.g. Shaista Shameem Report of the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human 
rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, Mission to Afghanistan, 
A/HRC/15/25/Add.2, 14 June 2010 <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/A-HRC-15-25-
Add2_AEV.pdf> accessed 6 March 2015; see also Markets for Force, (n469) at114-116. 
817 Montreux Document (n 673)  at Preface, Section 9(c). 
818 Ibid.  
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conflict with, or occupation of, another State.819 Territorial States are classed as those within which 
the PMSC physically operates or undertakes its security services. Finally, Home States, are classed 
as those “where the PMSC is registered or incorporated.” Alongside these three categories of states, 
the Montreux document provides guidance for both PMSC personnel and “all other states.”820  
 
The responsibilities of a State under the Montreux Document differ depending upon the 
class of state. There is, however, a significant crossover between these classes. The most general 
provision, applicable to all states is an “obligation, within their power, to ensure respect for 
international humanitarian law by PMSCs.”821 Alongside this, all states have “an obligation to enact 
any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering 
to be committed, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional 
Protocol I.”822 These general obligations form the basis of the Montreux Document, noting that 
regardless of the use of PMSCs states retain their obligations under International Humanitarian 
Law. Furthermore, they further clarify the positive obligation all States have in protecting 
International Humanitarian Law, including ensuring each States domestic law “adequately 
incorporate international legal principles and provide functional criminal penalties when 
international laws are violated”823 Ultimately, these provisions however, offer little more than a 
reaffirmation of a state’s general obligations under international law, which are largely 
unquestioned, while providing little specific guidance on their application to PMSCs.  
 
In comparison to the responsibilities of states and PMSCs under international law, the 
Montreux Document provides more detailed guidance on the applicability of international law to 
                                                     
819 Montreux Document (n 673) at Page 11. 
820 Montreux Document (n 673)  at Part D at page 14. 
821 See e.g. Montreux Document (n 673) at Section A(3) (for Contracting States); Section B(9) (for Territorial States); 
Section C(14) (for Home States); Section D(18) (For all other States).   
822 Montreux Document (n 673) at A(3) (for Contracting States); Section B(9) (for Territorial States); Section C(14) (for 
Home States); Section D(18) (For all other States). 
823 Ian Ralby, ‘The Montreux Document: The Legal Significance of a Non-Legal Instrument’ in Gary Schaub Jr. & Ryan 
Kelty (eds.) Private Military and Security Contractors: Controlling the Corporate Warrior (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2016). 
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PMSCs. This section will first consider those more general guidelines applicable to all, or most, of 
the different classes, before considering the type-specific regulatory requirements. 
 
The first of these general requirements is the States obligation to ensure, within their power, 
that the PMSCs they contract respect International Humanitarian Law. This is set out in Sections 3, 
9, 14 and 19 for Contracting, Territorial, Home States and All Other States respectively. The 
Document specifies that this should be achieved by Contracting States by ensuring PMSCs are 
trained and aware of their obligations,824 while Home and Territorial States must “disseminate, as 
widely as possible, the text of the Geneva Conventions and other relevant norms of international 
humanitarian law.”825 Furthermore, all States are required to ensure they do not encourage or assist 
in breaching any of these laws and take appropriate actions to prevent any violations. 826  For 
Contracting, Territorial and Home States, the Document further specifies that they have a 
responsibility to take legislative steps to implement their obligations under international 
humanitarian law, including “tak[ing] measures to suppress violations of international humanitarian 
law [including] regulatory measures as well as administrative, disciplinary or judicial sanctions”827 
while for Contracting and Territorial States this responsibility includes adopting appropriate 
“military regulations, administrative orders and other regulatory means.” 828  Alongside their 
requirements under International Humanitarian Law, the Document clarifies each state's obligations 
under both International Human Rights Law, and Customary International Law. Sections 4, 10, 15 
and 19 cover the requirement for Contracting, Home, Territorial and All Other States to implement 
their obligations under International Human Rights Law. This includes provisions to “prevent, 
investigate and provide effective remedies for relevant misconduct of PMSCs and their 
personnel.”829 Alongside this, the subsequent sections in each class of states cover the obligations 
                                                     
824 Montreux Document (n 673) at Section A(3)(a) page 11. 
825 Ibid at Sections 9(a) and 14(a). 
826 Ibid at Sections A(3)(a); 9(a)(2); 14(a)(1); 18. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Ibid at Sections 3(c); 9(c). 
829 Ibid at Sections 4; 10; 15. 
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with regards to “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional 
Protocol 1.” For the first three classes this constitutes an obligation to enact legislation to provide 
effective “penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions and, where applicable, Additional Protocol I”.830 This requires states, 
without prejudice to the nationality of the contractor(s) to bring such people before their national 
courts, or “hand such persons over for trial in another state… or to an international criminal 
tribunal”831 The final of the general requirements for states is that all states, regardless of their 
relationship to PMSC activity, have an “obligation to investigate and, as required by international 
law, or otherwise appropriate, prosecute, extradite or surrender persons suspected of having 
committed other crimes under international law, such as torture or hostage taking.”832 Effectively, 
the provisions of the first four sections of each class of state “unequivocally restate the bodies of 
law under which the various interested states must operate”833 Despite this clarification however, 
these sections of the Montreux Document effect little to no change to the status or regulation of 
PMSCs. There was little question as to whether states retained their obligations under international 
law, the use of PMSCs was not considered to have altered these obligations per se. Instead, the 
primary question as to the use of PMSCs was not if, but how a state's obligation interacts with their 
use of PMSCs. These sections of the Montreux Document offer little clarity on how these accepted 
upon aspects of international law interact with the use and employment of PMSCs by states.  
 
In relation to this question however, there are several sections that provide an insight into 
how the state's obligations are affected by PMSCs. The most comprehensive of these sections are 
contained within section 2 in relation to Contracting States. This section establishes that “States 
retain their obligations under international law, even if they contract PMSCs to perform certain 
                                                     
830 Ibid at Section A(5). 
831 Ibid at Sections 5, 11, 16, 20. 
832 Ibid at Section 6. 
833 Ian Ralby, ‘The Montreux Document: The Legal Significance of a Non-Legal Instrument’ in Gary Schaub Jr. & Ryan 
Kelty (eds.) (n 799). 
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activities.”834 The effect of this has been argued to prevent states from outsourcing activities to 
PMSCs that they cannot legally do themselves, with it being suggested that this is “extremely 
important in light of criticism suggesting that states use PMSCs to avoid legal obligations.”835 
Ultimately, however, the effect of this is limited by the extent to which states can be held 
responsible under International Law. 836  Furthermore, while this is useful in clarifying the 
responsibilities of states in directing PMSCs to undertake internationally unlawful acts, the greater 
question is posed by the responsibility of states for actions of PMSCs given a desired task or 
outcome, but without specific guidance as to how to achieve this. Otherwise, States would be able 
to essentially outsource unlawful acts by maintaining ignorance over their contractor’s actions. 
Considering this, it is Section 7 of the Montreux Document that provides the most substantial 
examination of the international legal frameworks applicable to States who employ PMSCs. The 
starting point of this is to note that entering into a contractual agreement does not “in itself engage 
the responsibility of Contracting States.”837 Instead, States that contract PMSCs are responsible for 
their violations of “International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, or other rules of 
international law”838 only where they are attributable to the “Contracting State, consistent with 
customary international law”839 As such, this approach appears to suggest the Montreux Document 
does not seek to adapt or change the application of the doctrine of State Responsibility in relation 
to the use of PMSCs. It has, however, been argued that the wording of Section 7 should be 
interpreted in a unique manner in relation to State Responsibility. Specifically, during the 
negotiations for the Document, some States argued for a stricter application of State Responsibility, 
under which contracting alone would be sufficient to engage obligations under both International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law.840 There have been suggestions that “section 7 may be 
                                                     
834 Montreux Document (n673)  at Part A(1) 
835 See e.g. James R. Coleman, ‘Constraining Modern Mercenaries (2004) 55(6) Hastings Law Journal 1493, 1537; Ian 
Ralby, ‘The Montreux Document: The Legal Significance of a Non-Legal Instrument’ in Gary Schaub Jr. & Ryan Kelty 
(n 799) 241. 
836 See Section  5.1 for a full discussion of the applicability of State Responsibility to PMSCs.  
837 Montreux Document (n 673) at Section 7 (page 12). 
838 Ibid. 
839 Ibid. 
840 James Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weakness and 
Promise of the Montreux Document’ (2009) 13(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law  401, 409. 
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compatible with such an interpretation.”841 Under this reading, while engaging a contract does not 
automatically engage state responsibility, if it can thereafter be demonstrated that the Contracting 
State has not undertaken their positive obligations under Sections 1-6, an approach mirroring that 
adopted in other similar legislation including the European Arms Export Code.842 This approach to 
understanding the Montreux Document, however, must be viewed with extreme scepticism. The 
wording of Section 7 does not immediately preclude such a reading, and there are specific 
precedents within international law for such an understanding, most notably the European Arms 
Control Export Agreement, which was heavily relied upon as a guide in establishing the Montreux 
Document. Fundamentally, however, taking note of the introductory remarks of the Document it 
appears such a positive obligation would be contrary to the purpose of the document which is to 
simply clarify the existing position. There is not currently any positive obligation upon States in 
relation to the manner in which they contract with PMSCs, and while specific treaties have created 
positive obligations within international law, these are not considered to have established an 
overarching position within international law generally.  
 
Furthermore, Paragraph 7 goes on to elaborate upon the circumstances in which States may 
be held responsible for the action of PMSCs under International Law.843 These largely mirror the 
approach to modes of accountability established through the International Law Commissions 
Articles on State Responsibility.844 This suggests again that Paragraph 7 merely seeks to reaffirm 
that the existing provisions of State Responsibility remain applicable in the cases of the use of 
PMSCs. While a detailed analysis of the applicability of State Responsibility is undertaken in the 
following section, it is worth noting how the Montreux Document addresses the issue, and 
specifically the forms of responsibility considered most applicable to PMSCs.  
                                                     
841 Ibid. 
842 Ibid. 
843 Ibid. at Section 7. 
844 See Ian Ralby, ‘The Montreux Document: The Legal Significance of a Non-Legal Instrument’ in Gary Schaub Jr. & 
Ryan Kelty (n 799) 241-7; Marie-Louise Tougas, ‘Commentary on Part I of the Montreux Document on Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security 
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The Montreux document first identifies the situation in which a PMSC is “incorporated by 
the State into their regular armed forces.”845 This is the most straightforward method of holding 
States accountable for the actions of PMSCs they employ and as such would attract State 
Responsibility. Similarly, the Document identifies situations in which PMSCs are identified as 
“members of organized armed forces, groups or units under a command responsible to the State.”846 
The distinction between “regular armed forces” and “command responsible to the State”847  is 
important in ensuring States remain accountable for all actions which take place under their 
supervision.848 While this description maintains a degree of ambiguity, this section makes it clear 
that the Document takes account of circumstances in which PMSCs are incorporated into forms of 
irregular armed forces and non-military organisations that operate in security-based operations.849 
This would, therefore, cover the use of PMSCs for “so-called black operations” 850  or covert 
operations in Afghanistan and could include the JTF within the Niger Delta.  
 
Beyond this, the Document identifies two further manners in which States may be held 
accountable for their use of PMSCs in circumstances in which the command structure is not as 
clearly defined. The first of these are situations in which the PMSC are “empowered to exercise 
elements of governmental authority if they are acting in that capacity.”851 This section of the 
Document, therefore, has two key elements which require fulfilling; that the PMSC exercise 
“governmental authority” and that they are empowered to do this. The requirement for 
empowerment is expanded in parenthetical information to include only circumstances in which the 
state is “formally authorized.” 852  This is based on Article Four of the Articles of State 
Responsibility, and the accompanying commentary under which, States may be held accountable 
                                                     
845 Montreux Document (n 673) at Section 7(b) 
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid. 
848  Tougas (n 844) at 328; James Cockayne, ‘Regulating Private Military and Security Companies: The Content, 
Negotiation, Weaknesses and Promise of the Montreux Document ‘(2008) 13 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 401, 
410; Chesterman (n 3) at 1074. 
849 Chesterman (n3) at 1074. 
850 Cockayne (n 848) at 410. 
851 Montreux Document (n 673) at Section 7(c). 
852 Ibid. 
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for actions of organs who acting in their official capacity exercise governmental authority.853 The 
Montreux Documents requirements, therefore, would mirror those of the Articles, with this 
requirement applying only to cases where an entity is “empowered by internal law” to undertake a 
specific governmental role rather than circumstances in which operating under general command 
they are tasked with completing an operation which is traditionally governmental.854 The second 
requirement that the entity exercise governmental authority is less clear as neither the Document, 
nor the Articles upon which it is based, provides significant guidance on what this constitutes a 
“function normally conducted by organs of the State.”855 The Document does, in Paragraph Two, 
explicitly list “exercising the power of the responsible officer over prisoner-of-war camps of places 
of internments of civilians in accordance with the Geneva Conventions”856 as being an example of 
a governmental task, and therefore not suitable for outsourcing. This definition, extending only to 
the responsible officer, is very limited and would suggest that the Document would class contractors 
who operate detention centres as non-governmental so long as a state agent was the responsible 
officer. Similarly, as the Document specifically lists activities PMSCs may undertake “armed 
guarding… protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places…”857 it 
can be assumed that these would not be “governmental.858” 
 
Potentially the widest mode of attribution identified within the Montreux Document is the 
fourth mode of attribution identified in Section Seven. Under this heading, States can be held 
accountable PMSCs when they are “in fact acting on the instructions of the State… or under its 
direction or control”859 Ultimately, this corresponds largely with Article 8 of the ILC Articles, in 
attributing responsibility to a State in cases where the “conduct is carried out on the instructions of 
                                                     
853 ILC Articles (n 679) at Article 4. 
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856 Ibid at page 11, Para. 2. 
857 Ibid at Preface Para. 9(a). 
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a state organ or under its direction or control.” 860  This mode of attribution can in effect be 
considered to have two separate specifications. The first of these being where an explicit order or 
command to undertake an act has been issued, whilst the second covers situations in which the 
degree of control over the PMSC demonstrates an implicit support for their actions. Ultimately, 
however, while it is important to note the importance of “control” in establishing State 
Responsibility, the exact parameters of this are highly contentious with the Montreux Document 
adding nothing to the understanding of how this applies in practice. Instead the Document merely 
restates a States existing legal requirements for States in “control” of non-state actors under 
International Law which, as this research will consider further on, in this case, PMSCs remains 
highly contentious and unsettled within international law.  
 
While the Montreux Document is overwhelmingly concerned with the responsibilities of 
States, Section E briefly address the responsibility of “PMSCs and their personnel” when operating 
within war zones. Paragraphs 22 and 23 outlines the legal systems applicable to PMSCs and 
individual contractors. This first notes that PMSCs retain their legal obligations under the national 
law of the State they are operating in.861 It has been suggested that due to the ambiguousness of the 
guidance this approach may present difficulties when the “rule of law has collapsed… or when 
there is a conflict between the state’s laws and those of another relevant jurisdiction.”862 Regardless 
of this, however, while seemingly innocuous, this provision is among the most notable of the 
Montreux Document. Specifically, PMSCs and Contracting States have repeatedly claimed 
immunity from the legal system of the states they operate in. During the Iraq War, Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order 17 specifically exempted PMSCs from Iraqi Laws for acts relating to 
their contract of employment.863  Similar claims were made in relation to the use of PMSCs in Plan 
                                                     
860 ILC Articles (n 679) at Article 8 
861 Montreux Document (n 673) at Paragraph 23. 
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Colombia864 with US personnel granted immunity as part of the bilateral military pact signed 
between the US and Colombia.865 Considering this, it is significant that signatories including the 
US and UK endorsed the view that in future PMSCs employed by them would be bound by the 
Laws of the territorial States.  
  
Beyond these general obligations, the Montreux Document also addresses one of the most 
persistent issues within the use of PMSCs; their status as under IHL. While PMSCs, and all 
individuals, are bound by IHL and would be criminally responsible for serious breaches of this, the 
protections that PMSCs would be afforded have remained contentious. These protections primarily 
relate to their status under IHL and the corresponding protections offered to them both during 
conflict, and if captured by the opposition. Which regime is applicable to them would depend upon 
whether the individual contractor or employee qualifies as a “civilian”, “civilian accompanying the 
armed forces”, or “civilian directly participating in hostilities”, or whether he qualifies as a 
“member of the armed forces”, a privileged “combatant” entitled to “prisoner of war” status 
“civilian internee” protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention or, rather, a “mercenary.” 866 Rather 
than attempting to categorise PMSCs, the Montreux Document instead provides a suggested method 
for establishing their position on a “case-by-case basis.”867 Paragraph 26 describes this process 
through which this determination can be made, with the starting point being that PMSC personnel 
will start as civilians under IHL. This status may change if they are incorporated into either the 
regular armed forces, or similar organisation, under a command responsible to the state. 868 
Furthermore, PMSC personnel will be presumed to be entitled to prisoner of war status if they are 
accompanying armed forces, as set out in the Article 4A(4) of the Third Geneva Conventions. The 
                                                     
864 Irene Cabrera & Antoine Perret, ‘Colombia: Regulating Private Military and Security Companies 
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primary benefit provided by this definition is the clarification of the default status of PMSCs as 
civilians. However, while it further clarifies that this presumption can be rebutted, it fails to consider 
or explain the circumstances in which this may be the case. Considering the Afghanistan case study, 
it is unclear whether the private militias employed by the Afghan National Army would be 
considered “incorporated” for the purpose of Paragraph 26869. The Document makes no attempt to 
identify the test required and it has been questioned whether this would require “de jure 
determination or would it also include de facto incorporation”870  
 
 
5.4 International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers 
5.4(2) Background to the ICoC 
Following the success of the Montreux Document for “Private Military Companies” in 
2008, the Swiss Governments Division IV, which focusses on human rights generally, established 
a similar initiative for “Private Security Companies” in 2009.871 The resulting International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICOC) was signed on 9 November 2010.872 This drew 
upon a “multi-stakeholder initiative… with the over-arching objective to articulate the human rights 
responsibilities of private security companies, and set to set out the international and principles and 
standards.”873 Parallel to this,  foreseeing “that a voluntary code of conduct could lack enforcement 
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871 Anne-Marie Buzatu, ‘ Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: A View From Inside 
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capacity to ensure compliance”874 the initiative established a “multi-stakeholder oversight body, 
namely the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).”875 The ICoCA consists of the 
Secretariat, the General Assembly and the Board of Directors comprised of the three pillars of the 
ICoCA; governmental representatives, industry representatives and civil society.876 This structure 
was designed to encourage a system of checks and balances between the three pillars, ensuring 
neither industry or civil society would dominate proceedings in a manner that might undermine the 
credibility or effectiveness of the Association.877  
 
In comparison to the Montreux Document, the ICoC and the associated ICoCA presents 
several advantages in regulating PMSCs and establishing avenues of accountability. The first of 
these is that unlike the Montreux Document, the ICoC does not limit its scope to situations 
amounting to armed conflict. Instead, the Code identifies PSCs operating in “complex 
environments”878 including areas “experiencing or recovering from unrest or instability, whether 
due to natural disasters or armed conflict, where the rule of law has been substantially undermined, 
and in which the capacity of the states authority to handle the situation is diminished, limited, or 
non-existent.”879 The scope of this definition has not been specifically articulated, however there 
are several factors that are noteworthy within this. The first of these is that the attributes are not 
cumulative and as a result could apply to situations in which the rule of law or state authority has 
been undermined but not as a result of natural disaster or armed conflict. However, even this more 
expansive scope fails to include all circumstances in which PMSCs may operate, including some in 
which PMSCs have been accused of human rights violations. Considering the case-study of Peru it 
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would be difficult to argue that the Campesino protests against mining companies880 undermine the 
rule of law, or diminished the authority of the state. This highlights another potential limitation of 
the ICoC approach, as it focusses on the state monopoly over coercive violence without 
consideration for the legitimacy of this regime. As a result, while the ICoCs scope is significantly 
wider than the Montreux Document it inevitably retains many of the state-centric limitations 
associated with the “explicitly traditional… principles articulated” 881  in relation to the state 
responsibility and the corresponding presumed monopoly over coercive violence.882  
 
Beyond the environments to which the ICoC is focussed, it is further distinguishable from 
the Montreux Document by its focus. In particular, while the Document overwhelmingly addresses 
the responsibilities of states, the ICOC considers the obligations and responsibilities of companies 
who provide security services directly. It has been suggested, therefore, that the ICoC is 
complementary to the Montreux Document and can “complement or even be an essential 
component of a state’s effort to regulate PSCs in accordance with Montreux Document good 
practices.”883 To this end, like the Montreux Document, rather than establishing a new stand-alone 
regulatory framework, the ICoC “share[s] the principle objective of enhancing PSC compliance 
with applicable rules of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.”884 In 
doing so, the ICoC attempts to expound a synthesise existing regulations and best practices into a 
“commonly-agreed set of principles and.. establish a foundation to translate those principles into… 
standards. Furthermore, while the ICoC does not seek to provide a new regulatory framework for 
PMSCs, it does seek to establish a new, and independent oversight mechanism through which 
individual PMSCs can be judged against existing standards. It is this that provides potentially the 
most significant benefit of the ICoC and ICoCA. In order to analyse the effectiveness of this 
approach, the following section will briefly consider some of the most relevant requirements under 
                                                     
880 See Chapter 4, Section 2(1)(b) on the security threats within Peru including mining conflicts. 
881 MacLeod (n 875) at 130. 
882 See also White (n 33) at 61. 
883 Ibid. (generally discussing the inter-relationship of the two approaches and suggesting that the ICOC is effectively a 
recommended approach to fulfilling the good practice guidelines contained within the Montreux Document.) 
884 Ibid at 1. 
219 
 
the ICoC, and thereafter analyse how effectively the ICoCAs oversight mechanism is able to 
regulate and establish accountability for PMSCs.  
 
5.4(3) Contents of the ICoC 
Contained within the ICoC there are four headings under which the requirement of PMSCs 
are divided; general provisions, general commitments, specific principles regarding the conduct of 
personnel, and specific commitments regarding management and governance 885  The general 
provisions are focussed on reiterating the complementary nature of the ICoC to both international 
and national legal standards. 886  While the general commitments outline the signatory PMSCs 
continued commitment to operate in accordance with their obligations under host state national 
laws and international laws, alongside the standards contained within the ICoC. The specific 
principles provide more substantial guidance on the rules pertaining to PMSCs. These begin by 
establishing that signatory companies will agree to operate in accordance with the provisions of the 
ICoC, including ensuring that all their personnel along with sub-contractors “or other parties” 
operating under their contracts act in accordance with the code.”887 Signatory companies will are 
therefore not to enter into contracts which would require acting contrary to the policies and 
guidelines of the Code.888  Similarly, signatory companies will not enter into contractual obligations 
that would require their contravention of IHL, human rights law, international law, the national 
laws of the host and home state or UN Security Council sanctions.889 Furthermore, paragraphs 33 
to 42 detail those activities which PMSCs under no circumstances should PMSCs engage, or sub-
contract another party to engage, nor should individual contractors engage in these actions even if 
they believe they are being asked to do so by a superior officer.890 These include committing sexual 
                                                     
885 ICoC (n 873) at “Contents” 
886 Ibid at Paragraph 14. 
887 Ibid at Paragraph 16. 
888 Ibid at Paragraph 20. 
889 Ibid at Paragraphs 21-22. 
890 Ibid. (Company prohibitions are listed in Paragraph 22, Contractors are provided in more detail between Paragraphs 
35-41.  
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offences,891 taking part in activities which may amount to “torture or other cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment”,892 being involved in human trafficking,893 slavery or forced 
labour,894 or the “worst forms of child labour.”895 
 
Beyond these explicit prohibitions, the ICoC provides a “well-developed and quite specific 
rules on the use of force,”896 largely mirroring the approach of the United Nations Rules on the use 
of Force for Police. 897  The ICoC does not, therefore, preclude the use of force but instead 
emphasises that it must be a last resort and proportionate.898 If the use of force includes the use of 
firearms this must be considered an extreme action with a strict interpretation or proportionality. 
The use of firearms must be resorted to only in cases of self-defence, or the defence of others where 
the risk of death or serious injury is a virtual certainty. According to the ICoC and the accompanying 
supplementary guidance899 therefore, the use of firearms should not be resorted to in cases of 
protection of property or in the prevention of a crime unless there is a corresponding risk of death 
or serious injury to the PMSC or another.900 Considered the case studies, it is clear that there exist 
many examples of PMSCs engaging in activities which would be considered to directly contradict 
this guidance. The use of lethal force by the JTF to prevent oil theft and sabotage would clearly fall 
foul of these guidelines. Similarly, as documented the private security at Yanacocha Mine have 
consistently been implicated in the disproportionate use of force against non-violent protestors up 
to and including the use of lethal force. Furthermore, the ICoC makes clear that when PMSCs 
should only apprehend people when necessary for the protection of persons and property901 and 
                                                     
891 Ibid at Paragraph 38. 
892 Ibid at Paragraph 35-37. 
893 Ibid at Paragraph 39. 
894 Ibid at Paragraph 40. 
895 Ibid at Paragraph 41; Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (adopted 17 June 1999, entered into force 19 November 2000) ILO Convention No. 192. 
896 White (n 33) at 266. 
897 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’ United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Cuba, 27 August - 7 September 1990) (Hereinafter UN 
Basic Principles on Force) 
898 ICOC (n 873) at Paragraph 30-33. (drawing upon Ibid at Paragraphs 5-8). 
899 UN Basic Principles on Force (n 897) at Paragraph 9. 
900 Ibid at Paragraph 32. 
901 ICoC (n 873) at Paragraph 34. 
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must hand over any apprehended person to the relevant public authorities at the earliest opportunity. 
While at Yanacocha mine, it was discovered that the private security guards had detained protestors 
for days on the property of the mine.902  
 
In combination with these negative obligations on the actions and activities of PMSCs, the 
ICoC seeks to establish a series of positive obligations to support and ensure these obligations are 
met, and ensure effective remedies are available where they are not. The ICoC, therefore, provides 
required internal institutional policies to enforce their obligations. Among the more general 
provisions established by these positive obligations are the establishment of a suitable and effective 
recruitment and vetting process. This requires companies to “exercise due diligence” in hiring 
personnel through establishing appropriate internal policies and procedures preventing the 
employment of  individuals who have been convicted of criminal behaviour or dishonourable 
discharge or previous breach of ICoC alongside other general conduct that “according to an 
objectively reasonable standards, brings into question their fitness to carry a weapon.”903  The 
companies must regularly review their personnel’s performance including the maintaining of their 
obligations under the Code and ensure that they are trained in their obligations under national and 
international law as well as the ICoC.904 Importantly, this process applies to both contractors of the 
signatory company but also to any sub-contractor that may be used by the signatory company to 
complete the contract.905 This policy is potentially an important step in ensuring PMSCs maintain 
appropriate standards of conduct, and could assist in preventing illegal activities and human rights. 
As the case study for Nigeria demonstrated in the past established and reputable firms have been 
known to engage inappropriate sub-contractors to conduct activities that they may otherwise be 
unwilling or incapable of performing. The obligation to apply an equal framework to sub-
                                                     
902 See Supra Section 4(2)(1)(d) “Private Security Guards” 
903 ICoC (n 873) at Paragraph 48. 
904 Ibid at Paragraph 55. 
905 Ibid at Paragraph 50; see also Buzatu (n 871) at 40 – 41. 
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contractors and contractors would if successful prevent such activities in the future.906 Beyond the 
rules regarding the employment of personnel, the ICoC also establishes a duty to ensure weapons907 
and other “materials of war”908 are dealt with in accordance with national and international law.909 
This includes the safe storing of all materials or weapons and accounting procedures to prevent the 
illegal transfer of weapons.910 Furthermore, where weapons are used the signatory company has an 
obligation that contractors that carry weapons be appropriately trained both in the use of weapons911 
and the applicable rules of force.912  
 
Among the most important of the positive obligations for the effectiveness of the ICoC are 
those related to the reporting of breaches of the Code, the grievance procedures. These were written 
with the intention of ensuring that signatory companies build in responsible working practices into 
their company ethos and foster a “corporate culture that respects human rights.”913 The final four 
sections of the ICoC, therefore, provide for incident reporting, safe and healthy working 
environments, harassment, grievance procedures and meeting liabilities. Among the most 
significant of these obligations is the duty of both the company and contractor to report any incident 
in which the personnel was required to use a weapon or any escalation of force, or incidents in 
which any party was injured or a crime was committed.914 This report should be followed by an 
inquiry with copies of the outcome sent to the PMSCs client, “and to the extent required by law, to 
the competent authorities.”915 This approach to reporting and monitoring incidents is a welcome 
development which allows companies to identify trends within the use of force by their personnel 
and maintain written records for the use of evidence in future internal disciplinary matters or legal 
                                                     
906 See Supra at Section 4(2)(2)(d) Private security (G4S’s use of local contracting firms/militias to undertake activities 
that breached the human rights of victims). 
907 ICoC (n 873) at Paragraph 59. 
908 Ibid at Paragraphs 60-62. 
909 The international obligations are particularly relevant to the prohibition on the possession of any materials of war that 
are illegal under international law, and that no transfers of these materials are made in contravention of UN Security 
Council Sanctions. Ibid at Paragraph 61 
910 Ibid at Paragraphs 56-58 for weapons and Paragraphs 62 for materials of war. 
911 Ibid at 59(a), (b).  
912 Ibid at Paragraph 59(c). 
913 Buzatu (n 871) at 41-43. 
914 ICoC (n 873) at Paragraph 63. 
915 Ibid. 
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matters. Paragraph 66 of the ICoC further provides that signatory companies must establish a 
grievance procedure through which personnel or third parties may bring allegations of misconduct 
or the failure of the company, or their personnel, to comply with their obligations under the Code. 
The Code states that the procedure for bringing a complaint must be publically accessible through 
a website, although it is difficult to establish the efficacy of this when working in volatile or under-
developed environments where access to the internet may be limited. Instead, this has the potential 
to create a two-tier system through which those with resources are able to lodge complaints, while 
those unable to access modern technology, in many cases displaced or indigenous populations, may 
be de facto precluded from access to justice. Once a complaint has been lodged, the company is 
under a duty to provide a fair and impartial investigation and potentially pass on such records as 
may be relevant to legal authorities.916 Following the conclusion of an inquiry, the company is under 
a duty to take appropriate disciplinary actions and keep records of such inquiries or allegations for 
use in future cases.917 The final significant requirement of the Code is that all signatory companies 
must provide “ensure they have sufficient capacity in place at all times to meet reasonably 
anticipated commercial liabilities for damages in respect of personal injury, death or damage to 
property.”918 As a result, the Code anticipates that all companies will be capable of making damages 
payments to any victims of their actions in accordance with the local legal regime.  
 
5.4(4) Oversight Mechanisms – The ICoCA 
 The scope and contents of the Code of Conduct has generally been received mixed reviews 
as while the contents can be considered “normatively… robust,” 919  there remains scope for 
                                                     
916 Ibid at 67. 
917 Ibid. 
918 Ibid at 69. 
919 Laura Dickinson, ‘Regulating the Privatized Security Industry: The Promise of Public/Private Governance’ (2013) 63 
Emory Law Journal 417, 421; see also Stuart Wallace, ‘Case Study on Holding Private Military and Security Companies 
Accountable for Human Rights Violations’ (Work Package No.7 – Deliverable No. 75, Fostering Human Rights Among 
European Policies) at 56 (“The Code has been praised for its detailed articulation of a wide range of norms and procedures 
that PSCs should adhere to”) 
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improvement by incorporating “economic, social, or cultural rights.”920 Regardless of the scope and 
content of the provisions within the code, however, the fact that it creates no legal obligations on 
PMSCs is a central weakness to the efficacy of the approach.921 In the absence of this, the initiative 
instead sought to establish an independent oversight mechanism with the focus directly on the 
signatory companies. The overall governance of this oversight mechanism sits with the twelve-
member Board of Directors922 which votes by a majority of 8 (at least two members from each of 
the four pillars must vote in favour of any decision.)923  
 
 Among the primary roles of the Primary role of the ICoCA is the certification of 
companies.924 Originally, this was researched for companies who explicitly undertook to maintain 
and fulfil all their obligations under ICoC however, more recently this has been expanded to include 
companies who have “third-party certification to one (or more)… standards… issues by an 
independent accredited certification body.”925 These must similarly fulfil the certification standards 
required926 under the ICoC while the ICoCA may establish additional requirements for companies 
under third-party accreditation to bring the standards up to an equal level.927  
 
 Article 12 of the AOA provides that the ICoCA is responsible, after certifying, for the 
monitoring, reporting and assessment of the performance of PSMCs under the ICoC achieved 
through a multilevel approach. The primary basis of this monitoring and assessment is an annual 
self-assessment report completed by each PMSCs disclosing their compliance with their obligations 
                                                     
920 White (n 33) at 237. 
921 Ibid at 261; Amstel & Rodenhauser (n 874) at 9. 
922 Dickinson (n 919) at 421 (for a discussion of the make-up of the Board of Directors See Supra at 5.4(2) 
923 Ibid. 
924 ICoC (n 873) at Article 10. 
925 ‘Certification’ (The International Code of Conduct) < https://www.icoca.ch/en/certification> accessed 5 May 2016).  
926 Ibid; to date the ICoCA recognises the PSC.1, ISO 28007, ISO 18788 as consistent and sufficient for certification 
under the ICoCA [hereinafter ICoCA]; see also Buzatu (n 871) at 57. 
927 Certification’ (The International Code of Conduct) < https://www.icoca.ch/en/certification> accessed 5 May 2016). 
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under the ICoC. 928  These self-assessment reports are combined with other “information 
collected”929 including from public sources, submitted complaints and civil society.930 If concerns 
are identified within this collation of date, the Executive Director may at their discretion undertake 
a field-based review931  in order to further investigate and review any institutional issues which may 
impact the company’s ability to comply with their obligations under the ICoC. There have 
numerous concerns expressed about the ability of the ICoCA to undertake this procedure with the 
necessary diligence, noting the relative lack of resources of the ICoCA in comparison to the number 
of signatory companies. This criticism focuses on the fact that the Secretariat consists of only five 
people responsible for receiving information and complaints from third parties and civil society 
organisations, in relation to over 101 companies,932 raising questions about the detail with which 
these complaints can in practice be reviewed.933 The ICoCA has responded to this by promising 
that;  
“[a]ppropriate staffing and resource levels have been provided for in the 2016 and 2017 
budgets, and the Secretariat anticipates that it will invest significant effort in 2017 on the 
development of a network of participating organizations and stakeholders in areas of 
significant concentrations of Member company activity.”934  
However, it has yet to be established the sufficiency of these measures. Similarly, To date, no field-
based reviews have been conducted and so data on the level of detail and success of this approach 
is negligible. Instead, the most recent ICoCA annual report noted simply that in July 2016 the 
                                                     
928 ‘Article 12: Procedures’ (International Code of Conduct Association) < 
https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCAt-Procedures-Article-12-Monitoring.pdf> accessed 5 May 2016 at 
Section III. 
929 See ‘2016 Information Session: International Code of Conduct Association for Private Security Service Providers’ 
(International Code of Conduct Assocation, 2016) < https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA-2016-Info-
Session.pdf> accessed 6 May 2016.  
930 Ibid at 19. 
931 ICoCA (926) at Section VI (applying Article 12.2.3) 
932  ‘Membership’ (International Code of Conduct Association) < 
https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?private_security_companies=companies&op=Search&view_type=list&form_id=
_search_for_members_filter_form> accessed 17 May 2016. 
933 Wallace, (n 919) at 57.  
934  ‘2015 – 2016 Annual Report’ (International Code of Conduct Association, 2016) < 
https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA_Annual-Report-2015-2016_0.pdf> accessed 13 January 2017 
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Working Group undertook a pilot study on field-reviews with the co-operation of three signatory 
companies. In their estimation “[t]he pilot, conducted over the course of four days between 6 and 9 
July 2016, successfully demonstrated the capacity of the Secretariat to review Member company 
operations, provide guidance… and deliver appropriate reporting to the Board”935 The details and 
conclusions of the review have not been released, however, to this authors mind a four day field-
study is unlikely to be sufficiently stringent and detailed to illuminate all the potential non-
compliance issues that a large security company may suffer from. While actual field-reports may 
be larger than this, it is difficult to consider that approach sufficient to establish “auditing and 
monitoring of their work in the field” as first envisioned by the text of the ICoC prior to the 
establishment of the ICoCA.936 
 
This overall monitoring process is intended to be supported by a process through which the 
ICoCA may enforce compliance and it is this aspect that has potentially proved the most 
contentious, with a variety of views on the effectiveness of the approaches adopted. The primary 
mechanisms available through this are dialogue with member companies937 and recommendations 
for corrective action. However, in extreme cases where this does not resolve the compliance issues, 
the board of directors may seek to begin suspension proceedings through which the company will 
lose its status as an ICoC member.938 This is in effect the only consequence which companies can 
suffer even from repeated breaches of their obligations under the Code. As a result, the effectiveness 
of the ICoC approach in practice rests solely in the hands of the PMSCs employers with companies 
only negatively affected if clients refuse to hire them on the basis of a lack of ICoC membership. 
There are two substantial problems with this approach. The first of these is that to date, few 
employers have to date made this a requirement for employment, with the US and UK among a 
handful of states that have done so. However, no developing nations, who are an increasingly large 
                                                     
935 Ibid at 12. 
936 Buzatu (n 871) at 43. 
937 ICoCA (926) at Section IV (applying Article 12.2.5) 
938 Ibid at Section VIII. 
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market for PMSCs have followed suit.939 Similarly, there has been no suggestion that any multi-
national companies intend to incorporate ICoC membership into their employment contracts and as 
a result, the effectiveness of the self-regulatory approach may be ultimately undermined. 
Furthermore, at a more conceptual level, it is important to consider whether the self-regulatory 
approach is even desirable when considering these forms of international actors. While the ICoC 
draws upon the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” (Ruggie Principles)940 and 
specifically the protect, respect and remedy framework it is questionable whether such an approach, 
drawn largely for manufacturing industries, is appropriate for the security sector. In practice, the 
motivation behind companies adopting the Ruggie Principles is largely in response to normative 
shifts within the consumer, that make respecting human rights a positive economic decision. The 
approach has been most successful in industries where the supply chain is clear enough to establish 
accountability, with clothing and food production considered particularly susceptible to the 
economic effects of negative human rights press.941 This is not the case for the security markets, 
where the consumers are primarily institutions or companies rather than individuals and as a result, 
the effectiveness of these normative changes are more limited. The regulation of PMSCs in Iraq has 
been influenced more by one incident in Nissour Square that drew the attention of the Western 
media, than the systemic but low-level abuses many Iraqis felt they were subjected to. Furthermore, 
it is questionable whether the ethical principles of the consumer population, usually in a Western 
country, should decide the social responsibilities of a security company, exercising a traditional 
state function, in a foreign country. It is possible that this approach is responsible for the lack of 
economic, social and cultural rights within the ICoC. The visual impact of a population being 
physically abused is more obvious than preventing a population from forming trade unions for 
                                                     
939  ‘Membership: Governments’ (International Code of Conduct Association) < 
https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?view_type=list#search_for_members_list> accessed 16 July 2017.  
940 ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework’ (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2011) < 
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Paper 67, Corporate Responsibility Initiative, June 2017) 
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example, though both can be important in raising living standards and protecting human rights of 
the host population.  
 
5.5 Conclusions on the Accountability and Regulation of PMSCs 
When examining the legal accountability and regulation of PMSCs several conclusions can 
be drawn from this Chapter of the study. The first of these is that attempting to ensure that PMSCs 
and their employers are held accountable for their actions presents complex legal and factual 
difficulties. The specific individual circumstances will significantly affect both the manner, and the 
extent, to which PMSCs and other actors may be held accountable and the regulations under which 
they operate. Despite this, however, it is also clear that there are legal avenues through which it is 
possible to establish accountability for PMSC activity including both state responsibility and 
international criminal law.  
 
As the most frequently cited in relation to PMSCs, the doctrine of state responsibility 
provides a potential method for ensuring that states that employ PMSCs, remain accountable for 
the actions of their agents. Applied vigorously, this approach would confront security outsourcing 
head-on, however the vigorous application of this doctrine is not the current reality. While the 
doctrine is only applicable in cases where the conduct breaches relatively strong international 
obligations, most relevantly the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention Against Torture, 
PMSCs have repeatedly been implicated in such activities.   
 
Substantial questions do however remain over the practical application of the doctrine, with 
significant limitations on the circumstances in which this approach will provide an effective 
remedy. In particular, the current position adopted by the ICJ that the state must exercise “effective 
control” over the actual perpetrators has been criticised for being too strict in cases of privatisation 
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effectively requiring the state to intentionally direct the action in order to be accountable. The result 
is that this approach potentially benefits states who are negligent or willfully ignorant of their 
agent's actions, and potentially, therefore, promoting an “ask no questions” approach.  
 
Considering the inherently dangerous role that PMSCs undertake, and their complex 
position within international law, it is possible that a more relaxed approach may be better equipped 
to deal with potential human rights abuses of PMSCs. In particular, there have been suggestions 
that within hierarchical structures a less stringent “overall control” test is more appropriate. Such 
an approach has significant support within both the legal and academic community, having been 
argued repeatedly that this represents the intention and purpose of state responsibility more 
accurately. Adopting this test, requiring only overall control over the contractors’ actions, even if 
they do not explicitly order them could more be more relevant in relation to PMSCs. Under this 
“overall control” test states could not outsource potentially violent activities, in which human rights 
abuses are a high-risk, and gain immunity through ignorance or negligence. Ultimately, however, 
as it currently stands state responsibility fails to adequately ensure that states are truly held 
responsible for the actions of their agents to the extent of actively requiring states to ensure PMSCs 
abide by their international obligations.  
 
 Beyond holding the states internationally responsible, one of the strongest manners to 
establish legal accountability for the actions of PMSCs would be to ensure that those “most 
culpable” are held criminally liable. Such an approach must draw an appropriate balance in 
imposing individual accountability on individuals who under their control, physically perpetrate 
illegal acts and re-emphasizing the importance of individual culpability. In relation to PMSCs 
however, as the association is voluntary in nature, a balance must be drawn between what a person 
actually knew and what that person should have known. Considering this, while traditional modes 
of liability, in particular CR and CTCP, offer potential avenues for prosecuting employers for 
crimes committed by PMSCs, both suffer significant limitations. The reliance upon a level of 
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knowledge can leave employers able to avoid liability by virtue of willful ignorance, or by 
intentionally distancing themselves from the physical perpetrators. It remains unclear how these 
theories may be applied to individuals in commercial leadership positions which, for the purpose 
of the PMSC activities may be crucial. Ultimately, however, the biggest problem faced in 
attempting to utilise international criminal law for the actions of PMSCs is the political will and 
capabilities to actively prosecute. 
 
Alongside establishing accountability, the growth of PMSCs must be met by a strong 
regulatory framework with the Swiss Initiative of the Montreux Document and ICoC the most 
prominent among these. While the Montreux Document is often considered as a regulatory attempt 
to be unique in scope, in truth both the strengths, and weaknesses, of the Document lie in the 
application of pre-existing International Law. While state responsibility remains an essential aspect 
of a state-centric international legal regime, its application and effectiveness are limited 
increasingly in scope by the proliferation of private actors in general, with the market for security 
mirroring this more general trend. The clarification regarding the legal status of PMSCs is an 
important distinction to be made, although arguably primarily for the protection of PMSCs, rather 
than for the civilian populations in which they work. Furthermore, as the Document applies only to 
situations amounting to armed conflict this immediately prevents it from being relevant to the 
majority of PMSC activities. While this distinction is important for the purpose of IHL, when 
applied to private actors operating in complex environments across the globe the distinction 
becomes less relevant and can lead to arbitrary distinctions between the obligations depending upon 
where contractors are employed. Beyond this, the Montreux document relies overwhelmingly on 
the doctrine of state responsibility and as a result suffers from both the same positives and negatives 
as discussed above.  
 
Finally, a more expansive regulatory approach directed at PMSCs themselves has the 
potential to eliminate some of the worst aspects of the current security market, with the ICoC and 
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related Association capable of becoming influential on actors operating within the private security 
market. It is positive therefore that they provide a relatively thorough and wide-ranging framework 
for good practice within PMSCS. This includes clear guidance on the use of force and the 
responsibilities that PMSCs have in storing and handling weapons and dangerous materials, issues 
which have consistently plagued PMSCs. Furthermore, the requirements on companies to undertake 
due diligence in not only ensuring their own personnel are suitable for the roles but also those of 
any sub-contractors is an important requirement considering the increasing use of localised sub-
contracts in order to fulfil contractual obligations. Despite this, however, there remain significant 
obstacles to the effectiveness of the approach. Central among these is that due to a lack of strong 
enforcement measures, the success of the ICoC relies heavily upon PMSC clients requiring 
compliance and certification as a pre-requisite for employment, otherwise the Codes enforcement 
is limited. Similarly, there are wide-ranging questions as to the suitability of self-regulation within 
the private security industry as a whole, with the approach potentially more suitable for industries 
that are not related to functions considered so central to the state. Furthermore, it is clear therefore 
that while self-regulatory approaches, and the ICoC specifically, are positive steps in ensuring that 
PMSCs recognise their responsibilities and commit to fulfilling these, this approach cannot 
effectively establish legal accountability for PMSCs actions.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
TOWARDS A UNIQUE TYPOLOGICAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF PMSCS 
6 Introduction to the classification   
In light of the data produced by the country case studies, and the critical analysis of existing 
legal and regulatory frameworks it is clear that current approaches to the issues posed by PMSC 
suffer from significant inadequacies. This research suggests that underlying many of these 
difficulties is that, despite the exponential growth of PMSCs in both size and activities, much 
academic and political dialogue relating to them has often relied upon overly-simplified and 
arbitrary distinctions in order to either group or isolate specific contractors in a manner that 
conforms to a predisposed position. As a result, however, much of the current discourse on PMSCs 
fails to fully examine the factual disparities within PMSCs, instead seeking to shoe-horn them into 
existing political and legal frameworks. This thesis, therefore, seeks to undertake a more rigorous 
analysis of the nuances within private actors and establish an original classification system capable 
of differentiating PMSCs with reference to the theoretical framework and empirical data identified 
in the preceding chapters of this work. To do this, this chapter will begin by critically examining 
some of the existing classification systems used within PMSC discourse, in order to identify the 
weaknesses that any new approach must avoid. Thereafter it will establish the methodological 
framework that this study will utilise to design its classification system, establishing the 
characteristics required of such an approach.   
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6.1 Current Classification and Definitional Approaches 
Taking note of the literature on the use of PMSCs, there are several approaches to defining 
and distinguishing PMSCs, and their activities, that have become prevalent within the current 
discourse. The first of these, and the most common approach within the literature, is to discuss 
PMSCs within either the privatisation of security or within the context of warfare. Within works 
adopting this approach, there are a myriad of motivations from both legal, political and practical 
perspectives however, this work will seek to show that regardless of these, the approach results in 
unavoidable inconsistencies when considered with reference to existing factual circumstances.  The 
second approach to distinguishing PMSCs, which while similar and sometimes used concurrently 
is the differentiation between those contractors who work in “conflict zones” and those who do not. 
While there are legal implications under international for which this distinction is important, it fails 
as a more generalised approach to classifying PMSCs. The final approach is to define PMSCs by 
reference the specific tasks they undertake. This approach, which is sometimes combined with the 
military/security distinction, undoubtedly provides positives in examining PMSCs however, the 
lack of contextual and stakeholder specificity is an inherent weakness within this approach that 
disregards important structural issues.  
 
6.1(1) Military or Security Exclusivity 
 
 The first, and most common approach within PMSC literature, has been to distinguish 
between a security or military approach. Specifically, since the emergence of modern day military 
style contractors in the form of Executive Outcomes in Africa, and more recently Blackwater in 
Iraq, there remains an overarching tendency to exclusively separate those actors who work within 
the “military” or those within the “security” sectors. One of the earliest and enduring studies of the 
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modern PMSC market P.W. Singer’s Corporate Warriors942 exemplifies such an approach. While 
Singer identifies the numerous uses of PMSCs, including ostensibly non-military tasks such as 
“guarding pipelines and other commercial assets”943 the study classes these all under the umbrella 
of military activities.944 A similar approach is adopted by Elke Krahmann in States, Citizens and 
the Privatization of Security who directly adopts a Singers taxonomy, and Deborah Avant in The 
Market for Force,945 who similarly uses the military distinction as a starting point for a more 
specific differentiation. In comparison Abrahamsen and Williams, citing an abundance of 
scholarship on the private military companies,946 instead focus their analysis solely on “947private 
security.”  
 
 This approach however, has been described as “controversial”948 for a number of reasons. 
Primary among these is the perception that this approach leads to seemingly arbitrary distinctions 
between military and security contractors. 949  The difficulties within this are exemplified by 
considering the range of operations undertaken by one single multinational PMSC, namely G4S. 
The operations of this organisation stretch across the globe, ranging from using unarmed security 
guards operating in the UK,950 employing armed quasi-military groups throughout South America, 
and directly collaborating with the Nigerian Army in the Niger Delta.951 Despite this, G4S fall 
within the category of a security firm, and as such are not considered within these examinations of 
PMSCs, nor would they be regulated under any potential rules designed for Private Military 
                                                     
942 Singer (n 18) 
943 Singer (n 18) at 9-17 (discussing the variations within the PMSC industry across the globe.) 
944 Singer (n 18) at 91. (Singer produces a typology of PMSCs based upon the proximity of the PMSC to the frontline of 
the war. As such he identifies, Military Provider Firms, those firms who undertake direct military actions citing Sandline 
International and Executive Outcomes. Military Consulting Firms, those firms who provide training and tactical advice 
without undertaking military operations. Finally, Military Support Firms, as those who provide logistical and technical 
support without directly affecting military combat. 
945 Avant (n 392)  
946 Abrahamsen & Williams (n 385) at 23. 
947 Ibid. 
948  Eugenio Cusumano, ‘Policy Prospects for Regulating Private Military and Security Companies’ in Francesco 
Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (eds) War by Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors 
949 Ibid at 15. 
950 See e.g. What we Do, G4S UK <http://www.g4s.uk.com/en-GB/> accessed 15 September 2016. 
951 See  Abrahamsen & William (n 385) at 139 -141 (Examining G4S’S contract with Chevron Nigeria, and Shell. This 
includes working alongside and even commanding members of the Nigerian Joint Task Force, including members of the 
Nigerian Military and Navy.) 
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Contractors. In comparison, taking Singers definition of PMCs, the overwhelming majority of these 
contractors would provide logistical support only, with less than 15% of US DOD contractors 
performing services that may require force.952  
 
6.1(2) Armed Conflict Operators 
                 The second approach to classifying PMSCs has been based upon the distinction between 
those contractors operating within armed conflicts and those which operate outside of these. To 
date this has been the most popular approach within attempts to regulate PMSCs, having been 
adopted most notably by the Montreux Document. To date the Montreux Document953 is the most 
comprehensive attempt at regulation but, relates only to the use of PMSCs during armed conflict, 
thus excluding the vast majority of PMSC activity from regulation.954 There is a clear rationale for 
distinguishing contractors within armed conflict due to the unique legal situation, the operation of 
International Humanitarian Law, and the generally accepted definition of mercenaries as 
exclusively within armed conflicts. However, while this provides a rationale for regulating PMSCs 
within armed conflict, many equally relevant reasons exist for regulating PMSCs outside of official 
armed conflicts. Considering the increasingly asymmetrical nature of warfare, the line at which a 
situation becomes an armed conflict is increasingly blurred. The potential complications posed by 
this are illustrated by the case study of Nigeria, where the situation in Northern Nigeria with Boko 
Haram would meet the criteria for an armed conflict,955 and PMSCs assisting in it956 would be 
covered by the Montreux Document, while the situation in the Niger Delta would not and PMSCs 
                                                     
952 Cusumano (n 948) at 15. 
953 ICRC & Switzerland, ‘The Montreux Document On Pertinent International Legal Obligations And Good Practices For 
States Related To Operations Of Private Military And Security Companies During Armed Conflict’ (ICRC & Switzerland, 
2009) <https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/Montreux-
Broschuere_en.pdf> accessed 23 September 2016. 
954 Despite signatories to the Montreux Document including G4S and Securicor, the regulation explicitly considers only 
the “certain well-established rules of international law apply to States in their relations with private military and security 
companies (PMSCs) and their operation during armed conflict” Ibid at 9. 
955  ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013’ (International Criminal Court, November 2013) < 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/OTP%20Reports/otp-report-2013.aspx#nigeria> accessed 17 October 2016.  
956 See ‘Nigeria’s Private Army: A Perception Study of Private Military Contractors in the War Against Boko Haram’ 
(Remote Control Project, Oxford Research Group, 2016) < 
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/NSN%20report%20final.pdf> accessed 18 December 2016.  
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operating alongside the same Nigerian military would not be covered.957 Furthermore, differing 
interpretations of non-international armed conflict, under Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
convention, make the decision to classify a situation as an armed conflict flexible and could lead to 
uncertainty as to the status of PMSCs. 
 
6.1(3) Task Differentiation 
The final approach that has gained significant traction within existing literature is the 
differentiation of PMSCs based on the specific activities they undertake. This is often combined 
with either of the above distinctions to create separate classes of tasks based on PMCs and PSCs. 
Singer, therefore, having differentiated between military and security roles further, divides PMCs, 
primarily in relation to the contractor's direct proximity to frontline combat situations. This result 
of this approach was to identify Military Provider Firms, Military Support Firms and Military 
Consultant Firms. Similarly, Schaub Jr. and Kelty’s edited collection Controlling the Corporate 
Warrior958 relied upon a task-specific determination derived from the Private Security Database,959 
a public data set on the use of PMSCs between 1990 and 2007, which distinguished 12 separate 
PMSC tasks ranging from combat operations and intelligence through to humanitarian aid and 
weapons disposal. 960  Distinguishing between tasks clearly has positive features allowing a 
differentiation between disparate tasks. However, the failure of this approach to consider the 
environment in which PMSCs are operating can prevent this approach from achieving its aim of 
uniformity with a brief examination of even the PSD’s highly specialised distinctions shows how 
this can lead to anomalous results. Taking the example of “quasi-police tasks” if this were applied 
to the three case studies the functions fulfilled by those in Afghanistan,961 where the police are 
tasked with countering the insurgency, would be vastly different from those in Peru,962 who may be 
                                                     
957 Supra at Chapter 4.2(2)(d). 
958 Schaub & Kelty (n 799) at 9. 
959 ‘Private Security Database’ (Data on Armed Conflict and Security) < http://www.conflict-data.org/psd/index.html> 
accessed 13 May 2015. 
960 Schaub & Kelty (n 799) at 9.  
961 Supra at Chapter 4.2(3)(b). 
962 Supra at Chapter 4.2(1)(b). 
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faced with largely peaceful environmental protestors, and both would appear similarly 
inappropriate if placed within the UK context. Clearly, therefore, while this approach is specific it 
fails to fully deal with the importance of the individual circumstances that PMSCs operate and as a 
result, can lead to anomalous classifications and seemingly arbitrary distinctions between the actors 
and their activities. 
 
6.2 A New Approach 
 It is clear therefore that the current discourse on PMSCs is limited in practical application 
and each approach has limitations and negatives. One of the central aims of this thesis is to provide 
a mechanism to more completely understand the implications of PMSCs in a manner that can 
provide an effective foundation for a regulatory framework. This study proposes that to achieve this 
it is necessary to take a holistic approach that considers the overall position of PMSCs in a manner 
that can accurately identify and classify PMSCs as a foundation for further study and regulation. In 
order to do this, the study suggests utilising a typological methodology in order to construct a 
classification system that can fulfil these requirements. The assumption is that a classification that 
is nuanced towards the specificity of the circumstances that permit PMSCs to operate and flourish 
is a pre-requisite if focused and effective mechanisms of scrutiny and regulation are to exist. The 
classification seeks to identify the operative distinctions within PMSCs at a foundational level, in 
order to identify their ability to directly affect human rights, and also the implication this may have 
for accountability and governance.  
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6.2(1) Typological Methodologies 
Typologies are considered to be “well-established analytical tools in the social sciences”963 
in particular political theory and international relations. Legal studies however, have been much 
slower to accept and value their use. The most recognisable of the few that do exist is Weber’s 
conception of “Legal Thought”964 which published posthumously in 1968 sought to establish a 
system of understanding the compulsion of law. Despite this, typologies have remained largely 
minimal within legal research, with few further notable examples of their use.  
 
It is important therefore to understand the rationale for choosing a typological approach, 
including both the benefits that they can bring, along with the limitations on their use. To do this it 
is necessary to establish what we mean by typology within this study. In essence, a typology is a 
classification system that seeks to systematically establish a series of conceptual sub-sets or 
dichotomous “types” with minimal “within group variance.”965  In order to do this, a typology 
“requires conceptualization along at least two dimensions,”966 with the variations of combinations 
within these representing a unique type. The operative feature of typologies is the conceptual nature 
of their categorising features in comparison to taxonomies which adopt a purely empirical approach 
to categorise on the basis of their occurrence, regulation or other observable data. The reliance upon 
conceptual characteristics is beneficial in identifying different types based upon their qualitative 
features.967 A typological approach therefore offers a number of clear advantages in the examination 
of PMSCs.  
 
                                                     
963 David Collier, Jody LaPorte, and Jason Seawright, ‘Putting Typologies to Work: Concept Formation, Measurement, 
and Analytic Rigor’ (2012) 65(1) Political Research Quarterly 217–232. 
964 Max Weber, Economy and Society (first published 1968, University of California Press; Revised Edition, 2013) 
965 Kenneth D Bailey, Typologies and Taxonomies: An Introduction to Classification Techniques (Sage Publications, 
1994) 
966 Ibid. 
967 Ibid.  
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The first of these benefits is the ability to design and customise the typology through the 
selection of relevant characteristics and therefore, unlike the arbitrary nature of classifications 
utilised to date, adopting a typological approach allows the study to proceed from a more holistic 
examination of PMSCs. In this way, the study is able to identify and analyse not just the 
circumstances of the PMSCs use but also consider the role of PMSCs in relation to the pre-
established conceptual frameworks and historical precedents that this study has identified. This 
allows the study to consider not just the specific instance of PMSC activity, but instead identify the 
relevant structural factors within this and classify them in a manner that can be extrapolated to all 
sufficiently similar PMSCs.  
Alongside this, the first of these is that typologies function as a tool with which to “reduce 
complexity or achieve parsimony.”968 In relation to PMSCs therefore, the ability of typologies to 
simplify the almost infinite varieties of possible types and uses for PMSCs, and reduce these to a 
manageable number of classes provides significant benefits to future studies of PMSCs and 
particularly, attempts to form regulatory frameworks. As has been evident throughout this work, 
among the most pressing issues faced by researchers considering PMSCs is the wide variance 
among the situations and types of PMSCs. A typology can reduce the complexity of these variations 
through the identification and selection of salient characteristics and dimensions.   
 
Finally, the typological approach benefits as a result of its capacity to recognize 
“similarities among cases, and group similar cases together for analysis”969 Therefore, while the 
typology reduces the number of combinations and types of PMSCs/PMSC activities it does so in a 
manner that identifies and highlights the similarities within the classes. Conversely, having 
identified the similarities between the groups, the use of typologies allows the research to 
simultaneously identify and highlight the differences between the groups. This means the 
subsequent research undertakes an analysis of these classes with a focus on the intra-class 
                                                     
968 Ibid at 12. 
969 Ibid at 12. 
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similarities and inter-class variances. For this reason, the use of typologies provides the ideal tool 
through which to compare and contrast types in a meaningful and analytical manner. Furthermore, 
through the use of Lazarsfeld's “pragmatic reduction”970 the typological approach is able to reduce 
a large number of variables into smaller sub-sets. This pragmatic reduction consists of “collapsing 
contiguous cells together”971 through the identification of sufficiently similar types972 which share 
necessary relevant characteristics and interrelation and can therefore be classed together. It is this 
ability to concisely and clearly differentiate within meaningful types that provides the unique 
foundation from which this study seeks to present a classification system capable of forming the 
foundation of future research and regulation of the PMSC market. Specifically, through utilising 
this typological approach the study seeks to produce a manageable list of sufficiently similar types, 
that within each class the common issues posed are best confronted in a similar manner.  
 
6.2(2) Conceptual Framework 
 Having established the rationale for undertaking a typology, it is necessary to outline and 
justify the methodological approach chosen. And to do this, this typology works within the 
conceptual framework established in the study of the relationship between coercive violence and 
sovereign power. As such, the typology draws upon the conclusions established in Chapter One of 
this thesis, and adopts a methodological approach sympathetic to the interpretation of the position 
of private violence documented throughout this work.  In particular, this study proceeds from the 
assumption that the use of coercive violence can be antithetical to the exercise of legitimate power. 
Considering the function of coercive violence, within the theories of Hannah Arendt and Walter 
Benjamin in particular, and considering the relationship between its exercise and legitimate power, 
the typological framework seeks to identify how the structural relationships that underpin the 
appropriation and exercise of coercive violence interact with and affect mechanisms of 
                                                     
970 Ibid at 13. 
971 Ibid at 27. 
972 Ibid at 5. 
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accountability and governance. In essence, the approach considers how traditional power structures 
can be circumvented or entirely subverted within the communities where PMSCs are active. This 
typological study, therefore, proceeds from the basis of identifying and examining the determinative 
relationships between the parties relevant to, or affected by, PMSC activity and identify potential 
imbalances within community power structures as a result of PMSC activity. Specifically, this 
analysis highlights the extent to which this private violence is able to prioritise the protection of 
one group’s interests at the expense of another’s rights through the use of external force, 
circumventing local opinions or beliefs, undermining social responsibility and accountability. 
 
To this end, the study identifies three differentiating factors as particularly compelling and 
informative in understanding the power structures, local politics and human rights issues that they 
raise. The first of these is the relationship between the PMSC and the local community, in particular, 
whether the contractors are representative of the local population or external forces. The second is 
the relationship between the funding party and the local population, focussing upon the 
geographical location and public/private nature of the employers, in order to establish the nature of 
the relationship between the local population and the interests being protected. The final criterion 
analysed within this typology is the form of engagement undertaken by the PMSC, specifically the 
type of coercive violence required in fulfilling their security roles. 
  
Having examined the factors that this thesis proposes as the foundation for a future 
typological system, it is necessary to consider how such a framework can be organised in order to 
establish a manageable and effective classification system. To achieve this, the typology undertakes 
a “reduction” in which the full range of potential combinations can be reduced to a manageable and 
practical number and categorised together as “types” on the basis of possessing sufficiently similar 
key characteristics. This study therefore seeks to identify, and thereafter group, PMSC into types 
that have are suitably alike and have a comparable effect on the human rights protections and be 
can practically and effectively, grouped together for the purpose of future regulation. In undertaking 
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this reduction process, it is particularly important that this study avoids the arbitrary distinctions 
that have hindered the effectiveness of existing classification attempts and instead remains focused 
on the conceptual framework and empirical data within this research. Specifically, these groupings 
must consider the practical effect of each particular type of PMSC has on the relationship between 
coercive violence and power and the ability of these to alter traditional power structures and 
undermine the mechanisms of accountability that are within these. In order to achieve this, the 
research identifies two requirements that this reduction process must fulfil. First, it must ensure that 
all the actors within each group are sufficiently similar that the type can be workable and practical 
for the future study or regulation of PMSCs. Equally important however, this typology must also 
be capable of explicitly identifying the specific structural difficulties posed by each group.  
 
In undertaking this reduction process, this section will begin by outlining the parameters of 
each group, through identifying the specific classes included within each grouping. It will thereafter 
move on to identifying the specific characteristics within the group as a whole and the issues and 
problems that are associated with this. To ensure that this is achieved in a concise and clear manner, 
this study will begin by discussing the first distinction considered within the typological framework; 
namely the level of violence, with the contractor classed as either a defensive, reactive or offensive 
PMSCs. The first subset; offensive PMSCs, presents by far the simplest form of distinction, with 
only two further factors being instructive with the variation between local PMSCs and external 
PMSCs presenting sufficient distinction for the eventual classification. In particular, it is clear that 
due to the level of violence exercised, both of these groups would most likely be considered to pose 
serious threats to the local population regardless of their employer or status as private or public 
forces. As such, therefore the pertinent legal consideration is whether the PMSCs are local or 
external to the host population.  
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6.3 Conceptual Characteristics 
6.3(1) Form of Violence 
The first consideration in undertaking a typological study of PMSCs is the form and level of 
violence that they privatise. On a preliminary level, when examining the potential effect upon 
human rights protection, the greater the degree of violence undertaken by a PMSC the higher the 
probability of abuse. Indeed, the use of many forms of violence by PMSCs will cause their actions 
to be illegal according to national or international legislation, while the use of excessive force is in 
direct opposition to the protection of individual’s human rights. However, potentially more 
instructive for this study is the correlation between a higher level of violence and lack of local 
support. In particular, it is clear that the use of high levels of violence is primarily related to 
situations in which there is significant local opposition to the activities being undertaken, or at least 
the manner in which they are being undertaken. In these circumstances it is clear that where a higher 
level of violence is used, it is to enforce their interests at the expense of the local population and 
therefore is similarly likely to affect the ability of the local population to counteract their actions or 
seek to protect their interests and rights. The use of violence against a local population is particularly 
likely to impede those individuals rights most prominently the freedom of expression and freedom 
to assembly. In the case studies above, it is clear that the use of high levels of violence was a direct 
response to the inability, or unwillingness to listen to the views and opinions of the local 
communities and was therefore used as a violent means of coercion. As such, distinguishing 
between the levels of violence used provides an excellent starting point for examining establishing 
a framework for the future regulation of PMSCs. To do this, the research proposes three categories 
of violence which are capable of providing a useful insight into the nature of the contracting firm's 
operations and of discerning the risk posed by their use. 
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6.3(1)(a) Defensive forces 
The first distinction identified by this work, are termed “Defensive PMSCs.” These are 
identified by their limited use of violence in their activities, and it would be expected that these 
form the majority of PMSCs, in particular throughout the developed world in the form of private 
security guards. Their role incorporates the use of force only in a defensive manner, with their 
primary duty being to observe and alert public police forces when necessary.  This thesis draws on 
a variety of sources to identify common restrictions on the use of violence by PMSCs to provide a 
guide for distinguishing this form of defensive PMSC. The ICoC guidelines provide that 
“personnel… take all reasonable steps to avoid force” 973  However, the use of force may be 
necessary so long as proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the situation.974 Similarly, the 
Sarajevo Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies, 975  a European Union and UN 
Development Programme initiative, considers the use of force and firearms as potentially 
permissible. Both cite the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officials976 
and UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials977 as guides to the appropriate use of force 
and firearms. Article Three of the UN Code of Conduct specifies that “officials may use force only 
when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.” 978  The 
associated commentary explains this to mean that the use of force may be used as is “reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances for the prevention of a crime, or in effecting an arrest”979 The 
UN Basic Principles similarly state that personnel should “as far as possible, apply non-violent 
means before resorting to the use of force and firearms.”980 Both further stipulate that the use of 
firearms, in particular, should be excluded except when the “suspected offender offers armed 
                                                     
973 ICoC (n 873) at Para. 30. 
974 Ibid. 
975  ‘The Sarajevo Code of Conduct for Private Security Companies’ (SEESAC, 2006) < 
http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Private-Security-Companies/The-Sarajevo-Code-of-Conduct-for-Private-Security-
Companies-EN.pdf> accessed 23 August 2015. 
976 ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’ United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Havana, Cuba, 27 August - 7 September 1990)  
977 ‘Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials’ UNGA Res 34/169 (17 December 1979). 
978 Ibid at Article 3. 
979 Ibid. at Commentary (a) 
980 United Nations Basic Principles (n 976) at Paragraph 4. 
 
246 
 
resistance or otherwise jeopardises the lives of others”981 or in self-defence or defence of others 
against imminent threat of death or serious injury.”982 Accordingly, adopting this approach to 
classifying defensive PMSCs would suggest that while the use of force is not entirely precluded it 
would only be utilised in the direct protection of property and their personal safety and according 
to the principles of proportionality. The expectation, therefore, is that the use of physical force will 
be the secondary and minimal function, with their presence as a deterrent being their primary role. 
When force is utilised it is expected that this will, barring exceptional circumstances, be non-lethal 
and severely limited, for example restraining until a public security organisation can assume control 
of the situation. Within this framework, several groups of PMSC would clearly fall within the 
defensive category, including the majority of European security guards. This would also include 
security at shopping centres, private residences and banks as well as cash transport guards, in effect 
accounting for a large majority of the private security sector.   
 
6.3(1)(b) Offensive PMSCs 
 The second group of PMSCs this thesis terms offensive PMSCs. These represent the most 
fundamentally violent contractors; in particular, they are distinguishable by the requirement that 
rather than reacting to provocation, offensive PMSCs utilise violence to pursue their goals. 
Offensive PMSCs therefore operate with the specific aim of using the violence at their disposal to 
further or enhance their employer’s interests against the local population. In establishing whether 
the PMSC is to be classed as offensive, this thesis utilises the approach adopted by the ICRC in 
establishing whether an individual is undertaking direct participation in hostilities. While the legal 
implications of this, are limited to cases in which the conduct takes places during an armed 
conflict,983 for the purpose of this typology the guidance is equally illustrative in cases not reaching 
                                                     
981 United Nations Code of Conduct (n 977) at Article 3, Commentary (c). 
982 Ibid at Paragraph 9. 
983 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Law 
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Reference Reports, February 2009) 
<https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf> accessed 23 July 2017 at 11 (the Interpretive Guidance 
is concerned with IHL only.). [Hereinafter ICRC Direct Participation Guidance] 
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the status of an armed conflict.984 According to established interpretations of direct participation in 
hostilities, a non-member of the armed forces will be considered to be directly participating in 
hostilities if they fulfil a three-step, cumulative criteria. First, they actions must adversely affect the 
operations of capacities of the opposition group, or alternatively inflict death, injury, or destruction 
on persons or objects protected against direct attack.985 Secondly, there must be a “direct causal link 
between the act and the harm.”986 Finally, the actions must be specifically designed to directly cause 
the required threshold of harm and be directly in support of the party they are acting for.”987 It is 
clear that adopting this criteria will allow the typology to distinguish those PMSC activities which 
rely upon the actual use of violence to advance their employers cause. Furthermore, while this 
definition is taken from IHL it is clear that PMSCs have acted in a manner capable of fulfilling 
these general requirements outside of official armed conflicts. There is significant evidence of 
PMSCs using this type of violence against local populations in relation to disputed land, or the 
securing of secure mining concessions. Considering the Case Studies, the use of local militia by 
Shell,988 in order to gain community drilling concessions would class as an exercise of offensive 
violence. The militia’s actions in demolishing homes and the deaths that resulted from the violence 
would fulfil the three requirements for direct participation.989 Similarly, in the case of Freeport Mine 
in West Papua, the Indonesian security forces were paid over $41 million by the Freeport McMoRan 
mining company, alongside a further $9.6 million to private guards.990 Their activities included 
forcibly removing the indigenous population from disputed mining lands and destroying their 
homes while they have been implicated in the death and serious injury of a large number of the 
local population.991 This demonstrates that while the legal implications are not relevant outside of 
                                                     
984 See for example Jamie A. Williamson, ‘Challenges of Twenty-First Century Conflicts: A Look at Direct Participation 
in Hostilities (2010) 20(457) Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 458 (discussing the difficulties posed by 
asymmetric or guerrilla warfare and terrorism to the strict interpretation of hostilities and direct participation.  
985 ICRC Direct Participation Guidance (n 861) at 46. 
986 Ibid. 
987 Ibid. 
988 See Supra at Section 4(2)(2)(d) “Local Milita” 
989 Ibid. 
990 Joanna Kyriakakis, ‘Freeport In West Papua: Bringing Corporations to Account for International Human Rights 
Abuses Under Australian Criminal Law and Tort (2005) 31(1) Monash University Law Review 95, 101; ‘Paying for 
Protection: The Freeport Mine and the Indonesian Security Forces (Global Witness Report, July 2005) 1-5. 
991 Paying for Protection, ibid at 9-12; Assessment Report on the Conflict on the West Papua Region of Indonesia: ‘An 
Overview of the Issues and Recommendations for the UK and the International Community’ (Politics of Papua Project, 
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situations amounting to armed conflicts, the test for direct participation remains a relevant 
consideration outside of armed conflict situations for distinguishing the actions of PMSCs.  
 
6.3(2)(c) Reactive PMSCs  
The final group of PMSCs that this thesis identifies are those who fall between defensive 
and offensive PMSCS, which this terms “reactive PMSCs.” Like defensive PMSCs, reactive 
violence is premised upon the use of violence only when provoked, however, within this framework 
it is differentiated by two characteristics that present greater issues for the protection of human 
rights and the legitimate control of coercive violence. These issues manifest primarily from the 
effect the difference in the PMSCs violence and the reduction in their ability balance and protect 
the human rights of the local population against the interests of their employer.  
  
The first of these differences relates to the level of violence required to elicit a violent 
response. Whilst defensive violence would require the direct protection of violence against the 
property of people, reactionary violence could relate to non-violent provocation. The second 
identifying feature is the level of violence used in retaliation to the provocation. Thus, whilst 
defensive PMSCs may be armed, if the use of potentially lethal violence is utilised in cases outside 
of direct self-defence, the PMSC must be considered a reactive PMSC. This means that we can 
clearly identify contractors who respond to either violent or non-violent with force disproportionate 
to the threat or risk posed as reactive PMSCs. A common example of this would involve the use of 
a PMSC to break up a non-violent protest or strike by workers. Considering the case studies, when 
the Peruvian police, under contract with Newmont mining,992 used lethal violence and enhanced 
interrogation against non-violent protesters attempting to block access to the site, they were not 
acting proportionately and with the use of force as a last resort. Equally, however, as they were 
                                                     
University of Warwick, July 2016) 19- 28; Kylie McKenna, ‘Corporate Security Practices and Human Rights in West 
Papua’ (2015) 15(4) Conflict, Security & Development 359.  
992 See Supra at Section 4.2(1)(d) 
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reacting, even if disproportionately, to an illegal activity and as result these acts would not be 
sufficient to amount to direct participation. Specifically, as a reaction to a provocation, these would 
fall foul of the requirement of being conducted specifically for the benefit of one party.993 
 
 
6.3(2) Identity of the contracting firm  
Having established the level of violence used by a contractor, the second factor that this 
framework proposes, relates to the type of the PMSC, with this identity valuable in understanding 
the nature of the relationship between the PMSC and the public. This understanding assists in 
developing an accurate classification with several characteristics providing a dynamic method of 
categorisation. Particularly, identifying the type of PMSC utilised can highlight potential issues and 
conflicts within the interests of the parties involved, and provides an opportunity to evaluate the 
potential risk of human rights abuses by the PMSC. Two identifying characteristics are useful to 
establishing a classification.  
 
6.3(2)(a) Location of the PMSC 
 The first characteristic is the geographical proximity of the PMSCs organisation, to the 
work they are employed to undertake. This criterion is significant for two reasons. The first of these 
is that like the employer, a local PMSC is more likely to be responsive to the needs and rights of 
the local population. As with the location of the employers, this consideration is not itself decisive. 
However, it provides an increased risk for two factors. The first of these is that psychological studies 
have concluded that levels of empathy decrease between different races and cultures with the effects 
becoming particularly prevalent within law enforcement activities.994 This phenomenon has often 
                                                     
993 See Supra at Section 6.3(2)(b)  
994 Among many excellent studies see Brad W. Smith, Malcolm D. Holmes, ‘Police Use of Excessive Force in Minority 
Communities: A Test of the Minority Threat, Place, and Community Accountability Hypotheses’ (2014) 61(1) Social 
Problems 83; Nick A. Theobald, Donald P. Haider-Markel, ‘Race, Bureaucracy, and Symbolic Representation: 
Interactions between Citizens and Police’ (2009) 19(2) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 409. 
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led to forces from different ethnic background being implicated in atrocities so that the use of forces 
of different religions, ethnic or tribal groups has been resorted to in order to avoid conscientious 
objections. This effect can be seen when examining the use of security forces during the Arab 
Spring; significant research has proposed a direct correlation between the use of sectarian militaries 
and unsuccessful revolutionary attempts.995 For example, the Egyptian army, comprised primarily 
of local Sunni Muslims with little sectarian separation from the population, refused to fire upon 
protesters when ordered to do so following a popular uprising against then President Hosni 
Mubarak.996 In comparison, during the uprising in Bahrain, a majority Shia country, large numbers 
of foreign security forces were imported from neighbouring states and Pakistan, specifically 
Sunni.997 Although direct causation is inherently difficult to attribute, it is unsurprising that the 
response of the Bahraini mercenary forces to the protests has been considered to be a particularly 
brutal crackdown.998 Indeed, in the current catastrophic Arab uprising in Syria, the ability of the 
Syrian regime to remain in control has been almost universally attributed in large part to both the 
ability to draw upon sectarian divisions within the country,999 and the use of Shia Iranian and 
Hezbollah forces to suppress protests and opposition forces.1000 An arguably even more startling 
example of this occurred in 2011 when the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Mohamed bin 
Zayed al Nahyan, paid £529million to Erik Prince, former CEO of Blackwater, to set up and staff 
‘Reflex Responses’, a private security firm used by the UAE to "thwart internal revolt, conduct 
                                                     
995 See e.g. Heiko Wimmen, ‘Divisive Rule: Sectarianism and Power Maintenance in the Arab Spring: Bahrain, Iraq, 
Lebanon and Syria’ (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, March 2014) <http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2014_RP04_wmm.pdf> accessed 25 July 2015; Housam 
Darwisheh, Trajectories and Outcomes of the “Arab Spring”: Comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria (Institute of 
Developing Economies, March 2014) <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/456.pdf> accessed 25 
July 2015; Daniel Silverman, ‘The Arab Military in the Arab Spring: Agent of Continuity or Change? A Comparative 
Analysis of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria,’ (APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, 2012) 
<http://politicalscience.osu.edu/intranet/cprw/Silverman%20CPRW%202012.pdf.> accessed 25 July 2015. 
996 See Jean-Pierre Filiu, The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising (Oxford University Press, 
2011) 57; see also Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick, ‘Mubarak Refuses to Step Down, Stoking Revolt’s Fury and 
Resolve’ New York Times (New York, 10 February 2011) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/world/middleeast/11egypt.html?_r=0.> accessed 14 July 2015.  
997 Filiu (n 996) at 81-83; Wimmen (n 995) at 6-11.  
998 Filiu (n 996) at, at 81-83;  
999 Maya Bhardwa, ‘Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War’ (2012) 1 
Washington  University International Review 76; Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War’ (RAND 
Corporation  Report, 2014); Heiko Wimmen, supra note 120, at 6-21-23. 
1000 Benedetta Berti and Jonathan Paris, ‘Beyond Sectarianism: Geopolitics, Fragmentation, and the Syrian Civil War’ 
(2014) 16(4) Strategic Assessment 21, 25-27.  
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special operations and defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from attacks."1001 According to widely 
reported documents seen by a number of media organisations, this originally 800 person force, 
increasing up to 7,000 was to consist only of foreign “non-muslim” troops.1002 On a more practical 
level, forces removed from the local population are likely to be distant from the views of the local 
population and able to insulate themselves from local pressures or dangers to themselves and 
potentially even their families. As a result, they are more likely to operate in direct confrontation 
with the local communities, thereby increasing the potential for disproportionate violence, and 
posing a greater risk of local human rights violations.  
 
6.3(2)(b) Public or Private Contractor 
Whilst this distinction may seem contrary to the notion of the privatisation of violence, as 
the two case studies above suggest, it is clear that within the private security sector, nominally 
public security forces are increasingly important actors. Specifically, two scenarios repeatedly 
occur within security operations. The first of these is the growing use of public groups as PMSCs; 
through the increasingly common practice of private companies to provide funding and material 
support in exchange for direct control over public forces. This scenario has been particularly 
frequent where extractive industries operate in developing and increasingly neo-liberal populations 
of South America and South-East Asia.1003 Severe, ideologically motivated financial cuts have left 
the police and army budgets insufficient for operational needs, with the result that private 
companies increasingly making up the shortfall. This poses a particular difficulty for the protection 
of human rights and the local population as rather than a PMSC operating in addition to the local 
public forces, the two are in essence one and the same. As both the case studies demonstrated this 
                                                     
1001 Mark Mazetti and Emily Hager, ‘Secret Desert Force Set up by Blackwater’s Founder’ New York Times (New York, 
14 May 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html.> accessed 18 March 2016.   
1002 Ibid.  
1003  See for example John Haller, ‘Overcoming the Past; History and  Transition of Indonesian Internal  Security 
Infrastructure’ )Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA), University of Pittsburgh 2006-34); Charles 
Hawksley, ‘Papua New Guinea at Thirty: Late Decolonisation and the Political Economy of Nation-Building’ (2006) 
27(1) Third World Quarterly 161; ‘Paying for Protection: The Freeport Mine and the Indonesian Security Forces (Global 
Witness Report, July 2005). 
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inevitably raises the possibility that those employed to police and protect the local population, 
instead work for groups whose interests can be in direct opposition. Furthermore, in such 
circumstances, when an individual’s rights are violated or threatened by the PMSCs actions, or 
these actions step beyond legality, there will be no immediate recourse or protection. With the 
police in particular, their control over the operation of the criminal justice system can pose 
considerable difficulties for individuals seeking restoration or justice.  
 
Equally problematic is the sub-contracting of public forces to secondary countries. In this 
situation, governments essentially hire or lease the violent potential of another nation as a 
replacement for, or supplement to, their own. This scenario clearly poses the same risks as the 
previously mentioned non-local PMSC. In particular, due to the high probability that such requests 
are made with a political or sectarian motivation, the risk of their use being tied to the suppression 
of local populations is increased as is the chance that they are expected to operate with a level of 
violence that the local public forces will be unwilling to use. The most notable current example of 
this occurred when in 2013, Colombia complained to the UAE that it was losing most of its senior 
soldiers to the UAE based PMSC “Reflex Responses”1004  without any compensation for their 
training. As a result, an agreement was reached whereby the UAE would pay Colombia to hire the 
troops, as well as paying the troops themselves with the result that 1,500 Colombian army troops 
are currently "loaned out" to the UAE.1005 This use of foreign forces drew particular international 
attention when it was revealed that hundreds of the forces had been deployed by the UAE in Yemen, 
including 450 Latin American soldiers,1006 whilst the commander of the elite force is a retired 
Australian Special Forces commander.1007 A similar agreement has been in place between Saudi 
                                                     
1004 Mark Mazzetti and Emily B Hagermay, ‘Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder’ New York Times (New 
York, 14 May 2011) < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html> accessed 30 June 2016. 
1005 Melanie Bencosme, ‘Future of Colombia’s 1.5k Troops in the United Arab Emirates Back on the Table’ Colombia 
Reports (Bogota, 20 June 2014) <http://colombiareports.co/colombian-troops-uae-talks-time/> accessed 14 July 2016.  
1006 Emily Hager and Mark Mazzetti, ‘Emirates Secretly Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen Fight’ New York Times 
(New York, 25 November 2015) <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/emirates-secretly-sends-
colombian-mercenaries-to-fight-in-yemen.html> accessed 14 July 2016.  
1007 Rori Donaghy, ‘Revealed: The Mercenaries Commanding UAE Forces in Yemen’ Middle East Eye (Dec. 23, 2015), 
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/mercenaries-charge-uae-forces-fighting-yemen-764309832> accessed 10 July 
2016.  
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Arabia and Pakistan for over a decade,1008 while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has been 
employed by Bashar Al-Assad to supplement the Syrian Arab Army which has been devastated by 
the Syrian civil war.1009  
 
 
6.3(3) Identity of the Employer 
The final factor concerns the identity of the employer and raises the issue of funding, 
specifically, where and from whom the funding comes. This information provides the basis for 
establishing the interests being protected and highlights potential issues and conflicts within these 
interests. As such this information is informative in understanding the level of accountability that 
the employer will feel to the local population, and their ability to ignore and override the interests 
of the local population. Two factors in particular provide the greatest indicators as to where the 
interests being protected lie and the threat to the rights of the local population.  
 
6.3(3)(a) Geographical location 
The first criterion is whether the actor employing the PMSC is local or external to the area 
in which the security operation is undertaken. In particular, this information is central to 
establishing whether the interests being protected are held by an organisation with links to the local 
community most likely affected by the actions of the PMSC. Whilst location alone is not conclusive 
as to the extent to which the organisation reflects and is responsive to the views and rights of the 
local community, it provides a useful preliminary consideration. External actors, in particular 
foreign or transnational organisations, are more likely to be removed from the views of the local 
                                                     
1008 Colin Freeman and Taimur Khan, ‘Pakistan in talks with Saudi Arabia to send combat troops to protect the kingdom’ 
The National (Dubai, 13 March 2017) (while numbers are kept confidential it is believed there are at least 70,000 
Ppakistani troops in Saudi Arabia at any one time). 
1009 Bozorgmehr Sharafedin, Ellen Francis, Iran's Revolutionary Guards reaps economic rewards in Syria Reuters (Beirut, 
19 January 2017) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/irans-revolutionary-guards-reaps-
economic-rewards-in-syria-idUSKBN1531TO> accessed 12 April 2017. 
 
254 
 
population, and furthermore subject to interests, particularly financial interests, unrelated to the 
local population. Due to this remoteness, external actors are more capable of insulating their 
operation from local pressures and therefore pose a greater potential for infringing or violating local 
human rights. Shell’s operations in the Joinkrana area of the Niger Delta evidence how the 
geographic isolation from an area can allow local views and pressures to be ignored with 
impunity.1010  Similarly, the case study of Yanacocha indicates how multi-nationals within the 
extractive industry often fail to engage with local populations increasing the likelihood of 
community protests and conflict.  
 
6.3(3)(b) Public/Private bodies 
Alongside this geographical categorisation, the most useful distinguishing feature of a 
PMSC employer lies in whether the actor is a public or private organisation. The importance of this 
split is twofold. The first of these lies once again in identifying the interests being protected by the 
PMSC. Specifically, if exercised by a public body, the issue is whether the interests are held in 
theory for the public good. By contrast, a private actor is unlikely to hold concern for the 
considerations of the local population in relation to the interest held. Directly related to this is the 
employer’s accountability to the population affected by the PMSC activity. For example, it is clear 
that local public authorities are more directly accountable to the local population, whilst private 
actors are accountable directly to the company’s owners or shareholders. As such, the rights of 
individuals are in theory more likely to be better protected by public bodies responsible to their 
citizens.  
  
                                                     
1010 See Supra at Section 4.3(2)(b) 
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6.4 Classes of PMSCs – Offensive 
6.4(1) Mercenaries 
The first reduction within this classification is the grouping of all PMSCs sharing the 
characteristics of offensive operations and external contractors, regardless of further distinctions, 
into a single classification that this study defines as mercenaries. Whilst mercenary is 
simultaneously a specific and vague term, this thesis proposes this to be both the most suitable and 
accurate classification for this type of PMSC, drawing from both common usage and legal parlance 
with reference to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries. Notably, this group does not distinguish between actors based upon who 
they operate on behalf of, nor whether the contractors are employed by a private or public 
organisation. Taking into account the rationale for identifying these criteria within the typology and 
the theoretical and historical framework for these choices, this study concludes that the externality 
of the contractor and level of coercion utilised provides a sufficiently related group of classes that 
they can functionally be considered within a single class. The first of these criteria is that the 
contractor be external, the fundamental requirement for all interpretations of mercenaries, which 
draws upon the representation of mercenaries as a form of externalising violence. For the purpose 
of this typology, the requirement of externality also negates the consideration of public or private 
contractors. As the purpose of considering this was to identify whether the private employment of 
the contractors undermined their public commitments, however, if the contractors are external this 
will not be applicable. The second element of this requirement is the use of offensive violence in 
exercising their coercive power over the local population. Adopting the theoretical framework 
established for this study, the consistent use of this high level of coercive violence is instructive in 
identifying these contractors as operating against the interests of the local population. The use of 
offensive violence suggests that the PMSCs are seeking to support, or sustain a “tyrannical” or 
“purely violent” regimes to suppress a conflicting form of legitimate power. This also ensures that 
regardless of the employer, their consistent reliance upon this level of violence negates any public 
accountability, with the identity of the employer therefore not being instructive in distinguishing 
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between these groups. As such, these two characteristics, location of contractor and level of 
violence, are sufficient alone to constitute a class of PMSCs with this class possessing the 
characteristics that have been so central to ensuring mercenaries are illicit within international law. 
Specifically, this class clearly represents an attempt to use a foreign force as an instrument to 
suppress the democratic control over the states coercive violence. This combination fundamentally 
alters the state monopoly over violence and undermines the social contract by externalising the 
exercise of coercive violence, circumventing public accountability and supporting the use of 
coercive violence to exert domination over the population.  
 
In considering this class, however, it is important to note that this group does not correspond 
directly to the current accepted legal definition of mercenary. It is clear that these external PMSCs 
would fulfil the requirement of not being a member of the party to the conflict, and is nor a “member 
of the armed forces of a party to the conflict” while being motivated by financial private gain1011. 
However, if adopting the purely legal definition of a mercenary, as per the Mercenary Convention, 
some of the cases identified within this class would have difficulty with the requirement of an 
“armed conflict.”1012 This is a result of the typology seeking to redress the arbitrary distinction 
between “military contractors” and “security contractors,” solely on the basis of whether the 
contractor operates in non-conflict zones under the definition within International Humanitarian 
Law.1013 In particular, with reference to the strict interpretation of non-international armed conflict 
adopted in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which requires the conflict to occur 
between the “High Contracting Party… armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory 
as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
                                                     
1011 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, A/RES/44/34 72nd 
plenary meeting, 4 December 1989, 44/34. Article 1, sections (b)(c) and (d) 
1012 Ibid at Article 1, Section (a) “in order to fight in an armed conflict.” 
1013  See ICRC, ‘How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’ (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Opinion Paper, March 2008) <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-
armed-conflict.pdf> accessed 15 August 2016. 
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Protocol"1014. As previously discussed in Section 6.1(2) many of the areas and situations these 
offensive PMSCs operate would not reach this level of organisation and intensity.1015 Similarly 
instructive would be the crackdown on protests in Bahrain in 2011, in which the Bahraini 
Government relied heavily upon foreign forces recruited from Pakistan and Jordan to violently 
suppress pro-democracy protests.1016 The resulting clampdown killed over 200 and injured more 
than 3,000 suggesting that the approach taken would easily fulfil the criterion of offensive violence. 
Despite this, as the pro-democracy movement was a spontaneous, unorganised protest as part of the 
wider Arab Spring and as a result the situation could not have reached the threshold of a non-
international armed conflict under IHL. 1017  Despite this, the UNs own Working Group on 
Mercenaries examined the situation in Bahrain.1018 It is clear therefore that even within institutions 
of international law, this definition of mercenaries has become strained, with it frequently being 
condemned as unworkable. It is proposed therefore that within this typological study, the 
application of the term mercenary to external actors who undertake offensive actions is more 
workable, precise and accurate. This class is distinguished by the degree to which coercive violence 
is used to suppress the local population, and represents a form of coercive violence which is 
fundamentally incompatible with protecting human rights and ensuring accountability. 
 
6.4(2) Warlord Militia 
The second reduced grouping within this classification relates to local PMSCs who operate 
in an offensive manner. Similar to mercenaries this grouping would apply regardless of their 
employer, or whether the contractors are publically or privately employed although their position 
as nationals would exclude them from consideration as mercenaries and therefore require a unique 
                                                     
1014 Additional Protocol II, art. 1, para. 1 
1015 Supra at Section 6.1(2) noting the different conclusions of the ICC in relation to violence in Northern Nigeria against 
Boko Haram, and Southern Nigeria in the Niger Delta.  
1016 Ahmed K Al-Rawi, ‘Sectarianism and the Arab Spring: Framing the popular protests in Bahrain’ (2015) 11(1) Global 
Media and Communication 25; Thomas Davies; Holly Eva Ryan; Alejandro Milci, Protest, Social Movements, and 
Global Democracy Since 2011: New Perspectives (Emerald, 2016) 
1017 See Section 5.4(1) for a detailed analysis of the requirements for an armed conflict. 
1018  
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class. This typology therefore proposes that this group of PMSCs would operate under the title of 
“warlords”. While the terminology of the proposed classifications is clearly secondary in 
importance to accuracy and usefulness, it is important that the language is appropriate. Therefore it 
is important to consider the how “warlords” may accurately describe the type of PMSC. It is 
important to note that to date, “warlord” has not corresponded to an exact legal definition and has 
rather been associated with politics, sociology and international relations as a result it is its use 
within other disciplines and its common understanding that provides the most suitable basis for 
examining this. As a starting point, Merriam-Webster provides a functioning attempt at defining 
warlords as being “a leader of a military group” who also either does, or attempts to, “exercise civil 
power by force.”1019 Within political science, “warlords” have increasingly been identified as actors 
who utilise coercive violence to exercise a form of authority, in particular where traditional power 
structures have disappeared such as those found in weak states.1020 Additionally, the term militia is 
taken to mean a military force raised from within the local population. Both of these definitions 
represent and identify the key operative characteristics of PMSCs within this grouping of offensive 
but local actors. Considering this, it is suggested that “warlord militia” is a satisfactory classification 
and type.  
 
These types of contractors provide particular difficulties in terms of regulation. As with 
mercenaries, the disproportionate use of violence illustrates that the contractors are acting in an 
attempt to violently coerce the local population in order to substitute submission for legitimate 
authority. This type of PMSC would draw parallels with Hannah Arendt’s regime of terror, with 
“the barrel of a gun” replacing legitimate power to enforce “perfect obedience.”1021 Any attempt to 
enforce authority through coercive violence in this manner creates an immediate threat to the 
protection of individual’s rights.1022 Furthermore, the use of this level of violence would ordinarily 
                                                     
1019  ‘Warlord’ (Merriam-Webster) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/warlord?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld> accessed  17 April 2016. 
1020 Kimberly Zisk Marten, Warlords : Strong-Arm Brokers In Weak States (Cornell University Press, 2012) At 1 -30 
(describing Warlords as a Phenomena and explaining how they relate to weak states). 
1021 Arendt (n 107) at 98. 
1022 Arendt (n 107) at 97. 
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be expected to be considered unlawful in normal circumstances. As a result, contractors falling 
within this group would pose identical difficulties regardless of the identity of the employer. For 
example, the issues posed by Shell’s use of local militias in the Niger Delta to control oil production 
are largely replicated by the use of “civilian militias” supported by the Philippines Government 
against local indigenous populations1023  or even the Indonesian government in East Timor to 
suppress pro-independence East Timor at the turn of the 21st century.1024 Indeed, as these examples 
demonstrate, the presence of these types of PMSCs usually indicates weakness or the complete 
failure of traditional state functions within the area in which they are operating. The employer 
therefore, whether private or public, could not claim legitimate authority over the population and 
would be utilising PMSCs in an attempt to suppress the legitimate views of the local population.  
 
 
6.5 Classes of PMSCs – Reactive 
The second stage within this reduction process is to consider those PMSCs who engage in 
reactive violence. These provide more difficulty in establishing groupings that are capable of 
distinguishing the variables that can accurately identify the operative features and potential 
difficulties posed, whilst remaining concise enough to be practically effective. Unlike those PMSCs 
operating in an offensive manner, the form of coercion utilised does not immediately indicate that 
the contractors are being utilised to suppress the local population. Instead, therefore, this reduction 
process must consider the relationships between the actors in order to establish whether, or in what 
manner the provision of private coercive violence is being utilised to alter power structures, or 
community relations. Furthermore, this requires a more complete consideration of the public/private 
split that can occur within both contractors and employers in order to establish how the use of 
                                                     
1023 Jim Gomez, Philippines to Investigate Militia Forces Linked to Attacks, The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, 27 September 
2015) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/27/philippines-investigate-militia-forces-linked-attacks.html> 
accessed 13 August 2016. 
1024  See Backgrounder: The Indonesian Army and Civilian Militias in East Timor (Human Rights Watch, 1999) 
<https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/1999/apr/etmilitia.htm> accessed 13 August 2016. 
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PMSCs is interacting with traditional conceptions of state authority and the corresponding 
mechanisms of accountability.  
 
6.5(1) Private Military Contractors (PMCs) 
The first grouping of contractors to be identified within this section comprises those 
contractors who are used to supplement the national military/security services through the use of 
either external contractors, or local privately employed contractors. This typology proposes those 
classes of contractors who are utilised in this manner be termed Private Military Contractors and 
grouped accordingly. As opposed to the generic term often utilised, the proposal here is for a 
specific class of PMSCs defined by the level of violence they use and their role in fulfilling 
traditional state functions in particular military or quasi-military roles. The first point to note is that 
this definition applies only to PMSCs who act in a manner that places them within the reactive form 
of violence. This ensures that PMCs represent more legitimate forms of contractors in comparison 
to the exercising offensive violence as discussed in the previous section. As such, they would not 
fulfil the criteria to be classified as mercenaries. Regardless of this however, the use of external, or 
private contractors for the provision of coercive violence still poses problems for traditional notions 
of the state monopoly on violence and civil control of coercive violence. In establishing the classes 
that would be within this grouping, this study includes all external contractors who are employed 
by a public authority, regardless of their location of the employer. While this may originally appear 
counter-intuitive, this approach suggests that when utilised by a public authority, any contractors 
operating within this level of violence are undertaking a function that is fundamentally 
governmental, regardless of their externality to the location.  
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Notable examples of PMSCs who would fall within this grouping would include 
Blackwater and Aegis as utilised by the Coalition during the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.1025 This 
approach would have prevented the two-tier system of justice that allowed many contractors to 
avoid disciplinary measures when corresponding military personnel did not.1026 However, as this 
classification would include the use of foreign forces to supplement the internal security apparatus 
it would similarly include contractors employed by the home state, with the Afghanistan 
government increasingly relying upon PMSCs in order to fulfil the security roles previously 
undertaken by Coalition forces.  
 
In order to ensure that there remains equal accountability this approach would suggest 
returning to a traditional acceptance that all people undertaking these governmental roles should 
fall under governmental authority, including those employed in roles sub-contracted out to private 
contractors. This thesis proposes this approach to ensure that States, and governments, are more 
clearly considered to be in control of, and exercising, authority over forces, which while not 
regularised into the military or armed police are operating under a similar authority or military style 
command. Furthermore, unlike some current proposals for regulation, this does not assume an 
illegitimacy to the outsourcing of these roles and instead takes into consideration the legitimate and 
valid reasons that public authorities may sub-contract out these roles. In particular, it accepts the 
positive benefits employing external PMCs can bring, in particular to countries struggling with 
weak governance and lack of trained or capable citizens. However, this nuanced approach offers 
the significant benefit of ensuring that these PMCs are explicitly discussed within the framework 
of national security forces, offering an approach that directly addresses the use of PMSCs to 
                                                     
1025 Jennifer K. Elsea, Moshe Schwartz & Kennon H. Nakamura, ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal 
Status, and Other Issues’ (CSR Report for Congress,  Aug 2008) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf> accessed 
3 January 2015.  
1026 The most significant among these was Abu Ghraib, where contractors who acted directly alongside military personelle 
could not be held liable while the military personnel involved received custodial sentences. See e.g. Mark W. Bina, 
‘Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountability After Abu Ghraib’ (2005) 38 John Marshall Law Review 1237;  
‘Accountability for Abu Ghraib Torture by Private Military Contractors’ (Center for Constitutional Rights, January 2015) 
<http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/PMC%20factsheet%20january%202015.pdf.> accessed 3 January 
2016. Other instances in which military personnel were not implicated but would have been disciplined for similar actions 
were frequent most notably at Nissour Square see e.g. Peter W. Singer, The Dark Truth About Blackwater, (Oct 2, 2007) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-dark-truth-about-blackwater/> accessed 4 January 2016. 
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circumvent traditional notions of state responsibility and would require governments to accept 
command control over the actions of their legitimate sub-contractors. As a result, instead of 
requiring a new regulatory framework to be developed, these contractors should be regulated in the 
same manner as their corresponding public counterparts. This would ensure there is no regulatory 
or accountability benefit to employing private contractors over public contractors, while retaining 
the possibility for states to utilise a positive resource when applied in the correct manner.  
  
6.5(2) Private Paramilitary Contractors (PPCs) 
The second class of PMSCs to be considered within those which operate in a reactive form 
of coercive violence are those who either through the contractor, or employer, retain an external 
element but which cannot be regulated by virtue of the public nature of their employer. This 
grouping would, therefore, include those contractors who are external to the host population but are 
employed by local companies, alongside local private contractors employed by an external 
company. This study proposes these privately employed contractors which operate in parallel to the 
state security apparatus should be grouped within a class of contractors named Private Paramilitary 
Contractors.  Similarly, to PMC’s this group of contractors pose difficulties by virtue of the external 
influence exerted over their activities and the corresponding disconnect with the local population. 
As such, the important distinction with this class is that at least one organisational level, whether 
employer or contractor, is external to the community in which they are operating.  
 
Within the examples discussed within the preceding case studies, it is likely that Forza 
security provides the clearest example of these private paramilitary forces, with an external foreign 
company employing a locally based private force to provide security. Furthermore, this example 
provides an indication of the issues that repeatedly arise within these types of PMSC, with disregard 
for the local community or environment by the employer manifesting in overly violent actions. This 
type of PMSC is often therefore present in regions and situations in which there is widespread, local 
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opposition to the operations of the employer in the local area. As in the case of Forza security, this 
is often an issue concerning land and mineral rights in indigenous, or minority regions, where the 
financial benefits are not shared by the local population. Furthermore, in cases where local 
indigenous or minority groups are present, this type of PMSC increases the risk of the operations 
undermining the right to self-determination, and resource sovereignty1027 of the local population. 
Related to this, the use of these types of contractors is particularly prevalent in situations in which 
the rights to freedom of expression and assembly, in the form of protests, often in relation to 
environmental or economic concerns, are infringed upon by a violent crackdown on protestors. 
 
Considering the conceptual framework influential in designing this typology this 
disconnect between the community and the employer and contractor significantly increases the 
possibility that these contractors will utilise coercive violence in a manner contrary to interests of 
the local population. In doing so, these contractors would be considered to be exercising a form of 
violent authority over the population, undermining or the legitimate authority of the local 
government. These issues highlight the importance of externality as a factor in identifying and 
grouping PMSCs within this type, with the ability of the local community to influence the decision-
making process, or being prevented from doing so by coercive violence, central to the issues posed 
by this type of PMSC. In particular, it is clear that the use of an external contractor by a private 
company increases the likelihood that local stakeholders are not being considered, or more likely 
are in opposition to the interests. Even reactive violence when employed either for external interests 
or by local employers who never the less feel the need to rely upon external contractors without a 
legal recourse is likely to undermine community interests. Furthermore, in these circumstances 
establishing accountability and imposing liability in cases where illegal acts have been committed 
can prove difficult. Unlike PMCs, these contractors cannot be considered to be acting under 
governmental authority, and therefore liability must be established beyond this. Attempts to 
                                                     
1027 Nicolaas Schrijver, ‘Self-Determination of People and Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, Right to 
Development’ (Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/RTDBook/PartIIChapter5.pdf.> accessed 12 December 2016. 
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regulate this form of contractor must consider the most appropriate form of liability, paying 
attention to those who are the most responsible for the contractor’s actions. Considering the high 
level of violence utilised, and the lack of direct accountability at government level, it must be 
considered that these PPCs require a higher level of scrutiny than similar PMSCs as they pose the 
possibility of exercising a degree of power over a region through the direct use of coercive violence. 
In particular, due to the private nature of these actors, any regulatory framework must specifically 
note the issues related to the right to self-determination, that can occur where private actors are able 
to exercise a degree of sovereignty over an area by virtue of coercive violence.  
 
6.5(3) Private Community Militia (PCM) 
The third class of PMSCs identified within the reactive class of coercive violence are those 
PMSCs whose operations rely upon local private contractors, working for local private employers. 
This thesis, drawing upon the local connotation of the term militia, proposes identifying and 
classifying these PMSCs as Private Community Militia. 
 
For this class of contractors two shared key characteristics make them a discrete proposition 
within the overall PMSCs classification system. The first of these is that both the contractors and 
the employers are based within the local community. Unlike, PMCs and PPFs, Private Community 
Militias are suggested to have much closer links to the community, with both the contractor and 
employer being local organisations. It is suggested therefore that these closer links with the local 
community would ordinarily ensure that the contractors are less inclined to utilise excessive force 
in dispensing their duties and furthermore that the employers, being based in the local community, 
are likely to face less community opposition. This combination of both locally based contractor and 
employer would particularly suggest that the use of violence is more likely to relate to smaller 
elements of the community, and the use of reactive violence is necessitated by the level of violence 
encountered. These forms of PMSCs are prevalent in a large number of countries, with South 
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America, in particular, experiencing a huge growth in these types of firms over the last two decades. 
Specifically, both Brazil and Argentina, where the police are often unable to provide adequate 
security for local businesses have large private community militias.1028 They are also increasingly 
prevalent throughout Africa, where economic growth and wealth gaps have not been accompanied 
by a similar growth in public security forces. Among the most notorious of these Private 
Community Militia are the aforementioned1029 O’odua People’s Congress and the Bakassi Boys.1030 
These semi-organised vigilante groups are employed by both local communities and companies to 
supplement the local police, who are considered insufficient and often plagued by corruption.1031 
Similarly, when the local police have proved incapable of discharging their duties, the local public 
authorities have employed these groups to restore community order. This has particularly been the 
case in areas affected by Boko Haram, with local councils preferring to employ local militias as 
security instead of relying upon federal police and army units which have a reputation for fleeing 
in the face of adversity.1032  
 
While the local nature of these contractors can be a restraining factor in ensuring the PCM 
act reasonably and proportionately in relation to the threats faced, it must be noted that this can also 
pose a direct threat to the protection of fundamental rights within the region. Specifically, the use 
                                                     
1028 Paulo Jorge Ribeiro & Rosane Oliveira, The Impact Of Militia Actions on Public Security Policies in Rio De Janeiro 
(Crime & Globalisation, Debate Papers, March 2010) < https://www.tni.org/files/download/CrimeGlobalization-
paper.pdf> accessed 16 February 2017; Luciana Araújo de Paula, ‘The ” Grey Zones ” of Democracy in Brazil: The ” 
Militia ” Phenomenon and Contemporary Security Issues in Rio de Janeiro’ (2015) Authoritarian Spaces, (Un)just 
Spaces? 8 < https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01508806/document> accessed 7 May 2017.  
1029 Nigeria Case Study, Supra at Section 4.2(2) 
1030 1030 Adejoh Pius Enechojo, ‘Assessment of the Performance of Infromal Structures of Community Crime Control in 
Metropolitan Lagos’ (2013) 14 British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 37, 45. 
1031  Chris Udeze, ‘Addressing the Problem of Vigilante Operation in Anambra State’ 
<https://www.academia.edu/8877692/Addressing_th_problem_of_vigilante_operation_in_Anambra_state_Nigeria> 
accessed 23 June 2017; Chinazor Queen Umeobika, ‘Synergy Of The Local Vigilante Group And The Police In Anambra 
State: A Proactive Step To Combat Crime’ (2012) 3 Nnamdi Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and 
Jurisprudence 182. 
1032 Adebisi Kolawole Shittu, ‘A Conceptual Examination of Militia Movements and Challenges to Socio- Economic 
Development in Nigeria’ (2013) 14(6) IOSR Journal of Business and Management 19 <http://iosrjournals.org/iosr-
jbm/papers/Vol14-issue6/E01462937.pdf> accessed 23 March 2017);  Eromo Egbejule, ‘They’re Defeating Boko Haram 
But are They Nigeria’s Next Security Threat?’ (Integrated Regional Information Networks, 22 August 2016) 
<https://www.irinnews.org/feature/2016/08/22/they%E2%80%99re-defeating-boko-haram-are-they-
nigeria%E2%80%99s-next-security-threat> accessed 22 March 2017; Nigerian Town Looks To Militias For Salvation 
From Boko Haram - Not Africa's Once 'Mighty Army' Mail and Guardian Africa (17 November 2014) 
<http://mgafrica.com/article/2014-11-16-nigerian-town-looks-to-militias-for-salvation-from-boko-haram-not-africas-
once-mighty-army> accessed 23 March 2017. 
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of community-based militia can exacerbate community tensions in particular in cases where ethnic 
or religious minorities are excluded or side-lined. The case of Nigeria’s community militias 
highlighted this with tribes using these militias to harass and attack rival tribes, often using trumped-
up allegations to build animosity between the groups.1033 Similarly, both Christian and Muslim 
minorities have complained that majority religious-based community militia have persecuted them 
and been responsible for sectarian attacks.1034 As such, while community-based security is generally 
more representative of the local community, this does not prevent them being utilised in a manner 
that negatively affects the lives of the members of the community.  
 
Considering this, it is important to note the second key characteristics of PCMs is that the 
contractors should be privately employed. This is relevant to any attempt to classify these 
contractors for the purpose of regulation as it results in a force exercising coercive violence parallel 
to the official state security forces. As private contractors, the state authority over the contractors is 
exercised indirectly through regulation and legal accountability. Within this typology, this is 
particularly notable as it distinguishes the form of regulation required for these types of PMSCs, to 
that for otherwise similar types of PMSCs. Unlike PPFs, the home state is entirely responsible for 
the legal regulation and accountability for PCMs, however, unlike the other locally based PMSCs, 
the state does not necessarily exercise any direct control over their operations. Thus, two significant 
issues remain within the Private Community Militia model that any attempt to regulate should be 
focused upon. The first of these is that any adequate form of legal regulation of Private Community 
militia relies heavily upon a fair and transparent public justice system, with all components of the 
community equally protected. This is necessary to ensure that all members of the community can 
rely upon the justice system for the protection from and accountability for these contractors as well 
as compensation in cases where the contractors may have breached their legal rights. Essential to 
                                                     
1033 Egbejule, Ibid. 
1034 Elijah Okon John, & Maurice John Akpabio, ‘Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria and the Need for Moral 
and Political Solutions’ (2016) 15 Journal of Culture, Society and Development 46, 47-49 
<http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JCSD/article/viewFile/28124/28870> accessed  23 March 2017; Atare Otite, ‘Ethnic 
Militia Threat to Democracy and Security in Nigeria’ (2012) 3(4) Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social 
Sciences 809.  
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this however, is the requirement that the government and legal system are capable of exercising 
authority over the militias. For any attempts at regulation or accountability to be satisfactory, there 
must be adequate and effective enforcement techniques to ensure that the PCMs remains within 
lawful and proportionate means when exercising coercive violence.  
 
The problems posed by this type of contractor, therefore, are particularly relevant if there 
is not a sufficiently robust rule of law in the region. One of the consequences evident in areas where 
there is insufficient enforcement has been the propensity for PCMs to switch between levels of 
violence if community resistance is encountered. Evidence has repeatedly shown that these private 
community militias can quickly transform into forces that closely resemble warlords when allowed 
to exercise outside or above the law. This problem has recently been highlighted by the difficulties 
faced in Venezuela, where local authorities had employed community militia to supplement the 
national police and army in maintaining state security. However, following political upheaval in 
early 2014, these community militia became essential to the violent crackdown on pro-democracy 
protests. 1035  Similarly, in Brazil, small local security militias originally conceived to provide 
additional private security in response to the threats from gangs have increasingly used violence as 
their primary method of operation. Instead of protecting the community they are increasingly 
considered as terrorising the local community1036 to the point that they have been considered to pose 
a similar threat to that of the gangs themselves, including running extortion rackets and 
kidnappings.1037 Considering this, it is clear that while PCMs are able to play an effective role within 
the security sector, they continue to pose significant challenges to ensuring their legality and 
                                                     
1035  Marguerite Cawley, ‘Venezuela Plans to Double Size of Civilian Militias’ Insight Crime (28 August 2013) 
<http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/venezuela-push-to-double-size-of-civilian-militias-poses-concerns> accessed 
17 February 2017. 
1036 Moritz Schuberth, ‘Challenging the Weak States Hypothesis: Vigilantism in South Africa and Brazil’  (2013) 20 
Journal of Peace, Conflict & Development 38, 46-51 <http://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/peace-conflict-and-
development/issue-20/Iss-20-Art-8-Final.pdf> accessed 24 March 2017. 
1037  Robert Muggah, ‘The State of Security and Justice in Brazil: Reviewing the Evidence’ (George Washington 
University; Elliot School of International Affairs, Working Paper no. 4, June 2016) 
<https://brazil.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/brazil.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/The%20State%20of%20Security%20and%20
Justice%20in%20Brazil-%20Reviewing%20the%20Evidence.pdf> accessed Mar 13, 2017 at 4. 
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accountability. Ensuring they operate lawfully and effectively relies upon a strong regulatory 
framework and a public authority willing and able to hold them accountable. 
 
6.5(4) Privately Seconded Paramilitary Forces 
Within the reactive form of PMSCs, the final type identified within this typological 
approach are those local public forces who are employed, either directly or indirectly by a private 
organisation. While to date little attention has been paid to this class of contractors who are largely 
considered to remain public forces, this study proposes that these be classed separately as Seconded 
Paramilitary Forces. These forces are therefore those contractors who are formed of public security 
forces who whether individually or as a whole group are funded by private actors. As such, the 
relevant criteria for grouping this class of contractors is the fact that they operate privately, that 
being for the interests of a private organisation, while maintaining a degree of the authority of the 
state.  
 
These types of PMSC are prevalent throughout much of South and Central America where 
the army and police regularly supplement their income through working for private organisations, 
often still within their official capacity as state employees. The primary concern within this type of 
arrangement lies in the democratic control of coercive forces. This difficulty is particularly 
enhanced when the state apparatus is utilised in an overtly violent manner as within reactive forces. 
The use of state apparatus for private means gives the employer a disproportionate level of influence 
over the local population relative to the size of their stake in the community. Within the conceptual 
framework identified throughout this thesis, the ability of private organisations to call upon, through 
financial means, the capabilities of the state’s coercive violence pose significant problems for 
maintaining an appropriate relationship between coercive violence and the ability to exercise power. 
Indeed, this form of PMSC raises the spectre of private organisations exercising sovereign power 
over a region, maintained purely by violent means. Furthermore, as the coercive force behind a 
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state’s power, when public security forces are seconded to a private organisation, it diminishes that 
states ability to exercise authority over that organisation in a manner equal to that of others. As 
such, it is possible that this form of PMSC is capable of effectively elevating a company or 
organisation above the law. It is clear, therefore, that this form of PMSC is inherently detrimental 
to both the democratic control over coercive violence and the rule of law.  
 
The case of Shell's use of the JTF is a prime example of this form of scenario, where through 
co-opting ostensibly public security forces, a company is able to advance its own interests, under 
the auspices of a public interest.1038 The use of the Nigerian military and police by Shell, and other 
oil companies, to suppress protests about environmental concerns and corruption essentially 
allowed Shell to advance their financial interests at the expense of the local community. Most 
significantly however, they did this in a manner that effectively allowed them no legal or political 
recourse. Similarly, the case study of Peru identified situations in which mining companies have 
controlled entire battalions of the Peruvian army and been able to influence or control the decisions 
of Peruvian military leaders. In this case, this has led to the State military being used to suppress 
the legal rights of indigenous people, including the fundamental right to self-determination within 
their lands.1039 This is almost identical to the use of Indonesian security forces by the Freeport-
McMoran corporation in order to suppress protests by the native West Papuans who have long 
claimed the Indonesian government have ignored their rights.1040  
 
Considering these examples, it is clear that this form of PMSC poses a unique difficulty for 
legal accountability and regulation. Within the conceptual framework that this study proceeds from, 
it is near impossible to state that this form of PMSC, which so fundamentally blurs the distinction 
                                                     
1038 See e.g. John Vidal, ‘Shell Oil Paid Nigerian Military to Put Down Protests, Court Documents Show’ The Guardian 
(London, 3 October 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/03/shell-oil-paid-nigerian-military> accessed 
2 June 2016. 
1039 Markets for Force, (n 469) at 57. 
1040 See e.g. Assessment Report on the Conflict in the West Papua Region of Indonesia, (University or Warwick & 
European Social Research Council, 2016); Kylie McKenna, ‘Corporate Security Practices and Human Rights In West 
Papua’ (2015) 15(4) Security & Development 395-285. 
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between power or authority, and rule through coercive violence could be legitimate. Even within 
cases in which there are legitimate reasons for this type of contractor and their actions have currently 
not been excessive or illegal, the possibility remains that they can challenge local power structures 
to the point of undermining democratic governance. Indeed, it is arguable whether any form of 
regulatory framework or avenues of legal accountability can ever effectively control this form of 
contractor, with the relationship between coercive violence and the exercise of power 
fundamentally transformed by the ability of companies to call upon the coercive apparatus of states, 
in a manner similar to that utilised during colonial periods. 1041  As the body responsible for 
establishing and enforcing the legal status of these PMSCs is directly involved in the relationship, 
it is difficult to prove that these regulations will remain applicable beyond convenience. 
Furthermore, as the instruments, or a portion of them, required for enforcing these rules are working 
for the organisation they are supposed to be enforcing against, it significantly diminishes if not 
destroys the coercive effect of the law against that one group only, effectively leaving them above 
the law.  
 
6.6 Classes of PMSCs – Defensive Violence 
The final group of classes to be considered are those who utilise defensive violence. In 
general of course, PMSCs who undertake only defensive forms of violence pose less of a direct 
threat to the rights and lives of the local community. Despite this, it remains imperative to consider 
how the variations within the stakeholder relationships are able to affect the local community and 
the ability of the state to protect the competing interests of the various stakeholders.  
 
                                                     
1041 For a discussion of this see e.g. Katerina Galai, ‘Companies of Past and Present: Lessons from the East India Company 
on the Use and Regulation of Private Forces Today’ (2016) 4(2) Legal Issues 1. 
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6.6(1) Privately Seconded Security Contractors 
The first group within these are those local public security forces who are subcontracted 
out to, or funded by, private organisations. This system classes this group as privately seconded 
security. Much as their corresponding class within “Reactive PMSCs” these are common in much 
of South and Central America, however, unlike the PSPs they are also much more prevalent in the 
global North. In particular, this form of relationship is common for cases in which private 
organisation require disproportionate security to the community as a whole. Generally, however, 
these are short-term arrangements with the most common examples including payments by Sports 
teams and performers to provide additional specific police for crowd control. Through the use of 
defensive violence, these forces do not often pose a direct threat to the protection of the local 
community. Despite this, they continue to present difficult issues when considering the role of 
coercive violence within the state. In particular, with budget cuts for central government roles like 
policing being cut almost universally across the world, the use of public services by private 
individuals raises the issue of a two-tier public safety system which rather than being utilised to 
coerce one group through inaction, is able to leave them exposed through inaction.  
 
6.6(2) Outsourced Public Security Contractors 
The second group within the defensive class are here are those private contractors, whether 
local or external, who are employed by a public authority in a manner that the public security 
services would ordinarily be expected to perform. These are one of the fastest growing groups 
within the PMSC spectrum, with governments and local authorities across the globe increasingly 
turning to private contractors to substitute for the shortfalls within their provisions. The Department 
of Homeland Security utilised over 20,000 private security guards to protect federal buildings 
across the United States, while the use of private contractors to protect foreign embassies is now 
almost universal. This “Outsourced Public Security” raises several issues for understanding the 
basic functions of the sovereign state. The decision by states to remove their monopoly over 
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legitimate coercive violence through privatising one the basic functions of statehood has raised 
general questions as to the role of the State in the 21st century. Within this study in particular, this 
poses substantial consequences for the position of state-centric international legal regimes, 
particularly human rights. The state-centric application of human rights obligations has led to 
claims that this outsourcing has weakened human rights regime. 1042  In particular, when these 
security forces break the law or over-reach their jurisdiction, without a showing of endemic or 
widespread it can be difficult to hold the government to account in the same manner as in those 
cases where the employees are directly under the authority of the government. 1043 Resultantly, this 
thesis proposes that within this class the key requirement of any regulatory approach is to ensure 
that the outsourcing of state functions cannot be undertaken with a view to reducing the legal burden 
accountability for state functions. Instead, while outsourcing may occur for a number of legitimate 
reasons, legal frameworks must be established to ensure that when this occurs, both the 
organisations exercising coercive violence on behalf of a state remain liable for their actions and 
more essentially, the State remains ultimately accountable for the actions of their agents.  
 
6.6(3) Private Security Guards 
The final group to emerge from the typology are Private Security Guards. These are those 
contractors who belong to private companies, whether local or external and are employed by private 
organisations to provide security to their operations, whether within a community in which they are 
based, or an external community entirely. As these guards rely only upon defensive violence, their 
type can be differentiated from those who exercise reactive violence, as the location of the employer 
and contractor is not a significant concern within these classes. In particular, the use of defensive 
violence alone does not represent a direct threat to the local population, and as such, the relationship 
                                                     
1042 See e.g, Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher (eds.) Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public 
Security And its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2009) 25-44; Krahmann (n 255) at 17; Malcolm K. Sparrow, Managing 
the Boundary Between Public and Private Policing (National Institute of Justice; New Perspectives in Policing, 2014) 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247182.pdf> accessed 12 February 2015 9-20; Nicole Deitelhoff, 
‘Transformation(s) of the State? The State of (Private) Security and the Security of the State’ (APSA Annual Conference, 
2009). 
1043 Chesterman & Fischer, ibid. 
273 
 
between the local community and the security personnel are less significant than where a higher 
level of violence is identified. Instead, the difficulty posed by private security guards, while more 
mundane, is related to the role of the state more generally within a local population and the ability 
of the citizens to rely upon public authorities to provide the level of security expected within a 
state.1044 This issue relates to the difficulty found when states abdicate their responsibilities under 
the traditional notions of a social contract to provide a monopoly over legitimate violence in order 
to facilitate the provision of security, both within a state’s territorial borders and against any threats 
that they may face externally. Alongside this, the presence of private actors providing security 
services, requires the government of the region to be capable of implementing and enforcing strong 
framework for ensuring accountability and regulation of these PSCs. And where necessary, the 
local population should be able to rely upon a state’s human rights obligations to ensure that they 
ensure minimum standards and establish accountability for these private actors.  
 
 
6.7 Future Application of the Classification 
When considering the future application of this classification, there remain several issues 
which must be addressed if this is to fulfil its purpose. The first of these is that as a form of 
qualitative analysis, this classification will be required to rely upon a degree of subjective analysis. 
This inevitably poses difficulties in applying the criteria in a not only a standardised, but also 
accurate manner, and defending the choices drawn throughout this. The most significant issue with 
regards to this subjectivity is experienced in distinguishing the level of violence used by a PMSC. 
This study suggests that decisions taken within this must be based on an organisational level, at 
least across the organisation within the specific location being considered. This is particularly 
                                                     
1044 See e.g. Jonas Hagmann & Moncef Kartas, ‘International Organisation and the Governance of Private Security’ in 
Bryden, Alan; Caparini, Marina (eds.). Private Actors and Security Governance, 285, 288 – 300 (Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2006) 
<http://dcaf.ch/content/download/36838/528893/file/annex_contributors.pdf> accessed Aug 21, 2016); Krahmann (n 
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challenging as this requires identifying and distinguishing the PMSC behaviour and policy, from 
individual contractor actions. Ultimately however, adopting this approach is necessary for this study 
if the cases considered drawn, and classifications thereafter identified are to be capable of drawing 
broad class-based conclusions required for an effective typology. Specifically, this approach allows 
these more comprehensive conclusions to form the basis for effective regulation, while 
simultaneously maintaining the accuracy necessary to classify PMSCs within legal systems, a 
central requirement for the effectiveness of the system.  This thesis suggests that the application of 
this requires utilising a stringent form of review in which overwhelming evidence is required for a 
PMSC to be classified as a more offensive form. This would require undertaking an objective 
analysis, balancing the available policy documents or guidelines of the PMSC or employer, against 
the verifiable data on their recurring behaviour, in order to accurately and factually classify the 
PMSC as a whole. Considering the Niger Delta example therefore, whilst Shell’s policy guidelines 
suggest that all contractors maintain minimum behavioural standards, overwhelming evidence 
exists that certain contractors used violence as a means, rather than a reaction. Bearing in mind that 
Shell’s funding continued after substantial evidence of the militia activity it is reasonable to 
conclude that whether by design or willful ignorance, the purpose was to employ offensive violence 
for their own benefit.  
 
Alongside this. difficulties will undoubtedly be encountered in trying to classify both the 
PMSC and employer as local or external actors. Overwhelmingly MNCs utilise a web of local, and 
international legal entities to organise their activities with a host of legitimate reasons to support 
this approach. Resultantly, however, the distinction between local and external actors is rarely as 
precise as first expected. This is particularly obvious in the case of employers, where several layers 
of corporations and corporate ownership can exist to blur the relationship between directly related 
firms. However, the case studies in both Peru and Nigeria identify this problem with international 
PMSCs registering local subsidiaries in order to bypass national legislation, with many PMSCs 
exhibiting features of both local and external forces. It is therefore necessary to form an appropriate 
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approach for both employer and contractor. The central aspect of this is ensuring that the approach 
fulfils the requirements of this typology and as a result, it is necessary to return to the purpose of 
the criteria in order to consider how these distinctions should be drawn.  
 
As a result, the approaches for judging the type of contractor, and the type of employer will 
necessarily vary to align with the divergent purposes of the criteria. The purpose of identifying the 
employer as local or external has been identified as “establishing whether the interests being 
protected are held by an organisation with links to the local community most likely affected by the 
actions of the PMSC.”1045 This was particularly identified as the remoteness of external actors 
allows them to insulate their operation from local pressures increasing the possibility that their 
operations run counter to the local population's interests and that their respective employment of 
PMSCs is seeking to exercise a coercive violence in order to protect these interests. The central 
factor within this criterion therefore is identifying the location of the primary financial beneficiaries 
of the employer’s actions, and the location at which decisions based upon these financial interests 
are primarily made. As an example of this, while Shell’s business in Nigeria is conducted through 
local subsidiaries, the primary financial interests stemming from the business in Nigeria remains 
with the parent company based registered in London. As such, the beneficiaries of the interests that 
Shell’s use of PMSCs are seeking to protect are not of the local community, but external and 
detached entities. For the purpose of this typology, taking into account the rationale behind 
including the identity of the employer within this, Shell would have to be considered an external 
actor, despite operating through a local company.  
 
When constructing the typology the rationale for the inclusion of the location of the 
contractors is similarly based on the ability for the contractor to insulate themselves from the 
concern of local populations. This was particularly the case as local contractors are likely to share 
                                                     
1045 Supra at Section 6.3(3)(a) 
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community relations, experiences and even familial ties with those affected by their actions and are 
therefore likely to be more restrained in their use of coercive violence. As such, despite the similar 
wording to employer criteria, this typology requires a different interpretation of the distinction 
between local and external contractors. Specifically, unlike the employer, the decisive factor is not 
the overall base of the company but rather the location of the individuals who are responsible for 
directly exercising coercive violence. Ultimately, however, even this distinction can be difficult to 
draw as the extent to which a contractor is representative of the population they are working within 
can vary vastly between regions. As such, the use foreign contractors in the United States American 
would be less problematic, if they were from the UK for example, than the use of national 
contractors would in other countries. For example, the use of Iraqi Shia paramilitaries by the Iraqi 
government have been subject to significant scrutiny for their role in sectarian violence and reprisals 
against Sunni communities. There cannot, therefore, be a one size fits all approach to differentiating 
between local and external with a subjective element clearly necessary. While nationality plays an 
important role, more localised considerations must similarly be considered alongside ethnic, tribal 
and religious considerations. Fundamental to this is a question of intention in choosing the location 
of their employees, with this decision resting on subjective elements. While employing contractors 
from a foreign country amount to external contractors, this can similarly be the case if the 
contractors are chosen from a different region in the same country. Within this scenario, the 
question therefore, turns on whether the contractors were chosen due to their disassociation from 
the population in which they are operating, as opposed to alternative legitimate reasons most 
notably economic factors, unemployment etc. This requires considering the overall trend within the 
contractors as opposed to individual situations or individuals.  
 
6.8 Concluding Remarks on the Typology  
This section has sought to present a classification method through which PMSC activity 
can be more effectively identified and grouped, in a manner that accurately considers the unique 
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nature of each situation. Specifically, it is suggested that through the application of this method, 
future attempts to design and implement regulatory frameworks may be more targeted, and 
therefore successful, than current approaches. It is proposed that through adopting the typological 
framework identified within this method this study is able to identify and categorise PMSC activity 
in a manner that accurately reflects the operative characteristics and relationships that highlight 
potential difficulties or risks within their behaviour. Through addressing the severance of the 
exercise of violence from the local population, this approach examines the use of PMSCs in a 
manner that identifies the key relationships within modern PMSC use and provides a framework 
from which these can be examined. Through the application of this methodological approach, 
regulatory frameworks can be formulated in a more focused and targeted manner. In particular, 
through identifying and addressing the non-linear relationship between host populations, the 
employer and the contractor this approach is able to compensate for traditional difficulties in 
regulating PMSCs. Furthermore, utilising this approach increases the ability for future regulatory 
examinations to interact with traditional state-centric systems, including human rights, to establish 
legal and social accountability in a targeted manner and effective manner.  
 
This thesis believes that this classification system will provide several key advantages over 
current attempts to distinguish or classify PMSCs. The first of these is that rather than relying solely 
upon the self-identification of the PMSC as many approaches have, this classification seeks to 
establish an empirical basis from which to distinguish types of PMSCs. The method presented 
within this chapter therefore, does not focus on arbitrarily distinctions between PMSCs based solely 
upon whether their operations are presented as military or security. Considering the increasingly 
ambiguous distinction between these two classes, the method adopted instead seeks to focus upon 
both the relationship between the host population and PMSC, and factual evidence of their activity 
as more indicative of the nature of the PMSCs activity. Through identifying the behavioural trends 
of PMSCs it is able to accurately reflect the manner in which the contractors operate. 
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Additionally, through identifying the relationship between the host population, PMSC and 
employer, this classification draws upon the conceptual framework to identify potential disconnects 
within traditional civil-security relationship. Through emphasising the ability of PSMCs to change 
the balance of power structures within societies and undermine traditional modes of public 
accountability.  This approach to the classification is able to both identify their potential to directly 
affect the local population, but also highlight the secondary impacts of their use. The use of non-
linear organisational structures can negatively affect attempts to establish local public 
accountability or increase the corporate responsibility of companies within their spheres of 
operation. Furthermore, these relationships can give an insight into the ability of private violence 
to exert undue influence over communities, particularly with regard to economic development and 
extractive concessions. Specifically, this classification provides a tool for analysing the propensity 
of certain types of PMSC, to be utilised to circumvent local attitudes, legal accountability and even 
direct action, in order to protect the interests of one party against another.  
 
Finally, it is hoped that by focusing upon not only the direct actions of PMSCs, but also on 
the wider context in which they operate, this classification system will facilitate the examination of 
the long-term societal effects their activities can have, and enhance the wider discussion as to the 
nature of the relationship between legitimate violence and legitimate power.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
  
CONCLUDING SUMMARY AND  
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
Private military and security contractors lie at the intersection of many lines of inquiry that 
have come to dominate the international arena of the 21st century. They question the “Westphalian” 
system that has underpinned centuries of development in international law and sit within the growth 
of the movement towards globalisation and the perceived erosion, or dispersion of democratic 
accountability that accompanies it. Their operations often highlight the increasingly blurred line 
between civilian and military and the potentially arbitrary legal distinctions drawn in relation to 
“armed conflict.”  
 
It is against the background of these distinct yet inter-related issues that this study has 
sought to examine the privatisation of coercive violence. This study has therefore sought to identify 
the practical implications of the proliferation of PMSCs for international law and the protection of 
human rights. By adopting an original theoretical perspective, reconsidering how coercive violence 
interacts with conceptions of sovereign power, it has sought to identify not just ramifications of 
privatisation within existing legal frameworks, but also consider the suitability of these approaches 
through the conceptual lens of legitimacy.  
 
 This research was shaped heavily by an uncomfortableness with the dominance of theories 
regarding the state monopoly over coercive violence and a perceived priori suitability of this as a 
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foundation for the evaluation of PMSCs. Specifically, relatively new theories, primarily grounded 
on the notion of strong and equal nation-states, that often implicitly placed violent coercion as the 
arbiter of legitimacy appeared inappropriate as the basis for a study on PMSCs. Instead, this thesis 
sought to undertake an original analysis of PMSCs through a detailed theoretical and empirical 
examination of the historical relationship between coercive violence and maintenance of power. 
Using this context, the thesis aimed to critique existing legal and regulatory frameworks and 
propose an original approach to the classification of PMSCs in a manner that identifies the operative 
characteristics that affect their roles within both legal and power structures. Specifically, it aimed 
to identify the criteria necessary for an accurate and comprehensive examination of PMSC activities 
with reference to established concepts of power, accountability and governance.  
 
7.2 Concluding Summary of the Research 
In approaching this, the research was split into six sections. Chapter One sought to examine 
the role of coercive violence within notions of sovereignty. Noting the ubiquity of Max Weber’s, 
sovereign monopoly over violence, as a starting point for examinations of PMSCs the work seeks 
to identify the function of violence within this formulation. In doing so it found that across the 
political spectrum, the control over violence has been seen as a legitimate form of top-down 
coercion from which sovereignty derives its power. Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s Critique of 
Violence it sought to illustrate the problems with this approach, noting that the resort to violence as 
a foundation for power establishes the environment in which authoritarianism can flourish. This 
study therefore suggested adopting Hannah Arendt’s distinction between and violence and power 
as a framework for critically analysing the impact of PMSCs. It concluded by establishing that 
within this framework, PMSCs must be recognised for the potentially subversive nature of their 
activities, noting that they offer the ability to insulate the sovereign from the consequences of their 
actions. This has the potential to allow illegitimate power to flourish while disregarding the political 
and civil rights of their citizens.  
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Having established this theoretical framework, Chapter Two sought to undertake a 
historical study of the relationship between coercive violence and power, in order to provide 
empirical support, the conclusions drawn in Chapter One. It showed that while the modern 
European state evolved from the competing polities of city-states and feudal kingdoms they shared 
a common need for private violence. As this form of mercenarism became widespread throughout 
Europe, with authoritarian rulers relying upon it to enforce and extend their authority, it increasingly 
threatened their position often undermining and in some cases deposing the ruling class. The study 
showed that while states had sort to limit this subversive potential by monopolising coercive 
violence, this only became possible following the growth of the social contract. It was the 
establishment of corresponding rights to their pre-existing responsibilities that led to citizens 
vesting their collective violence in a unified sovereign. This proposition was advanced in support 
the conclusions drawn in Chapter One that the ability to exercise of coercive violence should not 
be considered the defining feature of legitimate power. Instead, rather than the monopoly over 
coercive violence making a sovereign, it was only when citizens empowered a legitimate sovereign 
that they renounced their claim to their personal violence. This proposition was supported further 
by drawing comparison with populations who remained tyrannically subjugated. In both the 
institutions of slavery and the colonial empire a form of pure, and often external, violence was 
employed to maintain illegitimate rule over a population.     
 
Considering the development of an assumed state monopoly over coercive violence, 
Chapter Three sought to position the growth of PMSCs and the increasing legitimisation of their 
activities. It identified a combination of both practical and ideological factors that created the 
environment in which PMSCs have thrived. Central to many of these factors is the globalisation of 
world politics and the corresponding growth of supranational and multi-national institutions. 
Having established the environment in which PMSCs grew Chapter Four traced the practical effects 
of their growth. The first section of this demonstrated how globalisation and the growth of MNCs 
282 
 
had corresponded to an expansion in private security. Parallel to this, increasing insecurity and state 
weakness following the end of the cold war created a vacuum into which first mercenaries and then 
private military companies moved and as the demand for security grew private actors became 
considered to be increasingly legitimate. The second section of Chapter Four therefore presented 
three country case studies on the presence and role of PMSCs. Examining Peru, Nigeria and 
Afghanistan demonstrated the wide array of private actors now involved in the global security 
market. These case studies were designed to provide an empirical basis against which to scrutinise 
current modes of accountability and regulatory frameworks, identifying the difficulties with such 
disparate entities being collectivised under the umbrella term of PMSCs. Similarly, it demonstrated 
that many ostensibly private entities are ignored by the majority examinations despite their central 
role in many countries security sectors, primarily local private security groups who often fulfil a 
tradition function of the state outside of existing legal and regulatory frameworks.  
 
Chapter Four used these case studies to provide factual data against which existing legal 
and regulatory frameworks were critically analysed. Among these were the doctrines of state 
responsibility and international criminal law. Both offered opportunities for holding not only the 
PMSC but also potentially their employers accountable for the actions. However, it was found that 
despite their potential suitability a range of legal and political factors had largely blunted their 
effectiveness. Establishing intent was shown to be particularly difficult for the employers of 
PMSCs, creating a situation where ignorance, and ambiguous working practices or relationships, 
are beneficial and capable of removing liability from PMSC clients. Beyond these legal approaches, 
Chapter Four examined the most influential international regulatory approaches within the PMSC 
market. While both the Montreux Document and ICoC are positive steps towards establishing a 
normative framework for PMSCs the Chapter identified key weaknesses within these. For the 
Montreux Document, many of these weaknesses stemmed directly from its basis in the existing 
legal doctrine of state responsibility. In comparison, the ICoC adopts a more direct approach to 
PMSCs, focussing on companies however, considering the state-centric nature of international law 
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the enforcement and punishment mechanisms within the ICoC remain limited and rely instead upon 
clients refusing to engage with non-compliant companies. More fundamentally, it is questionable 
whether regulatory frameworks drawn up largely in response to calls from western populations are 
a suitable standard to be imposed as a uniform approach on global populations, with the omission 
of economic, social and cultural rights indicative of the western focus of these regulatory 
frameworks.  
 
Considering the limitations of existing avenues of accountability and regulatory regimes 
this study identifies the need for a more focused and specific approach to confronting the 
privatisation of violence. Noting that the range and type of actors falling under the umbrella term 
PMSC were too broad to be effective and that the common division between PMC and PSC often 
drew arbitrary distinctions between otherwise similar actors, this study sought to extricate an 
original classification system. In order to do this, the research drew upon the theoretical framework 
established and investigated in the first two chapters and combined this with the data derived from 
the case studies and the subsequent analysis of existing approaches. Through this approach the 
Chapter sought to develop a more complete and systematic classification system. To achieve this, 
the study adopted a typological methodology identified the operative distinctions between PMSCs 
with reference to the effects on accountability and power structures. Specifically, the study noted 
the importance of the identity of the PMSC, the identity of the client and level of violence utilised 
and identified eleven variations within these categories. Through a process of reduction, the forty-
eight potential variations were grouped into nine final types of PMSC. The effect of this process 
was to produce an empirically based classification system which categorises PMSCs in a specific 
and accurate manner with reference to their ability to impact upon the human rights of host 
populations and the extent to which coercive violence may be used to replace legitimate power.  
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7.3 Notable Research Outcomes and Implications 
From the outset, a central aim of this investigation was to adopt an original position in the 
debate surrounding the privatisation of coercive violence. It aimed to re-examine the common 
consensus that the use of PMSCs is primarily an issue for the state monopoly over coercive violence 
which, while often not explicitly acknowledged, is philosophically predicated largely upon the 
belief that at its foundation sovereign power is derived from the ability to enforce obedience through 
violence. This work was able to demonstrate that this is not a suitable basis for examining the effects 
of PMSCs which are able to not only exercise private violence, but also externalise if from the host 
population. Through a reading of the works of Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt this research 
was able to re-examine this relationship with a focus on identifying a more acceptable foundation 
for legitimate power. Adopting the Arendtian perspective that power and violence are axiomatic 
allowed the research to highlight the more foundational issues with PMSCs. Within this 
interpretation, the legitimate power of a sovereign is derived by virtue of their empowerment by the 
citizens, who retain the ability to withdraw this support at any point, delegitimising the sovereign. 
Accordingly, citizen security services provided an essential set of checks and balances upon the 
state monopoly on violence, allowing for its removal when it was abused. The use of PMSCs 
fundamentally undermines this reciprocal relationship. The import of external violence, free from 
the consequences of their actions, circumvents this inbuilt accountability and has the potential to 
subvert legitimate power. A historical examination of the use of coercive violence supports this 
conclusion, illustrating that illegitimate rule as a result of its inherent weakness, must rely upon 
private and external coercive violence in order to maintain this position. Traced from the Egyptian 
Pharaohs to the British Empire, unaccountable and autocratic regimes have almost universally 
relied upon external violence to suppress internal power. Through an original synthesis of 
theoreticians and historical analysis it is this under-examined phenomenon that the research 
demonstrated lies at the heart of the questions posed by the proliferation of PMSCs. Considering 
this, it is suggested that in the future, examinations of PMSCs must take note of the unique nature 
of coercive violence in order to effectively address the issues that this poses. While previous 
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literature has often alluded to the state monopoly on violence, rarely has the nature or purpose of 
the coercive violence been addressed, instead often being presented without examination or 
analysis. Going forward, the function of coercive violence as an independent concept must take a 
more central role within an analysis of PMSCs. The research proposes that in future the assumption 
that coercive violence is incumbent within legitimate power should be explicitly rejected as the 
ability to detach violence from its political setting undermines the mechanisms of accountability 
historically integral to this claim.   
 
 Alongside the theoretical study of PMSCs, this research produced a detailed investigation 
into the current market for security services, providing a unique empirical basis for an analysis of 
existing regulatory frameworks. By examining the security sectors in three divergent regions the 
research was able to draw upon substantial empirical data against which to test both existing 
regulatory approaches and modes of accountability within international law. The doctrine of state 
responsibility was shown as a plausible approach to confronting some of the most egregious PMSC 
activities. The practical application however was found to be limited by the current requirement for 
a state to exercise “effective control” in order to engage liability with many of the case studies 
demonstrating the restrictiveness of this approach to actual circumstances. This approach was found 
to be increasingly inefficacious as modern command structures and increasing combination of 
public and private actors have blurred the traditional state hierarchies upon which this approach 
was developed. Using the analysis of the PMSC environment, the work demonstrated how the less 
stringent “overall control” test could be incorporated into the doctrine of state responsibility in order 
to broaden the range of situations under which a state could be held liable for the actions of a PMSC. 
Importantly, it considered how in light of the increasing support for this approach, adopting it would 
not significantly affect or undermine the legitimacy of the legal regime. Similarly, drawing upon 
the empirical case studies, the work was able to demonstrate that adopting innovative approaches 
to modes of liability could transform international criminal law into a vehicle capable of confronting 
the increasing use of PMSCs. The study found that adopting approaches that were designed to 
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ensure that the most culpable are held criminally liable, would similarly provide the opportunity to 
establish criminal liability for those most responsible for the actions of PMSCs. Finally, this 
empirical data was used to demonstrate the deficiencies within current international approaches to 
the regulation of PMSCs. Both the contents and the application of the Montreux Document and the 
ICoC, while positive steps in recognising the needs for regulation of private violence, are 
substantially limited in their effectiveness by the arbitrary distinctions they draw based upon where 
PMSCs operate and how they are classified. Furthermore, the study suggested that while self-
regulation and the UN Guiding Principles may be adequate for some multi-national industries, the 
unique nature of PMSCs, particularly noting the conceptual framework that this study espouses, 
means that top-down regulation should not be considered appropriate.   
 
 Finally, and most significantly, this research produced an entirely original typological 
approach for the classification of PMSCs. This drew together the multiple lines of inquiry 
throughout this study, incorporating the conceptual framework and the findings from the empirical 
data in order to establish the framework for this typology. The outcome of this approach was to 
identify nine specific “classes” of PMSCs, representing the clearest and substantial divisions 
between the numerous types of PMSCs. Specifically, each class was deemed to compose of actors 
who by virtue of the manner in which they operate and the effect that these operations may have on 
the host community, share sufficient characteristics as to give each group an individual nature. It is 
intended that this will allow each class to be studied and regulated together without losing the 
specificity or each class,  over-generalising or drawing arbitrary distinctions.  
 
7.4 Recommendations for Further Research 
 This research began with the aim to reposition the current debate regarding the use of 
private violence, and more significantly, the role of the state monopoly over coercive violence as a 
feature of sovereignty. There remains significant scope within this aspect of the research to expand 
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upon this analysis. In future, for example, individual case studies may benefit from a broader 
assessment within this conceptual framework in order to examine not just the individual PMSCs 
but the structural basis upon which the privatisation of violence has been advanced. 
 
The typology produced within this thesis was designed with the explicit intention to foster 
future research. In particular, while the study briefly examined the future regulatory approaches 
that this typology could support the primary intention within this piece was to establish the 
conceptual framework and collect sufficient empirical data that the method could be rigorously 
analysed and the rationale could be factually verified. Considering this, there remains significant 
scope for the development of this approach from a more doctrinal basis. Such research would likely 
take the form of testing current international law approaches to specific classes within the research. 
This was alluded to in the final chapter as the research considered how state responsibility may 
interact with different classes of PMSCs in particular, those within the reactive range. Similarly, it 
was suggested that the offensive range of PMSCs may frequently interact with international 
criminal law, and future research into adapting or establishing new modes of accountability could 
be beneficial in confronting the growth of private violence that shows no signs of abating.  
 
While the typology was produced within an international framework, it would equally 
benefit in future from an analysis of how it interacts with the internal legal mechanisms of the state. 
The benefits proposed for this typological method are equally applicable to specific states and as a 
result, would provide a framework against which to analyse individual security markets and identify 
any issues within these.  
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